

HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION.

This summary is intended to furnish a concise history of events in the East from the beginning of the present century till now, with especial reference to Afghanistan and India. It will confine itself, as nearly as possible, to a record of prominent facts, of the political relations between England and Russia, and of the course of general policy necessitated by our position in India, leading up, as briefly as possible, to her present and future prospects as affected by the advances of Russia.

Special reference will be made to the events of 1836-39, and the explanations during that period between the English and Russian Cabinets; to the policy pursued towards Afghanistan in the four distinct periods of 1836, 1854, 1865, and 1868; to the active movements of Russia in Asia in 1838-39, 1864-68, and 1873, in contravention of peaceful declarations made just before those movements; to the general external policy inaugurated since 1869 towards the States surrounding India, not omitting brief references to Persia and Turkey, and a summary of the second and third series of explanations between England and Russia in 1865 and 1869-71, with remarks on the present political situation as affecting India.

Although the subjects thus enumerated may be enlarged upon *ad infinitum*, the object of this memorandum is rather to refer to them briefly as historical facts requiring the consideration of the Secretary of State, by whose desire the paper is drawn up, with such occasional observations as may connect up, with such occasional observations as may connect the threads of a complicated and ever changing question.

It may be interesting to remember that the first Russian invasion of Asia was made in 1581. The Russian colonies of Perna were at that period subject to constant inroads from the neighbouring tribes of Siberia; they engaged the services of the Cossacks of the Don to free them from their enemies; they drove back the Siberians, and by 1587 established themselves in a country extending to Tobolsk. Thus the first conquest in Asia, commenced by private enterprise, was adopted and perfected by the Russian Government, and the reasons assigned for it were the same as those ever since adopted—the necessity for protecting a front

Russian Advances
in Asia. War
Office, 1873.
1581.

tier population against predatory and barbarous tribes.

Under successive Czars fresh additions were made to Russian conquest in Asia, until in 1689 she reached Kiatchia and the River Amour, and in 1734 had placed her first foot in Turkestan territory by establishing herself on the Khirgese steppes.

While Russia was thus obtaining possession of the inhospitable regions of the North, England, through the enterprise of her merchants, gained a more genial footing in the south.

This is not the place for recounting the glorious deeds of British arms, which, whilst Russia was obliged to content herself with sending ill-fated expeditions to Khiva, conquered one by one the warlike and powerful races of Hindostan, establishing, without rival and without remonstrance, an empire which has grown to be the greatest diadem in her Crown, nearly wrested from her at one time by France, and coveted, since the days of Peter the Great, by Russia.

"Whoever shall reign there," so ran the supposed will of the Czar, "will be the real sovereign of the world." How well Russia has obeyed the orders of her master to "approach as much as possible to Constantinople and India; to excite incessant wars, sometimes in Persia and sometimes in Turkey; to seek and keep up with care the alliance of Austria; to endeavour to make one side or the other beg for her assistance, and to exercise a sort of protection over countries which shall pave the way for future dominion; to neutralize Austria's jealousy at the conquest of Constantinople," &c., &c., is a matter of history, which, but for the opposition of England, might have been one of success.

Although Russia and France had indeed projected a combined expedition against India,* by the Caspian Sea, of 70,000 men, an expedition which might, under ordinary circumstances, have been successful, yet its abandonment on account of the Peninsular War, and the relinquishment of further hostile designs, left no ground for diplomatic collision or interchange of explanations between England and Russia until 1838.

Passing over, therefore, the events in European and Indian history which intermediately took place, it is necessary to address ourselves exclusively to a study of events which, by an interchange of views, forced us for the first time to admit the equality of Russia with ourselves in ruling the destinies of the East.

England was between 1800 and 1838 in the zenith of her power. Whilst holding undisputed supremacy on the seas, she had added largely to her colonial possessions, and extended her Indian Empire up to the Punjab and Scinde, besides exercising influence in Persia and supremacy in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.

1689.

Michell's Russian Military Expedition to Khiva in 1717. 1873. Sarau's Russian Commercial Mission, 1872.

Cabal Question, by Transindicus Olim. 1869.

1808.

* The expedition was arranged by the Treaty of Tobit, between France and Russia. The route chosen was from the Caspian to Herat, Candahar, and the Helan Pass. The force was to be augmented by Turcoman, Cossack, and other irregular subsidiary allies. (Mons. de Warren's "L'Inde Anglaise," Vol. 6, page 225.) It compelled us to send Elphinstone to Cabul, to contract an alliance with that country to assist India in event of invasion. We had shortly before entered into a like alliance with Persia to assist us in case of an Afghan invasion!

Vide p. 32,
McNeill's Progress of Russia in the East. 1854.

Treaty of Goolistan, 1814.

Governor-General's Declaration, Simla, 1st Aug. 1838. Parl. Papers, 1839.

Mr. McNeill to Lord Auckland, 11th April 1838. Parl. Papers, 1839.

Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston, 1st Aug. 1838. Parl. Papers, 1839.

Russia, on the other hand, had made less way beyond annexing the Crimea,—by treachery and the slaughter of 30,000 Tartars,—partially subduing the Caucasus, and possessing herself of some of the northern provinces of Persia, besides the exclusive navigation of the Caspian, and the establishment of a port at Krasnovodsk (1819) on the eastern shore of that sea.

The influence which she gained at Teheran in 1830 led her for the first time into active interference with British interests, as may be seen from the following brief narrative of facts.

Towards the latter end of 1836, Lord Auckland sent Captain (since Sir Alexander) Burnes on a mission to Cabul, ostensibly for commercial, but in reality for political, purposes.

No sooner had our Agent arrived at his destination than the rumours of a Persian attack on Herat, which had led to the Mission, became a practical fact.

Count Simonich, the Russian Ambassador at Teheran, had prevailed on the Shah to undertake an expedition against Herat (1837), notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of the British Minister; and, furthermore, aided him with money, promises, Russian Officers, and a contingent of Russian deserters.

The constant and unexpected reverses of the Perso-Russian troops before Herat so completely disappointed the Shah as to incline him at length to listen to the advice of the British Minister relative to raising the siege and terminating the war, but the sudden arrival of Count Simonich himself at the Herat camp (20th April 1838) at once put an end to all hopes of such a fortunate contingency.

The Russian Ambassador, acting openly as the military adviser of the Shah, employed the Officers of his Mission in the construction of new batteries, furnished further sums of money to the Persian troops, and by his countenance and advice confirmed the Shah in his resolution to persevere in hostilities, obliging the British Minister, tired of vain remonstrances, to leave the camp. At the same moment an "unknown Captain of Cossacks," Captain Vicovich, rode up to Cabul, without pomp or retinue, with letters from the Russian Emperor and Count Simonich, and by specious promises of Russian support and Persian assistance against the Sikhs to the Dost, superseded the influence of Captain Burnes, and obliged him to leave Cabul in disgust without having effected the commercial or political objects of his mission.

Count Simonich, whilst superintending the siege of Herat, concluded a treaty with the Sirdars of Candahar (July 1838) guaranteeing to them, under Russian seal, the possession of Candahar and Herat under nominal Persian suzerainty.

The British Ambassador described the effect of this treaty as making Russia, "in the event of the

"fall of Herat, indisputable mistress of the destinies, political and commercial, of all Central Asia, for Great Britain having been forced back to the Indus, Khiva and Bokhara must submit if attacked, whilst Persia and Afghanistan will already be at her disposal."

Through the indomitable pluck, however, of one single British Officer, Eldred Pottinger, who at times, when all seemed lost, dragged the faint-hearted Yar Mahomed to the rescue, the Persian storming parties were again and again repulsed; indeed, in one assault (24th June 1838) the Russian battalion which led the forlorn hope was beaten back with the loss of its leader, General Borowski, and 250 men.

On the success of the siege of Herat depended the launching of a Russian expedition against Khiva and Bokhara, and we may well understand the dismay with which the news of the failure of the siege and the retirement of the Persian forces from before Herat (9th September 1838) was received by the Russian Cabinet.

Viscount Palmerston's Note, 26th Oct. 1838. Parl. Papers, 1839.

So seriously, however, was the hostile attitude of Russia viewed in England, that Lord Palmerston addressed a Note to the Russian Cabinet, requesting an explanation of circumstances which had "an important bearing upon the relations between Russia and Great Britain."

Viscount Palmerston's Note as above.

"It appears," wrote Lord Palmerston, "that whereas Russia has of late years invariably professed a desire to concert with Great Britain the course of policy which the two Governments pursue with regard to Persia, so that the identity of their measures might be a manifest proof of their friendship and union, Russian Agents in Persia and Afghanistan have lately been engaged in measures studiously concealed from the British Government, and planned in a spirit unfriendly to Great Britain and for objects hostile to her interests."

Our Ambassador was instructed to express a hope that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg would see in this communication "a fresh proof of the anxious desire of the British Government to maintain unimpaired the friendly relations which so happily subsist between the two countries, because explanations sought for in frankness and in a friendly spirit tend to remove misunderstanding and to preserve harmony between nations."

Count Nesselrode replied to this note in a lengthy Despatch. He commenced by saying that,—

"The idea of assailing the security and the tranquillity of the state of possession of Great Britain in India had never presented itself and will never present itself to the mind of our August Master. He desires only what is just and what is possible. For this twofold reason he cannot entertain any combination whatever directed against the British power in India. It would not be just, because nothing would have given cause for it; it would

Count Nesselrode to Russian Ambassador in London, 1st Nov. 1838. Parl. Papers, 1839.

"not be possible, by reason of the immense distance which separates us, the sacrifices which must be made, the difficulties which must be overcome, and all this to realize an adventurous scheme which could never be in accordance with sound and reasonable policy. A single glance at the map ought to be sufficient to dissipate, in this respect, all prejudice, and to convince every impartial and enlightened man that no hostile design against England can direct the policy of our Cabinet in Asia."

He proceeded to explain, that Count Simonich, far from being ordered to oppose British interests at Herat, had received the Emperor's instructions to induce the Shah to come to a peaceful understanding; and further, that the Persian Government had been actually called upon by the Emperor, during the progress of the siege, to dismiss the battalion of Russian deserters. Count Nesselrode explained and excused the active part which the Russian Ambassador had taken in the siege, as well as the Candahar Treaty and the mission of Captain Vicovich to Cabul. He pointed out that Count Simonich had been re-called from his post, and concluded with the following declaration,—

"Great Britain, like Russia, must have at heart the same interest, that of maintaining peace in the centre of Asia, and of avoiding the occurrence of a general conflagration in that vast portion of the globe. To prevent this great calamity, it is necessary carefully to maintain the tranquillity of the intermediate countries which separate the possessions of Russia from that of Great Britain; to consolidate the tranquillity of those countries, not to excite them against each other by nourishing their mutual animosities; to be contented with competing in industry, but not to engage in a struggle for political influence; finally, beyond everything else, to respect the independence of the intermediate countries which separate us. Such is, in our opinion, the system which the two Cabinets have a common interest invariably to pursue, in order to prevent the possibility of a conflict between two Great Powers which, that they may remain friends, require not to touch each other, and not to come into collision with each other in the centre of Asia."

Lord Palmerston, replying to this Despatch, said, that although there were passages in it which, under other circumstances, Her Majesty's Government would have felt it their duty to notice, yet, as matters stood, they preferred letting those passages go by as belonging to discussions then happily closed, on the reservation that silence did not imply acquiescence. Lord Palmerston expressed the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government accepted the declarations of the Imperial Cabinet that it did not harbour any designs hostile

* The Russian Government were also obliged to disavow the proceedings of Vicovich, and the large sums he expended at Cabul. He returned to Russia and put an end to his life.

* Italic in original.

Lord Palmerston to Russian Ambassador in London, 20th Dec. 1838. Parl. Papers, 1839.

to the interests of Great Britain in India and Persia, and he added,—

“ If such shall continue to be the policy of Russia, and if her Agents in the East shall faithfully obey their instructions, there seems every reason to hope that nothing can hereafter occur in those quarters that can be calculated to disturb the good understanding between the two countries.”

Count Nesselrode, on being subsequently informed that the question was about to form the subject of serious discussion in the British Parliament, wrote a second Despatch repeating emphatically his former declarations, announcing the refusal of the Emperor to ratify the Candahar Treaty, and containing an intimation that Count Simonich's successor at Teheran had received orders to declare to the Shah as well as to the Affghans,—

“ That the compact which his predecessor had guaranteed had not received the sanction of our August Master.

“ That the intention of the Emperor has been, and will continue to be, not to maintain with Affghanistan any other than purely commercial relations;

“ That his wishes have been ill expressed or ill understood if any political tendency whatever has been attached to them;

“ Finally, that Russia will not take any part in the civil wars of the Affghan Chiefs nor in their family feuds, which have no claim to our intervention.”

Count Nesselrode concluded his Despatch by repeating the declaration expressed in his former one as to the policy of the two Cabinets being—

“ To abstain from disturbing the tranquillity of the people of the centre of Asia by nourishing their animosities; to be contented with competing in industry in these vast countries, but not to engage in a struggle for political influence; to respect the independence of the intermediate countries which separate us; such is, we once again repeat, the system which England and Russia have a common interest invariably to pursue in order to prevent the possibility of a conflict between these great Powers which, that they may remain friends, require to remain each within its own limits, and not to advance against each other in the centre of Asia.”

Such were the official explanations between the English and Russian Cabinets on their relations in Central Asia more than thirty years ago. They are worthy of consideration, as showing the true policy by which the two Powers ought to have been guided. They were immediately followed by two warlike expeditions, one launched against Afghanistan* by England, the other against Khiva by Russia. This result may be laid to heart as assisting us to realize

Count Nesselrode
to Russian Am-
bassador in Lon-
don, 5th March
1839. Parl.
Papers, 1839

* The expedition against Afghanistan assembled on the Indus on 10th January 1839, and marched on Candahar. The Khiva expedition started under Perofski on the 27th November 1839. The Affghan war was executed by the schemes of the Russians before Herat; that of Khiva was executed by the English operations in Afghanistan, &c. The Khiva expedition had, however, been in preparation five years previously.

the worthlessness of similar more recent engagements.

Reviewing the events of 1836-39, it cannot be denied that they were unfortunate in their issues for both Russia and England.

Russia had, under the guise of friendly assistance to Persia, secretly planned the fall of Herat, the Candahar Treaty, and the establishment of its influence at Cabul, to be followed by long-prepared expeditions against Khiva and Bokhara. The unexpected defeat of the Persians before Herat, wholly due to a single British Officer, upset this well organized scheme, and compelled the Russian Government not only to disavow the proceedings of her Minister at Teheran, but to tear up the Treaty, and to publish declarations which, however outwardly frank, were virtually embarrassing, inconvenient, and known to be distasteful, to her.

On the other hand, the open interference of Russia practically caused the failure of Burne's Mission at Cabul, and so alarmed Lord Auckland as to hurry him into a policy which, however well intentioned, was badly conceived and unfortunate in its termination.

Whilst wisely desiring, in the light of past events, to see a strong and friendly Government established at Cabul, he, as unwisely, sought to carry out this policy by armed intervention (1838), which drove our best friend the Dost from the country, forcibly established on the throne an unpopular Ruler, made our name hateful to the Afghans, and, notwithstanding our easy occupation of the country, ended (1842), through the fault of an incompetent Commander, in disaster and extermination.

Our newly acquired Russian allies sared, however, no better, for a second disaster had previously occurred in another part of Central Asia.

Count Nesselrode, hearing of the advance of the English into Afghanistan, quickly seized the opportunity to throw over his peaceful declarations, and hurried on General Perolski (1839) to destruction in an ill-fated expedition against Khiva.

It is impossible and unnecessary to enter here into the details of that sad expedition, nor of the later but still more sad disasters in Cabul. It is sufficient for us to lament the delusive words of peace of two Powers who, before the ink was dry, launched warlike expeditions far from calculated to preserve the "tranquillity or independence" of the countries lying between their respective limits.

The failure of the Khiva expedition forced Russia to relinquish for years the long cherished dream, bequeathed to her by Peter the Great,* of annexing that Khanate and establishing a hold over the commerce of Turkestan and Western China, whilst our own disastrous occupation of Afghanistan gave rise to a distrust and hatred in that country from which we have never since been able to recover.

Vide Russian Military Expedition to Khiva, 1839. Calcutta, 1867.

Vide Kayes War in Afghanistan, 1841. Eyre's Retrospect of the Afghan War. 1869.

* Peter the Great died in 1725. One of his great schemes was to establish his authority on the shores of the Caspian and in Turkestan. During the eighteenth century, five different Rulers of Khiva professed allegiance to him. The failure of Bekasoff's expedition in 1717, of Perolski's in 1839, and the stoppage of an intended expedition in 1854 by the Crimean War, saved Khiva from annexation till 1873, i.e. 148 years after his death.

More lamentable still, it has imparted to our counsels the pusillanimous policy of "watching events" whilst doing nothing, which has marked the whole of our Eastern relations from that period till now.

The disasters of Khiva and Cabul kept back the Governments of England and Russia for some time from much further active interference in the affairs of their neighbours.

Russia, however, eight years afterwards, sent a military expedition to the Syr Daria, and established herself at Fort Aralsk (1847); secured a position on the Island of Saghalien, and founded the port of Nicolaevsk at the mouth of the Amour (1850), apprising the Chinese Government of the fact a year after its accomplishment; occupied the important position of Almaty or Fort Vernoë in Turkestan (1852); attacked and captured Fort Ak Metchet (Perofski) after an obstinate resistance organized by the present ruler of Yarkund (1853), and would probably have advanced still further had not the Crimean war absorbed her attention and prevented her carrying out further operations.

Advances of
Russia, 1847-54.

The causes of the Crimean war, which have been variously explained, are too complicated to discuss in this memorandum, notwithstanding that that war forms an important link in the "Central Asian question,"—the possession of Constantinople and the dismemberment of the Turkish Government forming no mean part of a programme having for its foundation the destruction of Mahomedan power in the East and the expulsion of all competitors from Asia. Its results were as lamentable to ourselves as to Russia, for we missed the opportunity of destroying her power by driving her from the Caucasus, and only succeeded after much bloodshed in forcing her compliance to a treaty which she tore up at the first favourable opportunity.

1854.

What concerns the scope of this memorandum more closely is to review our position (1854) in India towards Afghanistan, which began, for the first time since our disaster of 1842, to claim attention at our hands and to add another chain to the "Central Asian question."

Afghanistan and
India.

Dost Mahomed, who in 1839 had been carried a prisoner to Calcutta, was, after the evacuation of Afghanistan, allowed to return to Cabul and to form any government that he chose. He soon found means of strengthening his power; he annexed Balkh (1850) to his possessions, and established a strong government of his own. Finding himself weakened, however, by the antagonism of his brothers at Candahar and the constant interference of Persia, he expressed a desire to return to terms of friendship with the English, the loss of which he had great reason to regret.

This desire roused the attention of Lord Dalhousie's Government which was most anxious to strengthen our relations with Afghanistan and Kelat.

Lord Dalhousie's
Minute, 14th
March 1854.
Enclosure to
No. 27, Secret
Letter from India,
dated 13th June
1854. Also
Minutes of Sir
James Outram,
Colonel Abbott,
Sir Richmond
Shakespeare, &c.,
&c.

The opinions then expressed in the Minutes of the Government are not unimportant at a time when the very same question has become a matter of grave consideration. Although the Minutes are too lengthy to quote *in extenso*, the following passages may be appropriately selected.

Lord Dalhousie wrote,—

"The probability and practicability of an invasion of the Western Frontier of India by a Russian army have at all periods, in modern times, been frequently and keenly disputed. Since the last period at which convictions of the serious progress of Russian designs upon India were entertained and acted upon in 1838, much information has been obtained as to the probabilities of such an occurrence, and much experience of the difficulties and dangers of the enterprise has been bitterly gained by ourselves."

"Lieutenant Conolly stated, as the conclusion to which he had been brought, that the invasion of India by Russia is not an event which we have to fear immediately. Years are necessary for Russia's advance to points whence she may make a fair start; but she is steadily working to gain them by a policy which is every way opposed to British interests. For the working out of this policy, Lieutenant Conolly held that the Russians had two great routes to India; but prior to attempting the invasion of it they must push themselves or their influence further east. They will either establish themselves or their authority at Khiva, and, making that their base, will go up the Oxus to Balkh, and on over the Damocan mountains, *viâ* Cabul, to the Indus, or, taking the Persian frontier for a base, they will follow the great road through Afghanistan."

Lord Dalhousie then went on to quote the opinion of Lieutenant Conolly as to the ease with which Russia could march across the steppes, and capture Khiva, and as to the slight physical obstacles in the way of the march of an unopposed army from Herat and Candahar, through Afghanistan on India.

"The Russians," added Lieutenant Conolly, "are chiefly dependent upon the people of Afghanistan for the means of invading India. Doubtless, therefore, it is our policy to make friends with neighbours through whom the enemy, from whichever anticipated quarter they come, must pass. A large army cannot make a dash at Hindostan through such a country as Afghanistan, nor could it attempt to carry war into India with an enemy in its rear. The Afghans have nothing to gain, but much to fear, from letting the Russians enter their country; but they must be specially built up, or they will lose their means of resistance... Whether, therefore, we consult the policy of to-day, or that of a hundred years hence, we should raise up a strong barrier between the Russians and ourselves. The surest bond between two nations is common interest. Our political interests and those of the Afghans as a nation are closely connected. We can make ourselves a source of wealth to them, and that wealth will return into our own hands. The traders must be the medium for keeping it in circulation."

After quoting Lieutenant Conolly's opinions at length, Lord Dalhousie added,—

"These sentiments are the opinion of an intelligent Officer of well known enterprise and reputation, who framed them upon personal examination of the countries whose dangers and difficulties he describes, and after much personal observation of the several nations of whose projects or of whose feelings he treats. They lead to strengthen the prevalent belief that the designs of Russia towards India would always be steadily pursued; that no

attempt would be made to prosecute them by force in the face of such difficulties as existed when Lieutenant Conolly wrote, nor until Russia had established a more advanced position towards the East : that such an advance by way of Khiva would without doubt be found practicable, that a subsequent advance through Afghanistan would be easy provided the people were friendly, that it would not be done otherwise than by deliberate progress ; and, lastly, that the proper mode of thwarting all such designs, and of raising a secure barrier for our defence against all attacks against Russia would be to make friends of the Rulers and people of Afghanistan."

Lord Dalhousie then pointed out his belief of the improbability of Russia establishing herself at Khiva, and of the greater difficulty of the task than supposed by Conolly, but added, —

A " Nevertheless, great as are the obstacles in the way of any European army approaching in force from the westward,—improbable as we are warranted in believing all present rumours of projected invasion to be,—and certain as we may justly consider the ultimate defeat of any such attempt, it will be wise on our part to provide that nothing is left undone which would tend to make Afghanistan an effectual barrier against Russian aggression, or which would encourage and induce the Afghan tribes to make common cause with us against an enemy whose success would be fatal to the common interests of both Afghan and British power."

Sir James Outram's memorandum dwelt at great length on the "practicability or otherwise of the "invasion of our Indian Empire from Afghanistan."

5th Feb. 1854.

Although too lengthy to quote here, it will repay perusal. Briefly it may be said that he considered that our limit—

B " Should be the Indus, however Russia or Persia should bluster or intrigue, contenting ourselves with establishing a few agents in Afghanistan, and resting confidently on our strength on the Indus, whence, on any menace from the westward, our armies would advance to the foot of the passes, and our advanced posts would occupy their summits, where we could securely defy the world, for no armies of any nation could ever approach through Afghanistan in any state of organization."

"By the knowledge," he added, quoting an opinion given by him in 1830, "that we have now acquired of that fact, the bugbear of Russian invasion is discharged for ever. I have well considered every side of the question, and am now satisfied that British bayonets need never be pushed beyond the Himalaya mountains for the defence of India, that British armies could not be supplied or supported for any length of time on the (Afghan) side of those mountains, and that the natural and impregnable boundary of our Empire is the Indus."

C Major Abbott wrote, in his memorandum,—

9th Feb. 1854.

" When I was at Orenburgh in 1840, to negotiate the release of Russian slaves and Turkish captives on the failure of the Russians against Khiva, I was assured, upon excellent authority, that the Emperor would never give up his designs upon Khiva, that even then Staff Officers were actively reconnoitring the route for a renewal of the invasion in which the honour of the Government was felt to be involved. . . . It has never been the policy of Russia to do by force anything that can be effected by fraud or negotiation. If the reported Russian invasion of Khiva (1854) be authentic, the present movement of Russia in Europe has been long premeditated, for it requires several years of steady preparation to enable a Russian force to overpass the steppe of 900 miles, without water and without provisions, which separates Orenburgh from Khiva. For the invasion of 1839 General Perofski had asked seven years of preparation. Our movement upon Afghanistan obliged him to make it in the fifth year, and it failed. . . .

* These extracts are given at length, as the opinion of the writer is valuable and much respected on this particular subject.

D " Between the Russians, and the people of Khawrism an old and inveterate hatred subsists. The idolatry of the Russian is

as gross as that of the Hindoo. The people of Khawrism are bigoted deists, who conceive it to be a religious obligation, not only to hate idolaters, but either to slay or enslave them. . . . Russia could not safely isolate at Khiva an army of less than 20,000 men. The expense of such a force could scarcely be rated at less than 2,000,000*l.* a year, which is about seven times the net revenue of Khawrism. To defray even a portion of this expense, Russia must depose the king, and take upon herself the expenses of the Government, which would materially increase the burden. The kingdom of Khawrism is made up of one fertile and richly irrigated plain near the embouchure of the Oxus, having an area of about 9,000 square miles, the sandy but productive plain of Mervo of about 2,400 square miles, and about 34,000 square miles of steppe, wilderness, and desert. . . . The wild Turcoman and Mahomedan Cossacks are almost intangible in their steppes and deserts. There would be many struggles for freedom, and if Russia held her own, it would be under the domination of the entire nation, and with no power to advance for the invasion of India. . . . The possession of Khawrism would greatly enfeeble Russia, unless she should add Persia to the conquest, for her weakness is in the extension of her authority over unproductive tracts.

"The Persians are less bigoted in their deism than the people of Khawrism. They are less isolated by deserts from other nations, and although the Russians as a nation would speedily make themselves as much hated in Persia as individually they now are, the enmity would not show itself politically or nationally excepting at the fift of the King of Persia. There would therefore be no difficulty in the establishment of a Russian force at Teheran or Meshed, supposing the king to be as subservient to Russian counsels as he is reported to be, nor any obstacle to the march of an army with battering train to Herat."

Major Abbott continued,—

"Russia has only to be known to be detested by all. Supposing the Rulers of Cabul and Candahar should be the willing tools of Russia, it by no means follows that the people will submit to be so. The Afghans are as fond of their freedom as are Britons. Like us, they have a constitution, and are extremely jealous of any encroachments upon their privileges. It is with them an essential first principle that all Afghans, whatever their respective ranks, are equal. It is by humouring their pride that Dost Mahomed Khan has retained his ascendancy over them. When quitting Herat on my mission to Khiva in 1839, I ventured to suggest the recognition and development of their constitution, as a better means of controlling them and winning their regard than the imposition of a tyranny. Shah Shujah did not enter into the spirit of the people. He behaved himself as a little god, and was despised and detested, although a man of luminous disposition and considerable talent.

"Afghanistan may be well compared to a trap; the entrance to it is easy,—the exit from it scarcely possible. The people, individually brave and exceeding Englishmen in physical powers, are collectively cowards, *i. e.*, they have no ~~inclination~~ ^{inclination} to combine them in the hour of danger. So long as a respectable army advances through their open valley, they hold aloof in the mountains; the instant it attempts to retire they rise upon it as one man."

Major Abbott then proceeded to point out that the weak point of our position in India in case of invasion was the Native Army as then constituted, and he concluded with the following remarks:—

A "It is perhaps impossible for any considerable army, however highly disciplined, to march through Afghanistan without incensing the people, by the destruction of their crops, which are generally the only fodder procurable for the cattle. A Government may desire to remunerate the owners, but practically this is impossible or only partially possible. For, although the Government should pay the money, it will never reach one hand of every ten for which it was designed. The outrage to the people cannot be appeased by the obsequiousness of the Rulers of the country. The Afghans are a free race, who will not put up with wrong for any man's pleasure. An army in Afghanistan is, therefore, always an abomination to the people, who will retaliate

upon it the instant it meets with disasters, however friendly may have been its intentions."

Major Abbott did not attempt to deny in his Memorandum that successful invasions of India have taken place under Alexander, Timour, and others; but, he added,—

"It has long been the policy of Russia to alarm us for our Indian possessions as a balance to the power we possess over her commerce and her marine. But although her influence may occasionally stir up petty inroads upon our frontier, the time is not arrived for anything beyond this, and should the madness of her Emperor attempt more, it will be to his own confusion."

Sir Richmond Shakespear, in his memorandum, 13th March 1854.
pointed out his conviction that—

"The effect of a Russian army advancing on Balkh will be to drive the Afghans sincerely to desire our friendship, and thus Russia would in some measure remove the ill effects of our own mistake in 1838-39. Though I cannot foresee the remotest chance of a Russian invasion, as such, being successful, still I believe that it is in the power of Russia to very seriously injure, and eventually undermine, our noble Empire in India."

It may be said that nothing of particular interest occurred in India from the date of these papers until October of the same year, when a fresh interest was raised in the question of Central Asia by the arrival of an envoy from the Khan of Kokand, entreating British aid against a rumoured attack from Russia.

Lord Dalhousie recorded his views on this subject in an interesting Minute, in which he said,— 26th Sept. 1854.

"I hold, as before, that a Russian invasion of India at the present time is a physical impossibility, and I firmly believe that a Russian army will never be directed against the western frontier of India within any period of time to which the ordinary forecast of man can reach. But I am equally well persuaded that, if Russia shall be permitted to push her authority beyond the deserts to the north of the Aral, and if she shall succeed in establishing herself among any of the States of Central Asia, she will be in a position to work infinite evil to the British power in the East."

Lord Dalhousie earnestly pointed out the necessity of imposing some territorial limitation on Russia's advance in the East, in order that India might, as he said, be "timely saved from the pernicious influence which the policy of Russia will assuredly exercise upon her safety and peace if that great Power shall once be permitted to establish itself among the States of Central Asia."

Having thus quoted a few extracts from the valuable papers written in 1854 on the subject of an alliance between ourselves and Afghanistan, it is necessary to narrate the progress of the *re-opening* of negotiations with that country.

Dost Mahomed finding that the British Government was disposed to renew friendly relations with him, carried on a correspondence with the Commissioner of Peshawar, which encouraged the Government of India to draw out a draft of a simple treaty, which was ratified at Peshawar on the 30th March 1855, between Ghulam Hyder Khan, the

Correspondence,
Herat and Afghanistan,
Lahore,
1863.

" Art. I.

" Between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, Wazir of Cabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Ameer there shall be perpetual peace and friendship.

" Art. II.

" The Honourable East India Company engages in respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness' possession, and never to interfere therein.

" Art. III.

" His Highness Ameer Dost Mahomed, &c., engages on his part and on the part of his heirs to respect the territories of the Honourable East India Company, and never to interfere therein, and to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company."

their apparent of the Dost and Mr. (now Lord) Lawrence.*

Meanwhile Persia, who had been forced to sign an agreement (1853) not to interfere with Herat, began to show signs of unfriendliness to the British Mission at Teheran, and to again engage in hostile operations against Herat. No sooner had the treaty with the Dost been signed, than the British Government were startled with the news of the surrender of that fortress to a Persian force, and the setting up of a Chief under Persian suzerainty.

This brought on an open rupture between Great Britain and Persia, whilst Herat was recaptured on the 26th October 1856 by an Afghan force, and war declared on the 1st November 1856 by the despatch of a British force from Bombay to the Persian Gulf to occupy the island of Karrack.

It was thought advisable to subsidize the Ameer during the continuance of the war, in order to aid him in protecting Herat and in carrying on hostile operations, if necessary, against Persia.

The Ameer was invited to an interview at Peshawar with the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and on the 26th January 1857 entered into an agreement to receive a sum of 10,000*l.* a month during the continuance of the war, for the purpose of keeping up a proper army, and to allow British Officers, at the pleasure of the British Government, to be stationed at Cabul, Candahar, and Balkh, or all three places, not only to obtain reliable information but to watch the proper application of the subsidy.

It is necessary to call to mind that there was some discussion on this latter important point, but Mr. Lawrence finally reported to the Government that the Ameer would readily receive British Officers at Candahar, although unwilling to do so at Cabul.*

The new treaty with the Dost resulted in a mission composed of Major (now Sir Harry) Lumden, his brother, Lieutenant (now Colonel) Lumden, and Dr. Bellew, being sent to Candahar, where it arrived on the 26th April 1857, whilst a Native Envoy was deputed at Cabul as British wakil.

The mission was particularly instructed to keep on the most friendly terms with the Afghan Chiefs and people, and to "impress on all with whom they come in contact that we have no desire to send a single man armed or unarmed across the border, except with the goodwill of the Afghan nation."

Meanwhile peace had been concluded with Persia (4th March 1857), and hostilities terminated on her agreeing never to interfere again with the independence or sovereignty of Herat or other countries of Afghanistan.

About this period (July 1857) broke out the terrible Indian Mutiny. Partly from this and other causes, the mission remained at Candahar until 15th May 1858, and, as its results appear to have

1857.

10th Jan. 1857.
Page 78 Correspondence, Herat and Afghanistan, Lahore, 1863.

" His Highness believed," Mr. Lawrence said, " that much good would accrue from their presence on the Candahar frontier, and that the Afghan Generals would get good advice from them, and that the Persians would see that the English were hostilely with the Afghans. But that at Cabul no such advantage would accrue, and the common people would think, when they saw Europeans at the capital, that the old days of Shah Shuja were come again."

1857.

Secretary to Government of India to Chief Commissioner, Punjab, No. 22 of 26th Jan 1857. Epitome Herat and Afghanistan, 1862.

much guided the subsequent policy of Lord Lawrence as Governor General, they deserve more than a passing reference.

Major Lumsden informs us that, on the happy termination of the British expedition to the Russian Gulf, and the outlines of the treaty of peace (of 4th March 1857) becoming known at Candahar great satisfaction was expressed by all classes of Affghans; but about the same time news arrived of the breaking out of that fiery trial of British energy and valour, the mutiny of the Bengal Army, and for months all men's minds were concentrated on Hindustan. As the storm thickened, urged by the preaching of Mahomedan zealots, and pressed on by the machinations of certain Affghan Chiefs, the Affghan nation called on the Ameer to put himself at the head of the faithful, raise the green standard of Islam, pour down the passes to Hindustan, and once more re-establish Mahomedan supremacy throughout Asia.

Major Lumsden represented to the Government the exciting interviews of the Chiefs with the Dost, and his strongly expressed determination, witnessed by his son the present Ameer, not to act against the English.*

Major Lumsden wrote from Candahar (Candahar Diary, 19th June 1859),—

"The details of the progress of the mutiny in the Native Army is truly startling, and the exaggerated reports which have reached this have caused considerable excitement among the people; some lament that the Ameer by having entered into a treaty with the British has thrown away the golden opportunity of recovering Peshawur, while the Moollahs and religious classes appear to entertain the strongest feelings of animosity towards us. . . . As long as the Ameer rules in Affghanistan these political agitations are of little further importance than that they show the temper of a certain class, for his hold on the people is sufficient to enable him to follow an independent policy, and to do just as he pleases, but it is very doubtful indeed whether any of his sons will be so unfettered."†

Notwithstanding the opinion forcibly expressed by Major Lumsden, of the value of our alliance with Affghanistan, he, on his return to India, made a most unfavourable report of the character of the Affghans and the state of the army and country generally.

The army, as then organized, could not, he said, "for an hour oppose even a brigade of well handled disciplined troops;" the feudal nobility he described "as men whose actions cannot be calculated upon, but who are ready to grasp at any chance of bettering their own condition, obedient through fear alone, treacherous by nature, and political schemers from their birth," and the people generally were held up as "in outward appearance and

Major Lumsden's Report, 1st July 1858. Candahar Mission. Calcutta. 1860.

Candahar Diary, Government of India Letter No. 537, 29th July 1857.

* "Now is your time," urged the Chiefs, "bring out your forces, and Peshawur, the Panjab, nay India itself, will be free from the English! Peshawur would fall in a day, the Chiefs and Sardars Cis-Indus would join you with 100,000 Sikhs, and 200,000 Mussulmen would go with you."

† Again, Major Lumsden wrote, in reference to the effect of the news of the arrival of the British forces before Delhi, and the capture of the Flagstaff Battery on the minds of the Affghans (Candahar Diary, 2nd July 1857)—
"It is amusing, as well as instructive, to observe what sort creatures of impulse Affghans are, and how their opinions change with every current of the political atmosphere. All looked gloomy enough, except the Sardar (Gholam Hyler), and the mutterings of enthusiastic Moollahs were becoming distinctly audible, while expressions were hurrying to and fro from Calcutta. Every imaginable disaster was reported to have overtaken British India. 'War with infidels' was the popular cry, and it required all the persuasive powers of the heir apparent to keep the populace within bounds. We were his guests, and he insisted that, come what might, the laws of hospitality should not be broken. Suddenly our success at Delhi is announced and the wind changed, so nothing is heard on all sides but inquiries for horses likely to ensure the enlistment of their owners in the ranks of the new levies in Peshawur. We ought, indeed, to be grateful to Providence for having permitted our relations with Affghans to be so satisfactorily arranged before the onset of this crisis, for I am convinced that, had it not been that the minds of the Affghans were, in a measure, prepared for the Ameer's non-interference, he could not have prevented a general rush down the passes, which must have added greatly to our embarrassment at Peshawur and along the frontier."

* Major Lumsden acknowledged that to keep the country from Russian taint should be our great aim, but that the object would be best attained by "having as little to say to Afghanistan as possible beyond maintaining friendly and intimate intercourse with the *de facto* Government; by never on any occasion interfering with the internal politics of the country, nor assisting any particular faction, but honestly leaving Afghanistan to manage their own affairs in the way which suits them best. . . . Unless under the most pressing danger in Afghanistan, and at the spontaneous and urgent demand of that Government itself, no proposition involving the deputing of British Officers into the country should for a moment be entertained, for, after the example of Burnes, all such missions will ever be looked on with the greatest suspicion." Major Lumsden discarded the idea of Herat being an outwork of Hindustan, advocated a conciliatory policy towards our frontier tribes, and concluded his report as follows:—

"Providence has blessed us with a strong line of frontier covered by rugged and barren hills, through which there are but a limited number of passes by which any army could approach India; and the military art teaches us that the best position for the defence of such ground is on our own side of the passes, just where an army must disembark on the plains. Here, then, is our true position, which we are of course, in common prudence, bound to strengthen.

"With Peshawar, Kohat, and Seinde in our possession," continued Major Lumsden, "and the communications with our Indian provinces open by rail and steamers on the Indus, and a strong force of Europeans located in healthy cantonments all over the country, supported by a well-organized Native army, I consider that we should really have the keys to India in our own pockets, and be in a position to lock the doors in the face of all enemies, white or black."

Wheeler's Afghanistan, 1869.
Epitome, Herat and Afghanistan, 1863.

† Father of Sekunder Khan, now in London, 1874, and of Bihah Nawas Khan, a refugee at Teheran

"profession the most religious, orthodox, and just of Mahomedans, but really in practice without religion or faith, and examples of oppressors to the human faith."

Mr. Lawrence (Letter to Government of India, 1858) cordially agreed in Major Lumsden's views, and as he steadily adhered to them afterwards as Governor General through a period of what was called "masterly inactivity," and as they represent the opinions of the optimist class of Central Asian politicians, they are appropriately quoted here with all the weight due to the opinions of one of our best Indian Officers who had been in Afghanistan during a most critical period of British supremacy in India.

Nothing further of importance occurred in Afghanistan during 1853, except the sudden death at Cabul, on the 2nd July, of Gholam Hyder Khan, the favourite son and heir apparent of the Ameer, Dost Mahomed, for the second time, passed over his eldest son Afzul Khan, and nominated Shere Ali Khan the present ruler of Afghanistan to succeed him.

The withdrawal of the British Mission from Candahar was naturally followed by the withdrawal of the subsidy, the payment of which ceased on 30th September 1858.

Towards the latter end of the year Monsieur Khanikoff, a Russian Envoy, arrived at Herat, with a large diplomatic suite. He gave out that his mission was a scientific one, and on this excuse saved the roads to Seistan and Candahar; but his lavish expenditure gave his mission a political taint. Monsieur Khanikoff's ultimate object was to reach Cabul, but the Dost refused to receive him.

The Dost at this time (1859) brought Kunduz and Badakhshan again under the rule of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the relations between the Dost and his nephew and son-in-law Sultan Ahmed Jan,† who ruled at Herat, became inimical. The Dost resolved on punishing him. He set out from Cabul in July 1862, and after besieging the fortress for a year, during which time both Ahmed Jan and his wife had died, he made a final attack on 27th May 1863, and became master of the place. The Ameer only lived thirteen days afterwards. He died at the age of 76 on the 9th June 1863, and was succeeded by Shere Ali Khan.

In consequence of troubles on our frontier and the death of Lord Elgin, the formal recognition of the British Government was not despatched till the 23rd December, when the Acting Governor General (Sir William Denison) wrote as follows,—

"I take an early opportunity of acknowledging your khurreets, in which you intimate your succession to the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and your desire as Ruler of Afghanistan to entertain the same friendly relations with the British Government as have heretofore existed.

"You may rest assured that the British Government participate

in this desire. . . . I am confident that your Highness, conscious how greatly the interests of yourself and the Afghan people are at stake in this matter, will be solicitous to maintain peace and order on your own frontier, and will countenance no aggressions on the part of any persons over whom your Highness's Officers have influence."

We now come to an important period of the Central Asian question.

From the time of the Indian Mutiny till 1864 our foreign policy and external relations remained in a quiescent state. We had neither forgotten the Cabul disasters nor recovered from the shock of the revolt of our Native army.

Whilst the quiet preparations of Russia for further advances in Central Asia were outside the circle of objection, we ourselves were laying the axe to the ultimate weakening of our Indian Empire, by neglecting external policy and busily employing ourselves in re-modelling the Native army on a basis of Staff Corps and Irregular systems, presenting sumnuds to Native Chiefs, and laying the country under direct taxation.*

In 1863 the Russians captured from Kokan the fortress of Pishpek, and found it necessary in the following year to despatch two important expeditions against the forts of Aulieata and Turkestan. These were successively taken, followed on the 4th October by the capture of Chemkend with heavy loss to the Kokandians.

These advances of the Russians into Kokan excited great attention, not only in Europe but in India and Persia. There was a strong party who saw in them the commencement of a movement, the ultimate object of which was the possession of British India, whilst others considered that in a military and political point of view they were merely essential acquisitions to connect the Trans-Ili and Syr-Daria line of forts, and to improve the evils of a previously ill-defined boundary.

But in order to allay this inconvenient distrust Prince Gortchakoff issued one of those circulars of peace (November 1864), which the experiences of 1838 caused many to accept,—and events proved the correctness of their surmises,—as a prelude to further war.

Whilst laying down in detail that his August Master's policy consisted emphatically "not in extending beyond all reasonable bounds the regions under his sceptre, but in giving a solid basis to his rule, in guaranteeing their security, and in developing their social organization, their commerce, their well-being, and their civilization," Prince Gortchakoff explained clearly and definitively that the recent operations were merely undertaken to unite a better defined frontier by fortified posts, "fixing for us," as he added, "with geographical precision the limit up to which we are bound to advance, and at which we must halt."

* This is not the place to argue these questions in detail. The writer of this Memorandum was at that period in India as Military Secretary to Sir Hugh Rose, to whom was entrusted the reorganization of the Native Army. The Staff Corps and Irregular system were formed against his advice and that of Lord Canning, and the danger of having neglected it is seen in the expediture, the discontent, and the inefficiency of that Army against local warfare or foreign attack. We neglected the golden opportunity of remodelling our treaties with Native States, and putting our relations with them on a firm and proper basis. We taxed our loyal populations, in the face of all experience to the contrary, for clearing off deficits which ought to have been paid, then and there, by an embargo on the rich but rebel bankers of Lucknow and Cawnpore. The errors of the Afghanistan policy of 1838 are only now bearing fruit; the errors of our remodelling of India may not require many more years before exercising a similar effect on the Central Asian question.

Russian Advances
in Asia. War
Office, 1873.

23rd Sept. 1865.
Russian Advances
in Asia. 1873.

Home Corre-
spondence. India
Office, 1865.

11th July 1865.

29th July 1865.

Under the southing effect of this Circular the Russians advanced and took the important town of Tashkend (June 1865), establishing themselves in one of the most important centres, whether in a military or commercial sense, of Central Asia.

General Koyfanovski, Governor General of Orenburg, issued a proclamation in which he stated that the object of these new operations was to restrain the depredations of the Kokandees, but that "the Emperor had no desire to make any addition to his already very extensive dominions."

This leads to the consideration of an important correspondence, of which the following is an abstract account,—

It deserves consideration as being the first occasion since 1838 in which we endeavoured to come to a "mutual understanding" in Central Asian matters with Russia, with an almost similar result.

The correspondence arose from some remarks on Central Asia made in 1865 by Sir R. Murchison, President of the Geographical Society, regarding the progress of Russia in Central Asia. Acting on these remarks, the Foreign Office addressed Sir C. Wood a Despatch inviting his opinion as to the expediency of entering into diplomatic arrangements with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, with a view to the adjustment of the basis of an undertaking to be come to by the Governments of Great Britain and Russia, disclaiming any intention to extend their territories in Central Asia.

Sir C. Wood replied, that he fully recognized the advantage of such an understanding, being of opinion that much might be done by frank statements and clear explanations to remove erroneous apprehensions; he did not approve of the first Article of the draft Convention,* but thought that a paper drawn up in the spirit of the two last Articles might be attended with mutual advantage to the two Governments.

In answer to Sir C. Wood's Letter Mr. Layard explained that Lord Russell did not contemplate a formal Convention between the two Governments, but merely that an exchange of notes should take place; and he added that having communicated to Baron Brunnow the object of the proposed Despatch to our Ambassador at St. Petersburg,† he had stated that Prince Gortchakoff, if invited, would declare the policy of Russia.

Mr. Lumley, referring to this Despatch, (10th August 1865) reported that, after reading it, Prince Gortchakoff expressed his satisfaction at the friendly assurances on the part of Her Majesty's Government, whilst confessing that he could not, however, understand Lord Russell's object in desiring an interchange of relations, nor as a practical man could he see what was to be gained by it. As regards the last part of the declaration, all he had to say was, that *he never suspected Her Majesty's*

* "1. The two Powers to declare that they have no intention to extend their territories in such a manner that their frontiers would approach each other more nearly than they are at present. If a deplorable necessity should force either of them to change this resolution, the Power contemplating such extension would make a full and frank exposition to the other of the causes which have enforced this change, and the extent to which the increase of territory is in contemplation.

"2. That both Powers will respect the present state of possession in Central Asia.

"3. That both Powers will respect the independence of the Persian monarchy, will be careful not to encroach on the territory of Persia, and will act in concert to support and strengthen the sovereignty of the Shah."

† The Despatch ran as follows:—
"Foreign Office, 4th August 1865.

"There are circumstances in the present situation of the British and Russian Empires which might give rise to anxiety, and Her Majesty's Government, being fully persuaded of the friendly and pacific sentiments of the Emperors of Russia, are desirous to remove any cause of danger which might threaten the future good understanding of England and Russia.

"Her Majesty's Government consider it would be useful to this end if the two Powers were to make friendly explanations to each other, based on the present state of affairs.

"Her Majesty's Government are determined to respect the present state of possession in Central Asia.

"Her Majesty's Government will respect the independence of the Persian monarchy, will be careful not to encroach upon the territory of Persia, and will act in such a manner as may best support and strengthen the sovereignty of the Shah.

"If His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will be prepared to make analogous declarations, Her Majesty's Government think that, without the formality of a Convention, an exchange of

Government of any intention of encroaching upon the territory of the Shah!

Prince Gortchakoff added, that Russia did not seek territorial aggrandisement but a safe road for her commerce. On this point Mr. Lumley observed that, in speaking of Central Asia, Prince Gortchakoff said, "I can well understand your Government, or rather that of India, showing some anxiety or curiosity about what is going on in that country, though they are better able than others to comprehend the necessity; for, after all, we are only doing by compulsion that which you have always done in India, and what you are obliged to do at this moment in Bhootan in spite of yourselves. What we really want is a safe road." Mr. Lumley asked His Excellency in what direction; he said, "To Kashgar;" and Mr. Lumley added, "To China."

On the 5th August 1865, Prince Gortschakoff, with some apparent reluctance, communicated to Baron Brunnow the views of the Imperial Government.*

Lord Russell felt some disappointment at the result, and addressed Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg (Foreign Office Letter, 5th September 1865) to the effect that,—

"These assurances are satisfactory, but it would have given Her Majesty's Government still greater confidence if Prince Gortchakoff had replied to the declaration of the views of Her Majesty's Government by a similar declaration.

"Her Majesty's Government, however, are willing to accept the explanation of the principles which guide the policy of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia contained in the circular already referred to, and are quite ready to believe that legitimate desires for the extension of commerce and the security of the Russian frontier, and no wish for territorial aggrandisement, guide the proceedings of the Russian Government.

"Such an extension of commerce, and the security of the Russian frontiers, will no doubt tend to the advantage of other nations who carry on trade in Central Asia, and of none more than Great Britain."

Shortly after this date, Sir A. Buchanan reported that he had had a long conversation with Prince Gortchakoff on the subject of the recent correspondence, when the Prince explained that he had considered it "unnecessary to instruct Baron Brunnow to speak of the policy of the Emperor with regard to Persia, because Her Majesty's Government could not doubt the desire of His Imperial Majesty's Government to promote the independence and prosperity of that monarchy." Prince Gortchakoff, without exactly saying so, seemed, according to Sir A. Buchanan's impressions, to consider that Lord Russell entertained unjust suspicions of the honesty of Russian policy towards that country, and had expressed this feeling to other persons. Sir A. Buchanan thought it right to add that, in speaking of the friendly conduct of Russia towards that Power, Prince Gortchakoff alluded to the Turcomans as "pirates who were not subjects of the Shah, and whose depredations against Russian commerce it was necessary for the

Notes might take place, which would tend to settle the inhabitants of Central Asia, and to prevent disturbances thereby affording a fresh security for the maintenance of the two Empires.

"You will read this Despatch to Prince Gortchakoff, and him a copy of it.

(Signed) Russ.

* The Despatch ran as follows:—

St. Petersburg, 5th August.

"Our August Master especially reciprocates the deep interest which the Government of Her Britannic Majesty desire corresponds so completely with the sentiments of the Emperor as to meet with the entire concurrence of His Majesty.

"Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State presses an opinion that a frank and friendly explanation of the respective views of the two Governments relative to Central Asia would contribute to the above result. His Exalted Majesty accordingly indicated the principles which the Government of Her Majesty Queen Victoria is disposed to adopt in connection with the States in this part of the world.

"Those which sever the policy of our August Master have already been communicated by Your Excellency to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State.

"You may reiterate to Lord Russell the assurance we have in Central Asia but a single interest, viz., the security of our frontiers, the establishment and development of commercial and peaceful relations with our neighbours, and we shall not reap the sole profit. We do not pursue as a design, but we attach thereto a just importance, and we labour with perseverance to attain it.

"If Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State expresses a wish to have a copy of this Despatch, we leave it in his hands.

(Signed) Gortschakoff

12 and 14th Sept. 1865.

Foreign Office,
19th Sept.

"Imperial military and naval authorities to repress
"or punish."

Sir A. Buchanan some days afterwards had an interview with the Emperor, when he was pleased to speak to him on the same subject and stated that Lord Russell might feel assured that "his Government had no ambitious designs in that quarter of the world, and that their language on the subject was entirely free from reservation or *arrivées pensées*"; that the Empire was already sufficiently large, and that his sole policy in Central Asia was to encourage commerce and civilization, but that, in following this object, it was of course impossible to prevent collisions occurring from time to time between his troops and the inhabitants of these distant and barbarous countries; that in regard to the policy of Russia towards Persia, Baron Brunnow had been instructed to give Lord Russell satisfactory assurances on the subject, "though he could not understand, unless it was merely to meet Parliamentary inquiries, why he should desire them."

Foreign Office
Letter, 17th Oct.
1865.

At a later interview with Prince Gortchakoff, which Sir A. Buchanan reported on the 11th October, His Excellency said that "Baron Brunnow cannot declare too positively to Lord Russell that all the Russian Government seeks in Central Asia is to secure caravan routes toward the East, and that, with respect to present measures, they consider it necessary in order to effect this that Kokan and Tashkend shall be assisted to maintain their independence of Bokhara."

Having thus far treated the attitude of the English and Russian Cabinets in 1865, let us return for a few moments to Afghanistan.

From the commencement of his rule in 1863, Shere Ali met with that opposition from his brothers which is the normal creed of Afghan Royal families.

After a hard and difficult struggle,* he was, by May 1866, completely driven out of the field, his elder brother Mahomed Afzul Khan proclaiming himself Ameer.

Whilst Shere Ali sought safety in flight, gallantly struggling, however, for his kingdom with the aid of his sons on every possible opportunity, a change in events occurred in the death of Afzul Khan and the succession to the Ameership for a brief period of his next brother Azim.

Our dealings with Afghanistan during this period of anarchy and civil war were carefully based on the policy recorded by Major Lumsden and Mr. Lawrence in 1858. Our traditional policy of establishing in that country a strong and friendly Government was virtually abandoned; we left the country to "take care of itself;" we practically deserted its lawful ruler; and in strict application of our *de facto*, but unfortunately not *de jure*, policy, we held out the hand to each successive claimant,

* It is impossible within due limits to describe in detail the rapidly succeeding events of the Afghan anarchy of 1863-68. They can be found in Wylie's and Wynne's *Precis*, which are well worthy of perusal. It is sufficient for our purpose here to briefly refer to the leading features.

Oct. 1867.

Government of any intention of encroaching upon the territory of the Shah!

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"Those which govern the policy of our August Master have already been communicated by Your Excellency to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State.

"You may reiterate to Lord Russell the assurance that we have in Central Asia but a single interest, viz., tranquillity, the security of our frontiers, the establishment and development of commercial and peaceful relations with our neighbours, of which we shall not reap the sole profit. We do not pursue any other design, but we attach thereto a just importance, and we shall labour with perseverance to attain it.

"If Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State expresses a wish to have a copy of this Despatch, you may leave it in his hands. (Signed) GORTCHAKOFF."

12 and 14th Sept.

1865.

Foreign Office,
19th Sept.

"Imperial military and naval authorities to repress
"or punish."

Sir A. Buchanan some days afterwards had an interview with the Emperor, when he was pleased to speak to him on the same subject and stated that Lord Russell might feel assured that "his Government had no ambitious designs in that quarter of the world, and that their language on the subject was entirely free from reservation or "*arrière pensées*"; that the Empire was already sufficiently large, and that his sole policy in Central Asia was to encourage commerce and civilization, but that, in following this object, it was of course impossible to prevent collisions occurring from time to time between his troops and the inhabitants of these distant and barbarous countries; that in regard to the policy of Russia towards Persia, Baron Brunnow had been instructed to give Lord Russell satisfactory assurances on the subject, "though he could not understand, unless it was merely to meet Parliamentary inquiries, why he "should desire them."

Foreign Office
Letter, 17th Oct.
1865.

At a later interview with Prince Gortchakoff, which Sir A. Buchanan reported on the 11th October, His Excellency said that "Baron Brunnow cannot declare too positively to Lord Russell that all the "Russian Government seeks in Central Asia is to "secure caravan routes toward the East, and that, "with respect to present measures, they consider it "necessary in order to effect this that Kokan and "Tashkend shall be assisted to maintain their "independence of Bokhara."

Having thus far treated the attitude of the English and Russian Cabinets in 1865, let us return for a few moments to Afghanistan.

From the commencement of his rule in 1863, Shere Ali met with that opposition from his brothers which is the normal creed of Afghan Royal families.

After a hard and difficult struggle,* he was, by May 1866, completely driven out of the field, his elder brother Mahomed Afzul Khan proclaiming himself Ameer.

Whilst Shere Ali sought safety in flight, gallantly struggling, however, for his kingdom with the aid of his sons on every possible opportunity, a change in events occurred in the death of Afzul Khan and the succession to the Ameership for a brief period of his next brother Azim.

Our dealings with Afghanistan during this period of anarchy and civil war were carefully based on the policy recorded by Major Lumsden and Mr. Lawrence in 1858. Our traditional policy of establishing in that country a strong and friendly Government was virtually abandoned; we left the country to "take care of itself;" we practically deserted its lawful ruler; and in strict application of our *de facto*, but unfortunately not *de jure*, policy, we held out the hand to each successive claimant,

* It is impossible within due limits to describe in detail the rapidly succeeding events of the Afghan anarchy of 1863-68. They can be found in Wylie's and Wymie's Treas, which are well worthy of perusal. It is sufficient for our purpose here to briefly refer to the leading features.

Oct. 1867.

—recognized, in direct contravention of the policy of the previous 50 years, the division of Afghanistan into two portions,—allowed Persia for the first time (1863) to seize Seistan without remonstrance, and ceased to trouble ourselves further with Russia who was progressing with rapid strides in Central Asia.

Every opportunity was taken to publish our policy,* which indirectly encouraged each successive claimant to fight for the *de facto* position which was to make him the friend of the British Government.

"My friend," wrote the Governor General of India to Afzul Khan after he had obtained a temporary footing in Cabul, "the relations of this Government are with the actual rulers of Afghanistan. If your Highness is able to consolidate your power in Cabul, and is sincerely desirous of being a friend and ally of the British Government, I shall be ready to accept your Highness as such."

This policy was so new even to the Afghans, that they exclaimed, truly enough,—

"It is difficult for any nation to get on with the English. The meaning of this letter would appear to be, that the English desire that our family should exterminate one another; the whole of their intention is clear from the Viceroy's letter. Adverting to the time that their answers have taken to reach us in our difficulties, it seems only right that we should take double time in responding. Without doubt they will have written to the same effect to the Ameer Shere Ali."

"So long," it was subsequently written to Afzul Khan, "as Ameer Shere Ali Khan holds Herat, and maintains friendship with the British Government, I shall recognize him as Ruler of Herat, and shall reciprocate his amity. But upon the same principle, I am prepared to recognize your Highness as Ameer of Cabul and Candahar, and I frankly offer your Highness in that capacity peace and the good will of the British Government."

On the communication of these sentiments to Shere Ali, he exclaimed, naturally enough,—

"The English look to nothing but their own interests, and bide their time. Whosoever's side they see strongest for the time, they turn to him as their friends. I will not waste precious life in entertaining false hopes from the English, and will enter into friendship with other Governments."

And this again leads us to a slight but important digression which Shere Ali's overtures to the Persian Government occasioned.

In September 1867 the Government of India reported that Shere Ali was negotiating an alliance with Persia, and observed on the general question

* "We should not be hasty," so wrote the Governor General of India in Council in 1866, "in giving up Shere Ali's cause at last. We should await the development of events. It should be our policy to show clearly that we will not interfere in the struggle; that we will not aid either party; that we will leave the Afghans to settle their own quarrels, and that we are willing to be on terms of amity and good will with the nation, and with their Rulers *de facto*. Suitable opportunities can be taken to declare that these are the principles which will guide our policy."

Wyllie's Precis,
No. 2, paras. 89,
89.

Wyllie's Precis,
No. 2, para. 153.

No. 3, Secret,
3rd Sept. 1867.

of Afghanistan and Central Asia, that "our relations should always be with the *de facto* ruler of the day, and so long as the *de facto* ruler is not unfriendly to us, we should always be prepared to renew with him the same terms and favourable conditions as obtained under his predecessor. In this way we shall be enabled to maintain our influence in Afghanistan far more effectually than by any advance of our troops,—a contingency which could only be contemplated as a last resort which would unite as one man the Afghan tribes against us and which would paralyse our finances."

Touching on the subject of the position of Russia in Central Asia, and the assertions of some of her statesmen that her true interests did not lie in the extension of territory, &c., Lord Lawrence's Government remarked,—

"If these representations be a correct exposition of the views of Russia, then it is as much in harmony with her interests as it is with those of British India that, up to a certain border, the relations of the respective Governments should be openly acknowledged and admitted, as bringing them into necessary contact and treaty with the tribes and nations on the several sides of such a line. If an understanding, and even an engagement, of this nature were come to, we, on the one hand, could look on without anxiety or apprehension at the proceedings of Russia on her southern frontier, and welcome the civilizing effect of her border Government on the wild tribes of the steppe and on the bigoted and exclusive Governments of Bokhara and Kokand, while Russia on the other hand, assured of our loyal feeling in the matter, would have no jealousy in respect of our alliance with the Afghans and neighbouring tribes or of our negotiations to repress Persia in her designs upon the tracts which border upon her eastern frontier."

No. 1c, dated
Oct. 1867.

The Government of India followed up their Despatch of the 3rd September by reviewing generally their position towards Cabul, and ultimately Russia, with especial reference, in an adverse sense, to any armed advance beyond the present boundary of India, which had been advocated in the English Press.

The Minutes sent home with this Despatch are so lengthy that it is difficult to give more than a general idea of them.

3rd Oct. 1867.

Lord Lawrence commenced his arguments by a decided expression of opinion that the policy which the British Government adopted in 1838-39 in invading Afghanistan was very unwise and uncalled for. He pointed out that that country could scarcely feed its own population, and that one of the causes of the internecine wars between the Chiefs was that they could not subsist in a suitable

manner. In a lucid description of the poverty of the country, he quoted a remark of Dost Mahomed's when at Peshawur in 1856; he said, in speaking of his resources, "We have men and we have rocks in plenty, but we have nothing else." To endeavour to hold such a country firmly, argued Lord Lawrence, or to try to control such a people, was "to court misfortune and calamity." Whether we advanced as friends or foes would, in the end, make little difference. "The Affghans do not want us; they dread our appearance in their country. The circumstances connected with the last Affghan war have created in their hearts a deadly hatred to us as a people, and those feelings are fostered and strengthened by their priests and Chiefs."

Dost Mahomed, according to Lord Lawrence, had the greatest dislike to the deputation of the Mission to Candahar in 1856. "If we are to be friends," said the Dost, "do not force British Officers on me. I have no objection to the presence of a Native Agent at Cabul."

"I am convinced," he added, "that we can gain nothing, but are pretty sure to lose a great deal in prestige, in honour, in the valuable lives of our officers and soldiers, by interfering actively in the affairs of Central Asia, and that so far from strengthening our tenure of India we may thus shake it to its very foundation."

Lord Lawrence went on to argue, that if Russia were to invade India our true policy would be to let her undergo the long and tiresome marches between the Oxus and the Indus.

Further, it had been urged, added Lord Lawrence, "that the extension of Russian power to our frontier would lead to insurrection in the interior of India. I do not think that this would happen to any serious extent, perhaps it would not occur at all. Much would of course depend on the Government of the day and the contentment of the people. But at the worst, our troops massed along the border ready to meet the invaders, would have a greater influence on the discontented people of India than the same troops locked up beyond the mountains of Afghanistan."

The members of Lord Lawrence's Government generally supported these views, the only dissentient member being Sir G. Yule, whose remarks are worthy of attention.*

Sir W. Mansfield followed much in the same sense as Lord Lawrence, whilst advocating the placing of our relations with the Cabul Court on a substantial and friendly footing so soon as the state of the civil war would permit. He concluded,—

"It is an enormous error to look upon India as a solid basis of operations from whence to pour an army of 100,000 men, while trusting to the spirit

* "It is," he said, "the excitement and restlessness within our own territories which would be caused by even a pretence of invasion that we have to fear. Much would, of course, depend on the Government of the day and the contentment of the people. But I believe it perfectly hopeless to expect on the part of any people conquered and ruled by a foreign race such a degree of contentment as would deter them from availing themselves of any fair opportunity of freeing themselves; and preparations for an invasion from Afghanistan, demanding that the greater part of our strength should be assembled on the border would afford such an opportunity, and a most favourable one to our subjects in Hindostan. . . . I do not see how it can be prevented, but it may be postponed, and postponed a gain in every way to us, and means may be taken to retard it

less favourable to our enemies when it does come than it would otherwise be.

"The present system of watching events," continued Sir G. Yule, "without making any preparation for them, the plan of saying, 'Good morning, Sir, how do you do?' to each successive leader who gets to the top, must disgust all the leading men, and proving indefinitely the ill will which the nation already entertains towards us. The policy in question has done us very serious injury already, and must continue to do as much more, unless its evil effects are obviated by other measures."

Sir G. Yule, therefore, advocated the conciliation of Afghanistan, the utmost freedom of trade by the establishment of fairs, opening communications, &c. He felt sure that a poor and proud but greatly nice folk would be made to entertain friendly feelings towards its wealthy neighbour, in spite of all temptations to the contrary. "I would not be in a hurry," added Sir G. Yule, "to recognize a man who had ousted his predecessor, and seated himself on the throne, but when once recognized, something more than words should be given to such men, according to his character and condition, little, comparatively, to one not likely to rule well or long, much to one who promised better. . . . A great effect might be produced in discriminating and occasional assistance in money and arms. . . . I have written this under the belief that, besides the words of welcome to the new leaders, we are doing nothing to improve our position with the Afghans." If this is a mistake, it is one under which I do not alone labour, and its public correction would have a most beneficial effect."

15th Sept. 1867.

* In October 1841 the support of Nohi Nojeh was costing 1,225,000*l.* a year.

"of the people to redeem the difficulties of the Government. . . . It is not for her to rise in defence of her conquerors or in support of an aggressive policy, though we habitually use her resources for her own peace and defence, as well as for our own purposes, including occasional petty invasion of other countries, in pursuance of a broad Asiatic policy. Hence all our military arrangements are those of strangers in the land. Accordingly, it is well to have the truth of this matter constantly present in our minds. We depend solely on the art of administration and on military arrangements, and not on the national feeling and spirit of the people."

Colonel Lumsden followed in a valuable Memorandum, containing a *resumé* of the question. He pointed out that, in the twelve years preceding 1828, 5,600,000*l.* had been spent on the policy initiated by Malcolm in Persia in 1810, with the view of counteracting the growing ascendancy of Russia at the Persian Court, and that by the end of 1837, 3,000,000*l.* had been spent with the same object. By the Cabul Expedition we spent 17,000,000*l.* more money,* and the Persian Expedition cost us 3,000,000*l.* more.

He mentioned the successful invasion and conquest of Cashmere from Ladak in 1543 by Mirza Hyder and Sekunder Khan of Kashgar, by the Karakorum and Leh route, as a proof that the north-western frontier of India is not absolutely impregnable although difficult. He touched on the idea of an advance on Herat as not impossible after the definite scheme put into shape by Napoleon in 1808. Yet the idea of occupying it or even Quetta, was, considering the expense and the irritation such an advance would cause, very chimerical. Finally, he pointed out what, in his opinion, was the true course for the Government to adopt.†

Sir Stafford Northcote forwarded these papers to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with a request that they might be submitted to the Cabinet, with the following opinion of his own,—

"I think it would be reasonable that we should either hold ourselves absolutely aloof from Afghanistan politics, and recognize the *de facto* ruler of the day whoever he may be, or that we should so far ally ourselves with one Chief as to support him with arms and subsidies, as Sir John Lawrence proposes, should occasion require it. But I cannot bring my mind to the proposal that we should subsidize first one and then the other, according as accident brings up Shere Ali or Abdul Rahman to the head of affairs."

Although Sir Stafford Northcote did not think that we had much to fear from a Russian invasion of India, yet he considered that the idea of her advance

† 1. To carry out the Treaty with the Dost of 1855 with integrity, as regards non-interference with the territories of Afghanistan.

2. To resist, by practical threat, the encroachments of Persia eastwards.

3. To remedy our present lack of systematic object and unity in political action.

4. To establish one military control from Peshawar to Kurmichee.

5. To complete the line of railway along and to the frontier.

6. To take up a position in Afghanistan from which the British Government would bring its influence to bear as a support to, or if need be a check on, the *de facto* Government ruling at Cabul, such as an occupation of the Koonar or Koot valleys with a force of 4,000 or 5,000 men, relieving the Cabul Government of the military charge, and paying them (1,500*l.* a year) the revenue. By this step, he admitted, Government would depart from the policy of non-interference, yet, when the safety of Afghanistan was imperilled by various factions, and its neutrality threatened, no other course was open but to strengthen Afghan rule without the direct occupation of the country.

was not wholesome, and that "an agreement with Russia, even if we could not rely on her keeping to it, might have a tranquillizing effect, or if this be thought objectionable, even a diplomatic correspondence which might be made public would have its advantages."

Lord Stanley agreed* that the papers should be circulated to the Cabinet.

The Secretary of State for India replied to the several Despatches from the Government of India above enumerated, saying,—

"It is the desire of Her Majesty's Government not to interfere in the internal conflicts of the Afghans so long as they do not jeopardize the peace of the frontier or lead to the formation of engagements with other powers dangerous to the independence of Afghanistan, which it long has been, and still is, the main object of our policy in that part of the world to maintain. If, however, your Excellency should see reason to believe that either party in the State is endeavouring to strengthen itself against the national feeling by invoking foreign aid, or especially if you should observe any disposition to make territorial sacrifices or otherwise to compromise the integrity of Afghanistan for the sake of obtaining such aid, it is quite right that you should warn those who may evince such an inclination that by such a course they may compel the British Government to give material support to their rivals."

Whilst these were the sentiments of the Government, matters were going from bad to worse in Afghanistan.

Some of the principal Chiefs of the country, seeing the hopelessness of the state of affairs, intimated to the Peshawur Commissioner, without receiving any reply,—

"The men of our family, and the tribes, of one accord come to this conclusion, that, without the interposition of the English Government, peace and order cannot be ensured, and with this view they entertain the thought of forwarding a general petition, acknowledging consent and submission to the rule of the English Government."

Azim Khan, on his usurpation of this troublesome throne in 1867, through the death of his brother Afzul, did not condescend even to announce to us his accession, but the Indian Government, without thinking it necessary to wait for this important eastern formality, despatched a British representative to Cabul,—who was not very cordially received,—congratulating him as Ameer.†

Such was the position to which the too rigid adherence to *de facto* rule‡ had brought our external relations.

* He said, "I am clear that Quetta ought not to be occupied, at any rate under present circumstances. I think a policy of entire abstinence from interference in the affairs of Afghanistan both possible and safe. No alliances, no subsidies. No understanding or engagement with the Russian Government will bind the latter, if they see their advantage in breaking it. I should, therefore, be cautious in making any bargain of this kind are too one-sided. We tie our own hands, and perhaps delude ourselves into the belief that we have tied the hands of the other party as well. I do not believe in Russian invasion."

No. 15, 26th Dec.
1867.

Wylie's Precis.
1867.

† The took place in November 1867. Had the Government of India delayed their recognition of Mohammed Azim Khan until he had acquired something like a stable possession of his Kingdom, the short period of six months, which was the limit of his reign, would have shown how little power he really possessed, and how hated he was by the Afghan nation.

‡ It kept Afghanistan in war, and obliged us to recognize a partitione, Syud Salem, as ruler of Muscat.

Shere Ali was not forgetful in his trials of the strength which an alliance with the British Government would give him; he made a last desperate struggle for his throne, and once more (8th September 1868) entered Cabul in triumph as ruler, and compelled Azim Khan and his nephew, Abdul Rahman, to take refuge in flight.*

Before pursuing this story further, it is desirable to refer back again to the advances of the Russians.

Whilst the Persians were allowed to seize Seistan, and occupy a position which will always paralyse Afghanistan (*vide* Appendix), the Russians made hostile demonstrations against Bokhara, attempted under General Cherniayef † to capture Jeesakh (January 1866), and, with a force of 2,000 men under General Romanofski, advanced on Irdjir (8th May 1866), putting to flight with great ease a Bokharian army of 40,000 men.

After this success the Russian General had to decide "between two courses,"—one, to advance on Samarcand and Bokhara in pursuit of the flying Ameer, the other to attack Khojend. ‡ He wisely chose the latter, and took it by storm (24th June 1866), with enormous loss to the defenders.

The Ameer of Bokhara, according to Russian accounts, § continued to maintain however a menacing aspect, and the Russians did not require much inducement to pursue their career of success. The province of Tashkend was formally annexed (27th August 1866), whilst the Russian General captured the fort of Uratiubé (2nd October 1866), with heavy loss to the Bokharians, followed by the reduction of the strong fort of Jeesakh (18th October 1866), before which Cherniayef had failed.

The Russian forces now required breathing time. No further advances beyond the occupation of strong outposts beyond Jeesakh were made in 1867. The principal event of the year was the creation of the province of Turkestan into a government independent of Orenburgh, a province which was, by the Emperor's ukase of the 11th July 1867, to comprise, in addition to Turkestan and Tashkend "the territories beyond the Syr-Daria occupied in 1866."

Thus Russia openly threw over her circular of 1864, and established a military frontier from the Tarbagatai Mountains in Chinese Tartary through Kopal, Vernooč, Tashkend, Khojend, Perovski, to the Aral Sea, which made it impossible henceforth for England to object or Bokharians and Khivans to resist.

Another year saw her, under General Kauffman, in possession (1st May 1868), of Samarcand the ancient city of Timour, in addition to the important fortress (18th May 1868) of Katty Kurgan.

* Azim Khan died on the route to Turkestan. Abdul Rahman succeeded in reaching Samarcand, where he has remained ever since an Afghan refugee in Russian pay, the leader of armies against Bokhara, one of the most formidable competitors for the throne of Afghanistan, and ready to be launched at the first favourable moment against Shere Ali or his sons. This is a matter which truly requires attention, and "mutual explanation."

† He was recalled for this failure, and superseded by Romanofski.

‡ Khojend is a renowned fortress, and a great commercial mart. All the caravans from Bokhara and Tashkend to Samarcand and Bokhara, and vice versa, have to pass under its walls, and pay heavy dues.

§ The whole history of these operations is from Russian sources, and therefore not worthy of much reliance.

Russian Advances,
War Office, 1873.

Bokhara, cut off from her water supply,* at once gave in, and consented to pay tribute to the Emperor, waiting her final annexation. By the virtual conquest of Kokand, Bokhara, and Khiva, the three provinces which alone geographically come under the term "Central Asia," Russia became the ruler of its destinies without any one to dispute her possession.

Let it not be supposed, however, that the inhabitants of these countries tamely submitted to their fate. They sent embassies to India and Constantinople, entreating for aid which could not be given, and, relating anecdotes of Russian rule which were anything but creditable to a Christian power desiring nought but peace, tranquillity, and the independence of her neighbours, were able to take back the one reply of our unwillingness and helplessness.

Whilst Russia thus took up a position in Central Asia which emboldened her henceforth to take an independent course, and almost question our right of demanding explanation, the British Government did not again venture to repeat their recent failure of 1865. The Russian Government were left without question to consolidate their new conquests, and to send exploring parties to Yarkund,† whilst we gave most public declarations of our intention of "non-interference."

At this period came a change of events and a change of policy.

It must be remembered that Shere Ali never lost entire hold of his kingdom. In his worst plight he held Herat and Turkestan, and the reign of Mahomed Azim at Cabul only lasted from November 1867 to May 1868. On the 9th of May of that year Yacoub Khan occupied Candahar, where he was joined in June by his father; whilst on the 22nd of August we see Azim Khan in full flight to Turkestan and Ismail Khan taking possession of Cabul in the name of his uncle, Shere Ali, who entered his capital in triumph on the 8th September 1868. Thus Shere Ali, after more than four years' hard struggle and the loss of his eldest and favourite son and heir apparent,‡ regained possession of the kingdom of Afghanistan.

Shere Ali addressed the British representatives at Cabul in friendly terms.§

At this time also Sir Henry Rawlinson|| once more directed attention to Central Asia affairs, whilst the late Lord Mayo was nominated Viceroy elect.

Sir H. Rawlinson's memorandum is almost too valuable to cut up into quotations, although too long to give *in extenso*. It must therefore be studied separately. It may be said, however, generally that he drew attention to the rapidly succeeding conquests of Russia, her protestations of moderation and unscrupulous conquests, her re-

* The whole water supply of Bokhara comes from Samarkand. Russia's system of warfare has been a system of possessing herself of the lakes, rivers, and water supply of Central Asia. She has succeeded, both as regards Bokhara and Khiva, and even at this moment she likes wipe the Northern Turcomans from the roll of mankind or procure their instant submission, by cutting off this water. (Vide "Ker's Flood to Khiva," 1874, 203 other authorities.)

† Captain Beitchell reached Kashgar on 21st October 1867, and has published an interesting account of his travels.

‡ Mahomed Ali Khan was killed in a hand to hand encounter with his uncle, Amooz Khan, who was immediately afterwards killed himself. The Ameer was so heavily oppressed with grief that for a time fears were entertained as to his sanity.

§ He remarked,—

"From the British Government I have received no friendship or kindness with reference to my success in this miserable civil war, until God Almighty of his own favour has again bestowed upon me the country of my inheritance. Now it is my desire to proceed with a small party to Calcutta for the purpose of a meeting, and to show my sincerity and firm attachment to the British Government and make known my wants."

|| Sir H. Rawlinson wrote his able memorandum on 20th July 1868. Shere Ali regained his throne 22nd August.

prisoners to her conquering generals whilst secretly rewarding them for their conquests, her caution, temper, and careful arrangements.

Whilst picturing the position of Russia in possession of the Jaxartes and Oxus, both navigable by small steamers and joined to the Caucasus by water and rail, he called attention to the question of how this position would affect our own in India, provided we continued our policy of abstinence from all active interference against her. He pointed out the close geographical and political ties that existed between Cabul and Bokhara, and the actual implication of Russia in Afghan affairs.*

Sir Henry Rawlinson then pointed out the weakness of the assumption that Russia did not contemplate the acquisition of any direct advantage over us by her career of Asiatic conquest. She was not likely, nor could we expect her, to undervalue the political leverage which her new position gave her. Quoting a statement of Sir Richard Temple, it was doubtful, he argued, whether we were not living on a volcano in India.†

With all this before us "are we justified," said Sir Henry Rawlinson, "in maintaining what has been sarcastically, though, perhaps, unfairly called "Sir John Lawrence's policy of 'masterly inactivity?'"

Sir Henry Rawlinson went on to show that to establish a strong and friendly power on our North-West Frontier had always been the true policy of India. He denied that disorder had been the normal condition of Afghanistan. On the contrary, from 1842 to 1863, a period of 20 years, the country had been perfectly tranquil and contented under the strong and friendly rule of the Dost, which seemed to point to the moral, that the distractions of the country since that period were somewhat due to our non-interference.

"The fortunes of Shere Ali," added Sir Henry Rawlinson, "are again in the ascendant. He should be secured in our interests without delay. Provided that he is unentangled with Russia, the restoration of his father's subsidy and the moral support of the British Indian Government would probably be sufficient to place him above all opposition and to secure his fidelity; and it may indeed be necessary to furnish him with arms and officers or even to place an auxiliary contingent at his disposal; but, whatever the price, it must be paid; of such paramount importance is it to obtain at the present time a dominant position at Cabul and to close that avenue of approach against Russia. Whether the time is come for the re-establishment of a Mission at Cabul, charged with the distribution of the subsidy and the direction of our quasi-protectorate of the country, is a question that can only be decided on the spot. It is a position that we must inevitably occupy sooner or later unless we are

* Sir H. Rawlinson added:—

"The implication of Russia in Afghan affairs is therefore no longer a matter of speculation. She has an Afghan contingent in her service commanded by a grandson of Dost Mahomed Khan, Abdul Bohann Khan, son of Afzul Khan, and a bitter enemy of his uncle, Shere Ali Khan. She is the mistress of a country which, on more occasions than one has been the mother of Cabul. It will depend on her discretion whether she interfere to the extent of regulating the succession and directing the government, or whether she merely offer friendly counsel and ultimate general relations of amity."
 "If she establish a mission at Cabul," said Sir Henry Rawlinson, "the effect of such an establishment will be at once perceptible in India. . . . If Russia once assumes a position which entitles her, in Native estimation, to challenge Asiatic supremacy, the disquieting effect will be prodigious. Every Chief throughout Northern India who either has, or fancies he has, a grievance will at once commence intriguing. It is not," it was added, "that the natives of India, whether Mahomedans or Hindus, have any particular affection for the Russians or believe that their rule will be more kindly and beneficial than their own; on the contrary, the followers of the Prophet everywhere regard the Russians as more intractable infidels than the English from their unclean habits and supposed worship of pictures, but, on the other hand, the approach of a rival European power betokens change, and to the active, gambling, reckless spirit of Asiatics change is always exciting and agreeable."

† "There are four classes who are necessarily our enemies, and are not open to any conciliation that we could reasonably use. There are, first, the priestly class, whether Hindu or Mahomedan; 2ndly, the military and political class; 3rdly, the Native Princes and Chiefs whom we have superseded; and 4thly, the mob, the *canaille*,—the blackguardism of the population. From what I know of Delhi in 1857-58, from what I am authentically informed of in respect to Hyderabad at that time, I believe that not more ferocely does the tiger hunger for his prey than does the Mahomedan fanatic throughout India thirst for the blood of the white infidel. All this may be very sad, but it is no use disguising a fact which is inevitable."—(Sir R. Temple's Report on Hyderabad.)

“ prepared to jeopardize our Indian Empire, and
 “ when once we have acquired the goodwill and
 “ confidence of the Governor there can be no great
 “ risk attached to it. The success, indeed,* of
 “ Major Lumsden’s mission (under the unfavourable
 “ circumstances of the mutiny) has already shown,
 “ that British Officers of firm but conciliatory
 “ bearing may traverse our old battle fields without
 “ exciting any special or dangerous hostility.”

Whilst Sir Henry Rawlinson was expressing these opinions at home, Lord Lawrence’s Government was able to announce the re-establishment of Shere Ali’s power, and their recommendation to give him 120,000*l.* and 3,000 muskets. Meanwhile Shere Ali wrote to the Governor General announcing his success; and a friendly correspondence was carried on ending in the promise of the above money† and arms.

Sir Henry Rawlinson’s Memorandum was sent out to India, and gave occasion for a further series of interminable Minutes.‡

It is neither desirable nor possible to quote from them the opinions of the writers which have been already sufficiently shown in the Memorandum. Suffice it to say that the Governor General and his Council seemed to agree in some slight change of policy, and in sending home their Minutes summed up this policy as follows,—

“ We object to any active interference in the
 “ affairs of Afghanistan by the deputation of a
 “ high British Officer, with or without a contingent,
 “ or by the forcible or amicable occupation of any
 “ post or tract in that country beyond our own
 “ frontier, inasmuch as we think such a measure
 “ would, under present circumstances, engender
 “ irritation, defiance, and hatred in the minds of
 “ the Afghans, without in the least strengthening
 “ our power either for attack or defence. We think
 “ it impolitic and unwise to decrease any of the
 “ difficulties which would be entailed on Russia, if
 “ that Power seriously thought of invading India,
 “ as we should certainly decrease them if we left
 “ our own frontier, and met her halfway in a diffi-
 “ cult country, and, possibly, in the midst of a hos-
 “ tile or exasperated population. We foresee no
 “ limits to the expenditure which such a move
 “ might require, and we protest against the neces-
 “ sity of having to impose additional taxation on
 “ the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is,
 “ to bear such pressure for measures which they
 “ can both understand and appreciate; and we think
 “ that the objects which we have at heart, in com-
 “ mon with all interested in India, may be attained
 “ by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our
 “ frontier, and by giving all our care, and expend-
 “ ing all our resources for the attainment of prac-
 “ tical and sound ends over which we can exercise
 “ an effective and immediate control.”

“ Should a foreign Power, such as Russia, ever
 “ seriously think of invading India from without,

* There is a strange divergence of opinion here between Henry Rawlinson and Major Lumsden and Lord Lawrence. The belief in India is that Sir Henry Rawlinson is right, and that Major Lumsden unintentionally-exaggerated our difficulties and dangers.

Telegram, 10th
 Sept. 1868, to
 Secretary of State.
 Despatch No. 169,
 to Secretary of
 State, 16th Nov.
 1868.

† 60,000*l.* was given before, and remaining 60,000*l.* after, 4 Umballa Durbar in 1869.

‡ They are to be found in full, No. 1 Secret, 4th Januzay 1840, to Secretary of State, and Wynne’s Confidential Proc. 1872.

No. 1, Secret, 4th
 Jan. 1869.

Attention is drawn to these remarks of India as it should
but India as it is not. It is a fairy picture.

"or, what is more probable, of stirring up the
"elements of dissatisfaction or anarchy within it,
"our true policy, our strongest security, would
"then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous
"absence from entanglements at either Cabul.
"Candahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance
"on a compact,* highly equipped, and disciplined
"army stationed within our own territories, or on
"our own border; in the contentment, if not in
"the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of
"security of title and possession with which our
"whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of
"the principal Chiefs and the Native aristocracy;
"in the construction of material works within
"British India which enhance the comfort of the
"people while they add to our political and military
"strength; in husbanding our finances and con-
"solidating and multiplying our resources; in quiet
"preparation for all contingencies which no Indian
"statesman should disregard; and in a trust in the
"rectitude and honesty of our intentions coupled
"with the avoidance of all sources of complaint
"which either invite foreign aggression or stir up
"restless spirits to domestic revolt.

Change of policy.

"The following are the only fresh measures
"which we could bring ourselves to recommend.
"We think that endeavours might be made to come
"to some clear understanding with the Court of
"St. Petersburg as to its projects and designs in
"Central Asia, and that it might be given to under-
"stand, in firm but courteous language, that it
"cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of
"Afghanistan or in those of any State which lies
"contiguous to our frontier. We are aware that
"this subject was pressed on Sir Stafford Northcote
"in the Despatches from us, which were all re-
"viewed by him in his Letter of the 20th of
"December 1867, No. 15, but without any result.
"The subject, however, is of such paramount im-
"portance that we think ourselves justified in
"again pressing it on Her Majesty's Government.
"The truth appears to us to be, that the advances
"of Russia, coupled with the constant allusions
"made in the newspapers to her progress as com-
"pared with what is called the inaction of the
"British Government, have produced in the minds
"of Europeans and Natives what we believe to be
"an exaggerated opinion of her resources and
"power. A mutual good understanding between
"the two Powers, though difficult of attainment,
"would enable us to take means to counteract
"unfounded rumours and to prevent unnecessary
"alarms,

"Then, we think that our relations with the
"Court of Teheran should be placed entirely
"under the Secretary of State for India, and that
"we should be empowered to give to any *de facto*
"Ruler of Cabul some arms and ammunition and
"substantial pecuniary assistance, as well as moral

" support, as occasion may offer, but without any
 " formal offensive or defensive alliance.

• • • • •
 " With these remarks, we would suggest further,
 " that opportunity be taken by Her Majesty's
 " Government to lay down a course of action which
 " will avoid the perpetual recurrence to these
 " exciting topics, and which will strengthen the
 " hands of those who have to conduct the affairs of
 " India on the spot, by, as we hope, endorsing
 " views which in the best interests of all parties
 " we have carefully considered, and to which we
 " respectfully and firmly adhere."

No immediate action appears to have been taken
 on this change of policy; nor was any necessary.
 For events settled themselves.

PART II.

The new Viceroy had started for India in No-
 vember 1868, and reached Calcutta on the 13th
 January 1869.

Lord Mayo had studied the "Central Asia
 question" before departure, and formed his con-
 clusions as to his foreign policy. He was absolutely
 in favour of abandoning inaction, although quite as
 averse as his predecessor to anything like armed
 intervention across our border. He looked upon
 Afghanistan as a small, although important, part
 of the general question.

Lord Mayo was glad to meet Shere Ali Khan,
 not only as a friendly act towards a neighbouring
 Ruler, but as one which by the splendour of his
 reception and the import of his acts and words,
 might lay the foundation of a firm general policy
 which he felt was one of the main safeguards of our
 stability in India. In various letters he wrote,—

" I hope that sensible men will not continue to
 " advocate the extreme line of absolute inaction, or
 " the worse alternative of meddling and muddling
 " by subsidies and emissaries. The safe course is
 " watchfulness, and friendly intercourse with neigh-
 " bouring States and tribes."^a

Again he wrote, "We must maintain over our
 " neighbours that moral influence which is in-
 " separable from the true interests of the strongest
 " Power in Asia. England cannot maintain a
 " Tibetan policy in the East. It is a policy that
 " must eventually have led to war. With Asiatics
 " a bold front is the first element of success, and a
 " bold front can, I firmly believe, be well main-
 " tained without aggression, oppression, foreign
 " conquest, or domestic tyranny. I am confident
 " we are in the right groove. We may have re-
 " verses, we are sure to meet with disappointments,
 " for risk is never absent from British existence in
 " the East."

^a He added, "Surround India with strong, friendly, or in-
 dependent States, who will have more interest in keeping us
 with us than with any other Power, and we are safe. The
 Central Asian question is a longhair if prudence be observed.
 We must look inside as well as out. Where the influence of
 Shere Ali's visit will be keenly felt is in the little disaffected
 Durbars of India and among those of our own people who hate
 our rule, for they know perfectly well that an Afghan will
 gladly fight an Indian and can always beat him, and that the
 Gurbulis Durbar will bring 50,000 of them in mass if we let
 them."

* The late Lord Mayo generally disliked the system of Minute writing, and drafted all his views into Despatches, the important paragraphs of which he wrote himself.

29th Dec. 1871,
embodied in a
Despatch to Sec-
retary of State,
No. 4, Secret, 19th
Jan. 1872.

Finally, before leaving this subject of the opinions of the new Viceroy as to the general foreign policy to be pursued in regard to India, let us read the last Minute* that he wrote on it before his lamentable death.

" I have never met a sensible politician who held
" the opinion that our true policy is to await an
" invasion of India within our frontiers, and do
" nothing outside. I have frequently laid down
" what I believe to be the cardinal points of Anglo-
" Indian policy. They may be summed up in a few
" words.

" We should establish with our frontier of States
" of Khelat, Afghanistan, Yarkund, Nepal, and
" Burmah, intimate relations of friendship; we
" should make them feel that though we are all-
" powerful, we desire to support their nationality;
" that, when necessity arises we might assist them
" with money, arms, and even perhaps in certain
" eventualities with men. We could thus create
" in them outworks of our Empire, and, assuring
" them that the days of annexation are passed,
" make them know that they have everything to
" gain and nothing to lose by endeavouring to
" deserve our favour and support. Further, we
" should strenuously oppose any attempt to neu-
" tralize those territories in the European sense,
" or to sanction or invite the interference of any
" European Power in their affairs.

" It may take years to develop this policy. It is
" contrary to what has hitherto been our course in
" India, but if it is once established, recognized,
" and appreciated, our Empire will be compara-
" tively secure."

" As to possible aggressions on the part of
" Russia, I am of opinion that any such movements
" should be protested against as opportunities
" occur. The party at St. Petersburg which is in
" favour of peace and of maintaining the *status*
" *quo* in Central Asia is very strong. Our diffi-
" culties with Russia are greater than with Turkey
" and Persia, but if a *firm, decided, and con-*
" *ciliatory* tone be adopted with all those Powers,
" if we can assure them that we have no ulterior
" designs of our own to serve, that our only object
" is the maintenance of peace and the spread of
" civilization over the wide territories which they
" govern, the moral influence that we could
" exercise in this direction would be so powerful as
" to render it extremely difficult for any of them
" willfully or deliberately to break the peace. . . .
" As to Persia, she can only succeed in securing
" for herself that position in which the British Go-
" vernment desires to see her by giving up, once
" and for all, vain projects for further extension of
" territory, by establishing some approach to a
" stable and just Government, and by organizing
" a strong internal administration."

" In regard to the transfer of the Persian Mission
" to the control of the Indian Government, I concur
" with Sir Henry Rawlinson as to the absolute

"necessity of an immediate change in the relations of the Indian Government with the British Mission at Teheran. I heartily subscribe to every word he says as to the good influence which an able and energetic Anglo-Indian statesman would exercise over the mind of the present Sovereign of Persia. The Indian Government could always supply an officer well fitted for the responsible and important duties which he would have to perform, and, seeing as we do repeatedly the enormous influence that a straightforward, courteous, and accomplished English gentleman can obtain in a very little time over the minds of Asiatic rulers, I cannot but believe that the recommendation which has been repeatedly made by the present Indian Government would, if carried out, be met with certain and immediate success."

Such were the cardinal points of the late Viceroy's ideas of general foreign policy, and he steadily kept them in view from the day of his landing till the day of his death.

Having said thus much, let us return to the first and most important of the "independent and friendly" States which were to surround India,—Afghanistan.

The wish that Shere Ali had expressed for an interview with the Viceroy, did not take place till 27th March 1869.*

Shere Ali entered British territory on the 2nd of March, and travelled slowly to Umballa, which he reached on the 23rd idem. He was much surprised at all he saw in British Indian territory, and many are the stories told of him *en route*.†

It is worthy of remark, that in secret councils held by him *en route*, it was agreed that one of the most important subjects to be discussed was that "Russia was daily extending its conquests and had come up to the confines of Balkh and Herat; that the British Government should take measures openly for the protection of these borders;" that the Ameer was prepared with his heart and property to oppose the Russians for the sake of protecting his country, and in deference to the British Government. "Let the British Government," it was said, "state the measures they propose to take in this matter; the external enemy should be first attended to." The Ameer then remarked,—

"Should the British authorities propose that an European Agent should be stationed at Cabul itself, although I am myself agreeable to such an arrangement, yet the people of Cabul are turbulent and mischievous. Should any European Agent be injured in any way, which God forbid, I would be disgraced. The late Ameer, my father, on these very considerations, refused to have an European Agent at his capital. But if an Agent be located in the interior, at places like Candahar, Balkh, Herat, there would be no objection. Such

* Lord Mayo did not wish to hurry matters; he desired, as a matter of policy, that the Central Asian States should clearly see that Shere Ali sought the interview of us and not us of him. This may appear to be a slight, but is an important point in Asiatic diplomacy.

† At one time he remarked, "The English spread wealth and prosperity in their tract wherever they go. It cannot, in fact, be otherwise, under their system of rule, where justice is tempered with mercy and the welfare of the multitude the object of Government."

At another time he said, "The ingenuity of the English has reached the highest point of perfection. In fact it is only we Afghans that remain the ignorant asses we always have been!"

In talking politics he remarked that British influence in Persia was quite powerless against that of Russia.

"an arrangement would be advantageous to both the Governments."

The meeting between Shere Ali and the Viceroy was very cordial.*

At the various private interviews between the Viceroy and the Ameer, the latter, with great earnestness, declared that the premature recognition of Azim Khan, who was not the lawful Ruler, had been the main cause of all the bloodshed and misery which had since occurred. He was anxious that we should acknowledge only himself and his family; he exclaimed again and again, that to acknowledge the Ruler *pro tem* and *de facto* was to invite competition for a throne and excite the hopes of all kinds of candidates; he therefore expressed great anxiety for a personal treaty; for "a fire had been lit in that country by the declaration that we would acknowledge any one who should win his way to the throne, and that nothing short of some assurance to the contrary would suffice to extinguish it." †

Lord Mayo was averse to anything like a treaty; he felt that it would lay the British Government under an awkward obligation to support the Afghans and the family of Shere Ali under any emergency, whilst a fixed subsidy would oblige us to expend a large annual sum of money which it were better to keep in our own hands and give when we deemed it expedient.

Although the Ameer was disappointed of his hopes of a treaty and subsidy, and although he had likewise to lay aside his wish to nominate his favourite boy, Abdoolah Jan, to be heir apparent, yet he went back to his dominions a contented man. He made no secret of it, for this was his first meeting with an Indian Viceroy, and he carried back with him not only material assistance in money and arms, but an assurance of warm countenance and support such as never before had been given to any Ruler in Afghanistan. ‡

The Umballa meeting broke up on the 5th of April, and the Ameer returned to Cabul territory on 26th April 1869.

So great was the moral effect of the meeting which had been spread throughout the length and breadth of the Central Asian States, that the first letter which the Ameer received on his return was a signed and sealed document from the hitherto rebellious Chiefs of Afghan Turkestan surrendering without a further blow, whilst embassies from Yarkund, Bokhara, Khiva, and other places poured into India asking for friendship and assistance. The Ameer went back with a firm resolve, to which he has ever since steadily adhered under great temptations to the contrary, of reforms § and a non-aggressive policy.

The policy of the "Umballa Durbar" is best

* Lord Mayo received him in Durbar, surrounded by the principal civil and military officers in India. In welcoming the Ameer, he expressed the hope that the meeting would be the commencement of many years of amity between Her Majesty and himself, and of mutual confidence and good will between the nation which Her Majesty rules in India and all the subjects of His Highness. The Viceroy also presented him with a sword, "as a token of his wish that he would ever be victorious over his enemies in defence of his just and lawful rights, and in all his efforts for the consolidation of his Kingdom."

† In a conference with the Ameer's confidential Minister (31st March 1869), it appeared that the Ameer was open to any proposition we could make for the security of his northern border, even to the construction of forts or the admission of European garrisons. The advantage of a clear understanding between Afghanistan and England would be, that "were the Russians or other enemy to come, even though the Afghans could not successfully keep them out of their country, they could harass them in every way; and the fact of a good understanding would spread fast over Asia." The Minister said he was "looking far forward, and the day might come when the Russians would arrive and the Ameer would be glad not only of British Officers as agents, but of arms and troops to back them." Syed Noor Mahomed said that Afghan enmity was far more bitter against the Persians and their friends, than against us, even at the present, and as we acting as their friends they would co-operate with a hearty friendship and energy in the field which we could little imagine.

‡ Lord Mayo's assurances of future support were couched as follows:—

"I earnestly trust that, on your Highness' return to your own country, you may be enabled specially to establish your legitimate rule over your entire kingdom, to consolidate your power, to create a firm and successful administration in every province of Afghanistan, to promote the interests of commerce, and to secure peace and tranquillity within all your borders."

"Although, as already intimated to you, the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war, and it will further endeavor from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor."

"This let or was accompanied by a present of two batteries of 2000 and 10,000 stand of arms."

§ He established courts to hear petitions, ordered promotion in his army to go by merit, insisted on cash payments for his troops instead of assignments of land, ordered his people in West English boots dressed himself in English clothes, organized a Council of State, rejected plunderers and drove some of his worst enemies.

described in the words of the Government of India, who wrote,—

"We have every reason to hope that the visit of His Highness, and the communications which have taken place, will be productive of the happiest results. It has assured His Highness that the policy which was adopted by his Lordship's predecessor, on the Amir's regaining the throne of Cabul in August last, will be continued. It will show to the world that we have in the Ruler of Afghanistan a faithful ally, and that while the British Government has no desire of aggrandisement and extension of territory, it will still use all its influence to support neighbouring Powers and Rulers who are earnestly endeavouring to create, by their own exertions, a strong, independent, and friendly Government."

It is now desirable to touch on the third series of explanations (1869-74) which took place between the English and Russian Cabinets on the subject of their mutual relations in Central Asia.†

There was much uneasiness felt in England, at the beginning of 1869, in regard to the recent strides of Russian advance. Lord Clarendon had frequent conversations with the Russian Ambassador on the subject, as well as on the necessity of allaying the uneasiness that existed. He recommended the recognition of some neutral territory between the possessions of the two Powers, and referred to Afghanistan as fulfilling the necessary conditions.

On the other hand, the re-establishment of Shere Ali on the throne of Afghanistan, the consolidation of his kingdom, and the fame of the "Umballa Durbar,"—all giving rise to reports of aggressive designs on the Russian position in Turkestan,—caused great uneasiness to Russia, and a general inclination was felt on both sides to come to some mutual and friendly understanding.

Baron Brunnow communicated Lord Clarendon's views to Prince Gortchakoff, and shortly afterwards informed him by letter that "nothing could better suit the views of the Emperor" than the proposition.

On the subject being referred to the Secretary of State for India, the Duke of Argyll informed the Foreign Office that, after consultation with the Members of his Council, he was decidedly of opinion that Afghanistan would not fulfil the conditions required, suggesting, at the same time, his opinion that the Upper Oxus, which was south of Bokhara, might be "the boundary line which neither Power should permit their forces to cross." On this matter being communicated to India, Lord Mayo's Government expressed their entire concurrence in the view that the feeling of uneasiness entertained by the British and Indian public with respect to the late advance made by Russia in Central Asia should as soon as possible be allayed,

3rd April 1869.

Lord Mayo wrote in a semi-official Letter to the Secretary of State (4th April 1869).—

"We have distinctly intimated to the Amir that, under circumstances, shall a British soldier cross his frontier to assist him in quelling his rebellious subjects, that no fixed salary or money allowance will be given for any non-aid period, that no promise of assistance in other way can be made, that no treaty can be entered into obliging us under any circumstances to recognize him and his descendants as Rulers of Afghanistan, yet that by the most open and absolute present recognition, and by every public evidence of friendly disposition, of respect to his character and interest in his fortunes, we are prepared to give him all the moral support in our power, and to assist him with money and arms, and in other ways, whenever we deem it possible or desirable to do so.

"I am convinced," added Lord Mayo, "that the policy we have adopted in this instance is safe, clear, right, and honest, and alike alike to ourselves and the Amir. We must assist him, but in a way that neither entangles us in any engagements which may prove embarrassing hereafter, nor weaken his dependence. The Afghans were once our friends, till we drove them in an evil hour, to create them. I believe this may be our opportunity if we strictly adhere to what has been committed here, and the day may not be far distant when we may find the advantage of possessing on our frontier an almost impregnable country, manned by some of the best hill troops in the world."

† This need not be done in much detail, as the correspondence has been so recently published and read. The few points of it will chiefly be pointed out.

Parliamentary Papers, 1873.
Lord Clarendon to Sir A. Huchman, 27th March 1869.

17th April 1869.

No. 177, Secret,
3rd June 1869.

* Lord Mayo's Government clearly pointed out the disadvantages of it, and sketched the policy which we ought to pursue in establishing our own borders, friendly and independent States, restraining Persia from aggression, and Russia from interference in Yarkund and elsewhere on our border, and pointing out at great length their disapproval of any idea of *neutralizing* any of the States on our border.

"It is, in our opinion," said the Government of India, "essential to our strength and power that we should be responsible to no foreign potentate for any of our dealings with the people who inhabit our frontiers. A declaration of absolute neutrality, enforced by treaty with European States, in regard to these countries, might lead eventually to some difficulty and danger."

"We believe, in fact, that as it is in the interests of both countries that a wide border of independent States should exist between the British frontier and the Russian boundary, it would be desirable that Russia should be invited to adopt the policy with regard to Khiva and other kindred States that we are willing to pledge ourselves to adopt towards Khorat, Afghanistan, and the districts around Yarkund."

"A pledge of mutual non-interference of this kind, embodied in treaty, would be alike honorable to both nations, and would be better suited to the position in which civilized Powers must always stand with regard to wild and savage tribes than specific treaty engagements could ever be."

"Let Russia and England declare to the world that they have a common mission in Asia, namely, the establishment of good government and the civilization of the mighty nations entrusted to their care, and that, as a pledge of good faith, it was desirable that a line of independent States should exist between their respective frontiers. Were this effect, we believe that public opinion, which is daily growing more and more powerful in every part of the world, would be amply satisfied."

"That feeling of jealousy and apprehension to which, latterly, expression has been given, both in the English and Russian press, would be speedily allayed by the conviction that the honour of two great nations was pledged to non-interference with each other's interests, and that they felt and declared that their objects and mission were the same."—(No. 177 to Secretary of State, 2nd June 1859.)

† By a treaty with China in 1860, Russia acquired the right of establishing an agent at Yarkund. She has never exercised this right.

‡ Commissioner of Jullundur. He had for some years taken an active interest in Central Asian affairs, especially Yarkund.

and cordially agreed in the opinion that Afghanistan could on no consideration whatever be considered as a neutral territory.*

The question remained in this stage for some months, during which Lord Clarendon carried on an important correspondence with our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, the chief points of which were that the Emperor of Russia acknowledged that "he had no ambitious views," but "had been drawn" by circumstances further than he wished into "Central Asia." Prince Gortchakoff, whilst expressing apprehension that the policy of the Indian Viceroy appeared to be aggressive, stated that "extension of territory was extension of weakness," and that Russia had no intention of going further "south." He further said that although Bokhara might at any moment be taken because it depended for its water supply on Samarcand, yet that it was the intention of the Emperor "not to retain Samarcand," and that "he could give no better proof" of His Majesty's determination not to proceed "further southwards." Prince Gortchakoff gave assurance that Russia had no hostile designs on Yarkund,† in fact, that her treaty with China precluded her from interfering with Kashgar.

Meanwhile Mr. Forsyth ‡ left India on leave, receiving authority from Lord Mayo, should it meet with the concurrence of the Home authorities, to give assurances to the Russian Minister of his peaceful policy, and to enter into frank and friendly explanations on Central Asian matters.

Mr. Forsyth reached St. Petersburg in October 1860, and carried out his mission with judgment and ability.

Mr. Forsyth showed Prince Gortchakoff a letter from Lord Mayo, expressing his hope that the most complete *entente cordiale* should be maintained between Russia and England in Central Asia. In mentioning Lord Mayo's views that the best security for peace would be provided by maintaining the intermediate States in a position of independence, and that the policy framed in India would always be in entire accordance with the wishes of the Government in England, Mr. Forsyth elicited the remark from Prince Gortchakoff that "in like manner it was to be understood that the policy enunciated at St. Petersburg was that which ruled the actions of "all Russian Officers in the remotest parts of the "Empire, and if different interpretations were put "forth by Consuls or Agents in other parts, they "were to be treated as mistakes which should be blown "away." In subsequent interviews with the Minister of War and the Minister of the Asiatic Department, it was agreed that Russia should accept as Afghanistan all the provinces which Shere Ali then held, whilst the Emperor himself repeated his views that "there was no intention of extending the Russian dominions."

The conferences at St. Petersburg comprising the above important declarations, in addition to

Mr. Forsyth to
Sir A. Buchanan.
2nd Nov. 1869.

those of mutual good feeling, resulted, it may be generally said, in an understanding that the Oxus should be the boundary line of Shere Ali's dominions to the north, and in the promises of both England and Russia to prevent aggression on the part of the States under their control.

Whilst these peaceful negotiations were going on however at St. Petersburg, the Russian Government lost no time in sending, "in the interests of commerce," an expedition of 3,000 men from Petroski on the Caspian, to an unknown point on the opposite coast, which turned out to be Kizzil Sou on the Balkan Bay, whilst making careful preparations for an attack on Khiva.

Prince Gortchakoff, however, when questioned, "denied positively the report of any intention of the Russian Government to despatch a military expedition to Khiva;" he emphatically repeated his determination not to consent "to an extension of the Empire."

In the meantime, Lord Mayo's Government again recorded its views on the necessity for a sincere reciprocity of pacific policy in regard to the independent countries in Central Asia,¹ and obtained from M. de Stremoukoff the assurance that the policy of the Indian Government, as set forth by Lord Mayo, formed also their own programme, and described "exactly what they desired and were endeavouring to establish."

Some doubts now arose as to certain points of the line of boundary between Afghanistan and Bokhara, the point was referred by the Russian Cabinet to General Kaufmann for opinion, with an order at the same time to make it known everywhere in Central Asia, "that a perfect understanding exists between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia with reference to the affairs and interests of these countries." General Kaufmann wrote to the Ameer of Cabul informing him of this, but as Shere Ali was aware of the hostile preparations against Khiva, and was suspicious of recent threatenings against Affghau and Turkestan, he felt uneasy at the receipt of the letter and sent it to the Viceroy, "wishing to be guided entirely in the reply by the wishes and counsels of the British Government."

The opportunity was taken to inform him of the negotiations of November 1869 at St. Petersburg, and of the pacific declaration of the Russian Cabinet.

Mr. Thomson to
Lord Clarendon,
16th Nov. 1869
Mr. Alison, ditto,
18th Dec. 1869.

Memorandum,
p. 23. Parliamentary
Paper of
1872, No. 2.

Sir A. Buchanan
to Lord Clarendon,
1st Dec. 1869.

(Extract.)

"The Governor General in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

"Fort William, 7th December 1869.

"We have now done all that lies in our power to maintain peace on the frontier of Afghanistan; and though we shall steadily adhere to our policy and continue to maintain an attitude of constant watchfulness, we can do but little more. It rests with the Czar Government, by adopting the same course with regard to those countries which bear the Russian possessions in Central Asia as we have taken towards Afghanistan, permanently to secure peace throughout those wide districts which are influenced respectively by the Governments of the Queen and of His Imperial Majesty. In view of the success of the efforts we have made to prevent aggression on the countries to the south of the Russian frontier and all interference with Russian interests in Central Asia, we consider that Her Majesty's Government have a right to suggest that the Government of the Czar should promise to use all its influence to save from seizure and attack the territories of the present Ameer of Afghanistan, and to observe that policy of peace which His Majesty professes to be her aim, and which he believes is as essential to the consolidation of his own power as it is to the interests of humanity and civilization in Turkestan."

"My friend, it affords me great pleasure to inform you that I have received intelligence from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India that, in September last year, Prince Gortchakoff, the chief of the statement to whom the Emperor of Russia has confided the government of his country, assured Her Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia has no intention of extending her boundary farther south. I have also heard from Mr. Forsyth, one of my high officers who visited St. Petersburg last year, that he had the honour of an interview with the Emperor, when he informed His Majesty of the deep interest which the British Government take in your independence and welfare, in reply to which the Emperor remarked there was no intention of extending the Russian dominions, and that, if the idea of conquest were banished from your Highness's mind, there would be peace in Central Asia. The Ambassador to the Queen at the Court of St. Petersburg, together with Mr. Forsyth, have also received assurances from the Ministers of the Emperor of Russia, with the full concurrence of His Majesty, that all the Provinces that your Highness now holds should be accepted as Afghanistan; and that whilst the good offices of England should be exerted to dissuade your Highness from aggression, Russia should similarly use all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

"I have also been informed that Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported to the Secretary of State that instructions have been sent to General Von Kaufmann to the effect that, as the Government of India had taken measures to carry out the understanding come to with Mr. Forsyth, the Russian authorities should act in a similar spirit, and should make it known that England and Russia are agreed as to a policy that should be followed, with a view of securing the tranquillity of the countries on their respective borders, and the peace of Asia. I have further received information that General Von Kaufmann has informed the Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan (now supposed to be resident at Tashkend) that Russia is firmly resolved not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and that consequently all negotiations with him (Abdul Rahman Khan) are useless, and that General Von Kaufmann will soon meet intimate to Abdul Rahman Khan that he can only be granted an asylum in the territories of Russia on condition of his abstaining from intrigues and political projects for the realization of which he must not in any way reckon on assistance from Bokhara."

• The Government of India wrote:—

"No. 28, Simla, 26th May 1871.

"2. Your Grace is aware from our Despatches with what jealousy and fear any rumored extension of Russian possessions in the East is watched by the independent States of Central Asia, what uneasiness it is calculated to excite not only in those countries, but within our own possessions in India, and what excellent results have followed the recent assurances, referred to in these Despatches; that the Russian Government had no intention of extending their dominions; that extension of territory was an expression of weakness; that a perfect understanding existed between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia with reference to the affairs and interests of the countries of Central Asia, and that it was the determination of the Russian Governments that there should be no dispute between the two countries regarding Asiatic boundaries.

"3. It would, therefore, be a matter of the deepest regret to us if any measures which the Russian Government may deem necessary to take in order to place their relations with the Khan of Khiva on a more satisfactory footing, or to protect their trade, should have the effect of reviving that alarm and distrust in Central Asia which the recent mutual explanations between the British and Russian Governments have done so much to remove.

"4. Although fully impressed with the belief that the repeated disavowals of Russia as to any intentions of extending her possessions in the East are perfectly sincere, we think it of the utmost importance that Her Majesty's Government should now renew the Russian Government of these declarations, and express a decided opinion that it is most desirable, in the interests of peace, that the Ministers of the Czar should take an early opportunity of publicly explaining the causes which have led to the expedition, and its ultimate objects.

"5. We by no means assert that a war between Russia and the Khan of Khiva must necessarily lead to the annexation, or even to a lengthened military occupation, of that country; but the expedition which appears to be determined on by the Russian Government will of itself do much to unsettle the confidence of the independent States of Asia in the continuance of that policy of peace which has been so recently announced. It is, therefore, desirable at once to calm the apprehension which will inevitably arise.

"10. If, however, it should appear to Her Majesty's Government either that the annexation of Khiva is secretly intended by Russia, or that the measures that are presently to be undertaken by her will probably lead to that result, we must express our confident hope that Her Majesty's Government will lose no opportunity of stating, in the most unmistakable terms, their clear disapproval of such a course as inimical to British interests, and calculated seriously to imperil the peace of the East.

"12. It is unnecessary to point out to your Grace that occupation or annexation of Khiva by Russia would be a fatal blow to Persian independence. Should such an event occur, she must either submit to the absolute influence of Russia, or seek for protection from British or Turkish power.

"13. We entertain as firmly as ever the conviction that the peace and prosperity of Central Asia depend on the acceptance and observance, both by Russia and ourselves, of the policy described in our Despatch of 7th December 1862, viz. that England and Russia should abstain from all aggressive designs in those regions; that we should endeavor to create on our respective frontiers a series of strong, independent, and neutral States, and so gradually to provide for the termination of that state of conflict and chronic disturbance which has for many ages prevailed in Central Asia."

No. 120, 11th
June 1871.

Whilst General Kaufmann thought it desirable thus to publish throughout Central Asia that a perfect understanding existed between England and Russia with reference to its affairs and interests, the operations on the east coast of the Caspian were progressing; Shahr-i-subz (in Bokhara) had been stormed and taken by a Russian force (24th August 1870); Khulifa was added to the list of conquests (4th July 1871), with a territory of 20,000 geographical square miles; and warlike reconnaissances made against the Dugangs and Turcomans. But General Kaufmann had no leisure to make his report on the points raised as to the line of frontier, and the English Foreign Office did not hurry him!

Meanwhile the alarm felt in Afghanistan and elsewhere respecting the hostile movements just mentioned became more and more serious, and the Government of India both telegraphed and wrote home drawing attention to the apparent revocation of the peaceful declarations of the Russians.

Sir A. Buchanan informed Lord Granville that Lord Mayo's representations had formed the subject of a conversation between himself and M. Westmann, who at once assured Sir A. Buchanan that he was "aware of no change in the policy of the Government, or of there being any intention to send expeditions either to Khiva or Bokhara."

At this time Lord Enfield added to the general hopelessness of the question by declaring in his place in the House of Commons, in reply to a question from Mr. Eastwick, that no arrangement had been entered into with Russia as to the extent of Shere Ali's dominions!

Lord Mayo became seriously uneasy regarding this official statement. He begged by telegram, without avail, that it might be modified, as throwing doubt on all past negotiations, as well as on the letter of the Viceroy to the Ameer (24th June 1870), just quoted. So annoyed was Lord Mayo at the effect in India of this renunciation of all the negotiations that had taken place, that he made it the subject of an official despatch, in which he pointed out its possible evil effect, and reminded the Home Government of his hope that the negotiations commenced in 1869 with such marked success might be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

† Mr. Eastwick asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether there was any truth in the rumour that Herat had been taken by Yakoub Khan; and whether that city and the adjoining provinces of Murgab and Maimana were included in the arrangements entered into between Her Majesty's Government and that of Russia, in 1869, as to the extent of the dominions of Shere Ali Khan.

‡ Lord Enfield.—No information has been received at the Foreign Office respecting the rumour that Herat has been taken by Yakoub Khan. No such arrangement as that referred to has been entered into with Russia as to the extent of Shere Ali's dominions.—(Times, 23rd May 1871.)

§ Foreign Office say Enfield's statement cannot be modified, as there is no formal engagement between Russia and England defining limits of Afghanistan.—(Duke of Argyll to Lord Mayo, 2nd June 1871.)

§ The Government of India wrote:—

"No. 29, Simla, 16th June 1871.

"In acknowledging the receipt of Your Grace's telegram, dated 2nd instant, we have the honour to invite attention to the several communications on the subject of the Northern and North-Western limits of the territory of His Highness Shere Ali Khan, Atmeer of Cabul, as discussed between high British and Russian Officers, and as understood and concurred upon by the Government of India.

No further action was taken by the Russian Government to hurry General Kaufmann's report until October 1871, when they for the first time raised grave objections to Badakhshan being included in Afghanistan.

Although the object was tolerably apparent, *nothing could be done beyond discussing the point, which was an important one occupying much time and attention.*

So time dragged on, during which the Russian Government began to impress on the English Cabinet that the "news from Khiva was unsatisfactory. The Khan, it was said, continued in the same "hostile attitude" as heretofore, his chief crime being that he sent an Envoy to the Government of India, entreating protection and assistance," which could not be given.

At this moment a momentous and grievous event plunged all India in consternation and grief. Lord Mayo was cruelly assassinated (8th February 1872) at Port Blair, Andaman Island, by an Afghan convict. His firm counsel and kindly hand were no longer to guide the fortunes of our Indian Empire. Russian aggression and English negotiations were for the moment laid aside. One of the last Despatches which he penned, but left unsigned, referred to the Afghan boundary for the settlement of which he had struggled so long.

The sorrow of the Ameer of Afghanistan knew no bounds. He shut himself up for some days in sincere mourning; he ordered every demonstration of respect to be paid at Cabul to the memory of the valued protector and friend who had been so cruelly taken away from him, and wrote his sentiments to the Government of India in touching words †

Lord Northbrook was appointed to the Viceroyalty. He arrived at Calcutta on the 3rd of May 1872, succeeding to the responsibility of a foreign policy which he henceforth warmly supported.

Russia was at this time obliged to avow an arrangement establishing the River Atrek to be the boundary between herself and Persia, which had apparently been settled between the two Governments in 1869. A force was at the same time assembled at Krasnovodsk ready to be launched on Khiva.

But the time was not yet; the arrangements were not ready. M. Westmann consequently denied the rumours of any demonstration and continued the hopeless discussion as to the right of Shere Ali to incorporate Badakhshan into his territories. Baron Brunnow denied the existence of any Treaty between Persia and Russia as to the cession of the Atrek to the latter power. He also submitted to Lord Granville a new Despatch from Prince Gortchakoff recapitulating the different phases of the negotiation between the two Cabinets. ‡

We always considered that the declarations of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers would be held to be equivalent to any more formal engagement which, under the circumstances, might have with difficulty been concluded. In this view, and having regard to the time and trouble which has been taken in the matter, we cannot but regret that the reply of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Eastwick in the House of Commons, on the 24th May 1871, did not place the subject before the public in a more explicit form. It appears to us that the answer may possibly lead to misapprehension, and place the position of Russia in regard to the Afghan frontier in a less favourable light than that which really exists.

We think it desirable that the Russian Government should be asked to communicate the purport of General Kaufmann's reply to the letter on this subject, the transmission of which to his address was mentioned in Sir A. Buchanan's Despatch of the 21st September last. When the tenor of that reply is made known, it may be hoped that the negotiations conducted on such favourable auspices, and carried on hitherto with such marked success, may be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

* The Khivian Envoy rosebek Faima on the 5th September 1872. He dwelt on the great desire of the Khan for friendship and assistance, and strictly denied the existence of hostility or aggression towards the Russians (Wyvane's Confidential Papers, p. 223); he returned to his Master with a friendly letter of advice to give up any Russian prisoners he might have sent to the cause of offence. Shere Ali exclaimed to our Agent at Cabul, "Should the Russians obtain possession of Khiva, which God forbid, affairs will assume one of three aspects, viz., that all the Turcomans will accept the religion, city and religion of the Russians, or seek shelter in the Herat Province. If all the Turcomans come to Herat, the Government of Afghanistan will be placed in a very difficult predicament, because, in the event of the Russians proceeding in armed pursuit of them, God knows what will happen."

No. 31, April
1872.

† The following letter was penned at his own dictation.—

"After expressions of sorrow and affection, be it known to your friendly heart, that I have just been shocked to hear the horrible and mournful tidings of the death of the Viceroy and Governor General of India.

"By this terrible and unforeseen stroke my heart has been overwhelmed with grief and anguish, for it can scarce ever occur again, in days so out of joint as these, that the world will see another so universally beloved and esteemed for his many high and excellent qualities as he who is now in the spirit land.

"All great and wise men have ever regarded this transient world as a resting place for a single night, or as an overflowing and changing stream, and have never ceased to remind their fellows that they must pass beyond it, and leave all behind them. It is therefore incumbent on men not to fix their affections on perishable things during the course of their short lives, which are, as it were, a lease to them from above.

"Nought remains to the friends and survivors of him who is gone from us but patience and resignation. The unwavering friendship and kindness displayed towards me by him who is now no more, had induced me to determine, if the affairs of Afghanistan at the time permitted the step, to accompany His Excellency on his return to England, so that I might obtain the gratification of a personal interview with Her Majesty the Queen, and derive pleasure from travelling in the countries of Europe. Before the eternally predestined decrees, however, men must bow in silence. A crooked and perverse fate always interferes to prevent the successful accomplishment by any human being of his most cherished desire. What more can be said or written to express my grief and sorrow."

‡ He did this as follows.—

"St. Petersburg, 7th December 1872.
"The two Governments had consequently come to an agreement, that it was expedient to leave a certain 'intermediary' zone, for the purpose of preserving their respective possessions from immediate contact, *Afghanistan seemed well fitted to supply what was needed, and it was consequently agreed* (1) that the two Governments should use all their influence with their neighbouring states towards preventing any collision of mercantile interests, on one side or the other, of this 'intermediary' zone (2). All that remained was to trace the exact limits of the zone" (3).

Although the recapitulation by Prince Gortchakoff of the character of the negotiations that had passed was entirely erroneous, the Foreign Office apparently deemed it unnecessary to correct his mis-statement.

Lord Granville
to Lord A. Loftus,
24th Jan. 1873.

But Lord Granville replied, urging the "claim" of Shere Ali to Badakhshan, and expressing the assurance that the Imperial Government, "weighing these considerations dispassionately," would "concur" in the recognition which they had made of Shere Ali's sovereignty.

31st Jan. 1873.

Prince Gortchakoff, expressing his satisfaction that the English Cabinet continued to pursue in Central Asia the same object as themselves, that of "insuring them peace, and as far as possible tranquillity," did not, "under all the circumstances," refuse to accept the line of boundary laid down by England, and he felt the more inclined to this "act of courtesy," as the English Government engaged to use all its influence with Shere Ali to keep him from aggression,—an influence "based" not only on the material and moral ascendancy of England, but also on the subsidies for which Shere Ali was indebted to her.

The English Cabinet seemed, however, glad to settle the "Badakhshan" question on any terms. Whilst fixing their eyes intently on it, the preparations for the Khiva Expedition, from which their attention was carefully diverted, were slowly and carefully progressing.

Lord Granville
to Lord A. Loftus,
6th Jan. 1873.

Count Schouvaloff, "a statesman enjoying the" "full confidence of the Emperor of Russia," arrived unexpectedly at London on the 8th January 1873, to personally express the Emperor's sanction to the agreement as to Badakhshan, which was a question that ought not to "ruffle the good relations between the two countries," and to formally break the news *at last* that an expedition to Khiva had been "decided on for next spring;" that it was to consist of $4\frac{1}{2}$ battalions, and was solely for the recovery of certain Russian prisoners. Count Schouvaloff repeated to Lord Granville the surprise which the Emperor felt at the uneasiness which existed in England on the subject, and begged him to understand that he "might give positive assurances to Parliament," that "not only was it far from the intention of the" "Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive" "orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should" "be such as could not in any way lead to a" "prolonged occupancy of the country."

Whilst the English Cabinet accepted this explanation as frankly as it was offered, the small force of $4\frac{1}{2}$ battalions grew rapidly into three distinct columns, amounting in the aggregate to 10,000 men, and 40 guns, and Khiva fell on the 10th of June 1873. The vanquished Khan was compelled to acknowledge himself to be the humble servant

Treaty of 24th
Aug. 1873, between
Russia and
Khiva.

of the Emperor of all the Russias, gave up the whole of the right bank of the Oxus, hitherto belonging to Khiva, into the possession of Russia, gave Russian vessels the free and exclusive right of navigating the Oxus, allowed Russia to establish factories on the left bank of the Oxus, for the safety of which the Khan of Khiva was to be held responsible, gave Russian subjects all "citizen" rights in Khiva, abolished slavery, and agreed to an indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles for the expenses of the war, to be paid in gradual instalments.

The Russian Cabinet did not deem it necessary to communicate this Treaty to the friends with whom such a perfect understanding existed in regard to Central Asia, but a copy came into our possession through the British Embassy at St. Petersburg. It called forth another lengthy despatch.

Her Majesty's Government* saw "no practical advantage in examining too minutely," wrote the English Minister, "how far the above arrangements were in accordance with the assurances given to them by Count Schouvaloff in January 1873, as to the intentions with which the expedition against Khiva was undertaken," at the same time each step of the progress of the extension of Russian influence in Central Asia rendered it desirable that a "clear and frank understanding should continue to exist between the two countries as to the relative positions of British and Russian interests in Asia," and it was necessary once more to review all the communications that had passed.

This being done, with the exception as just noted of Count Schouvaloff's statements, a reference was made to a rumoured expedition to Merv. Whilst it was true that such an expedition was supposed to be as yet discountenanced at St. Petersburg, yet Lord Granville acknowledged that "past experience" showed that it would be unwise to look upon the project as being therefore "entirely out of the question," for circumstances might occur, as they had more than once occurred before, to "force the Russian Government" into a course to which they were on principle opposed.

After a detailed narrative of these principles, it was deemed unnecessary to retrace the series of circumstances which, "in spite of the Russian Government," led to the recent expedition to Khiva.

"In the face of these events," it was added, "it would be unwise not to contemplate the probability of the consideration that self-defence," or the necessity of punishing acts of plunder or hostility, might "eventually" give occasion for a Russian expedition against the Turcoman tribes, and it was therefore deemed advisable to bring to the notice of the Russian Cabinet the fears of the Ameer of Cabul in regard to its results.

£275,000.

Lord Granville
to Lord A. Loftus,
7th Jan. 1874.

* This Despatch has caused the deepest feeling of surprise and regret in India, both in official and non-official circles. The leading Indian journal—*The Friend of India*—writes on 2d April 1874 in the following angry and almost outrageous terms:—

"We had not supposed it possible that even Lord Granville would have shown such culpable weakness as the telegrams reveal. But to a courtier a Royal warrant was a matter of more immediate importance than the honour of England, so the Russian Government is told that our Foreign Office saw no practical advantage in examining minutely whether the Khivan Treaty strictly accords with the assurances of Count Schouvaloff, while our Foreign Minister is indisposed to share the exaggerated apprehensions of the danger of Russian influence. How Lord Granville's conduct must have been felt when he wrote that sentence, remembering his assurance to the House of Lords that the word of the Tsar was equal to any written pledge. All he insisted on, from a Government which had so shamelessly broken its Khivan pledge, was the renewal of its other promise, not to interfere with Afghanistan, whatever the Turcomans on the northern frontier might do. Prince Gortchakoff's reply, on the 21st February, was a joyful expression of satisfaction with Lord Granville's views, a renewal of the 'positive assurance' that Afghanistan is beyond Russia's sphere of action, but a warning that Russia must punish the Turcomans if the Ameer and the Indian Government do not exercise their influence to quiet them. This assumption that either the Ameer or the Viceroy of India is responsible for the Turcomans, who are beyond the influence of both, or that they were responsible, a Turcoman raid would justify the annexation of Merv—for that is what is meant—is so monstrous that it is to be hoped the St. Petersburg Despatch was left in the Foreign Office for Mr. Bourke to smash a reply to it."

Such are the comments on this final summing up of our relations with Russia—comments recapitulated in still severer language in every letter received from India.

Prince Gortchakoff to Baron Brunow, 21st Jan. 1874.

Prince Gortchakoff replied, expressing the entire satisfaction which the Russian Government felt at the just view taken by Her Majesty's Government with regard to the questions which the two Cabinets were called upon to "treat together in Asia." In his opinion the understanding was "complete."

If the two Governments exercised their ascendancy over the States placed within the range of their natural influence, there was "reason to hope" that no violent collision would occur to disturb the repose of Central Asia, more especially as the Government of India, no doubt, "possessed the means of making itself listened to by the Ameer of Cabul.

Any intention of "an expedition against the Turcomans" was denied, especially as the Ameer of Cabul could assist in removing the possibility of it by "making the Turcomans understand clearly beforehand" that if they provoked rigorous measures by acts of depredation against Russia they could not count upon any assistance or protection from him.

After expressing the belief that the Indian Government was certainly in a position to give him this advice in a form which would "ensure its effectiveness," the conviction was repeated that the two Governments had an equal interest in not allowing their good relations to be disturbed by the "intrigues of Asiatic Khans."

The Russian acceptance of the Afghan boundary was communicated to the Indian Government, and by them to the Ameer of Afghanistan. Satisfaction was expressed at the termination of the negotiations, more particularly at "the most decided and positive assurances" of Count Schouvaloff that it was far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, an assurance which afforded complete evidence that the policy of the Russian Government on the general question had undergone no change, and that the Government of His Imperial Majesty would approve of no course of action calculated to "revive the uneasiness with regard to Central Asian affairs which the frank and amicable discussions of the last three years have done so much to allay."

In a subsequent Despatch the Indian Government ably summed up the whole of the negotiations, adding,—

"Although we have abstained from entering into any treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for

No. 23, 28th March 1873, Government of India to Secretary of State.

No. 60, Secret. 20th June 1873. The Despatch will reply perusal. It is clear and close in its adherence to fact.

" material assistance from us, and circumstances
 " might occur under which we should consider it
 " incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's
 " Government to render him such assistance.

" Should our general view of the recent negotia-
 " tions and of the obligations which will conse-
 " quently devolve upon us receive the approval of
 " Her Majesty's Government, we would suggest
 " that a copy of this Despatch might be communi-
 " cated to the Russian Government in order that
 " we may act with freedom and confidence in our
 " future communications with the different coun-
 " tries whose interests are concerned."

They also expressed the hope that in any further boundary discussion opportunity would not be lost of obtaining a definition of those of Yarkund.

These Despatches were sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with reference to the wishes of the Government of India, but Lord Granville expressed an opinion adverse to the communication to the Russian Government of the letter relating to Afghanistan, as thereby conveying indirectly an intimation that any aggression on Afghanistan " would be resisted " by Great Britain with force of " arms," nor did he think it expedient to raise any question as to Yarkund.

Comment on these negotiations is unnecessary. The mind is lost in confusion and wonderment whether to blame the complaisant diplomacy of the one side or the daring frauds of the other.

Returning once more to Afghan-istan, we find the Ameer and his people full of misgivings* as to the Russian advance and English negotiation.

In July 1873, the Ameer sent his confidential Envoy† to see the Viceroy and talk over political matters. In the course of the discussions the Envoy stated that he had been instructed to apply to the British Government for assistance, both present and prospective; the former for strengthening the Government of Afghanistan, and the latter with the view of meeting the contingency of actual aggression by a foreign Power. The Viceroy at once promised to give the Ameer a sum of 100,000*l.*, with 10,000 Enfield and 5,000 Snider rifles for which he had asked. In regard to the latter point, the Envoy was told that " if, in the " event of any aggression‡ from without, British

* The value attached to these negotiations in Afghanistan may be gathered from the following facts. In an interview with the Viceroy in September 1873, Syad Noor Mahomed, the Ameer's Special Envoy, said that the rapid advances of the Russians in Central Asia had aroused the gravest apprehensions in Afghanistan. " Whatever specific assurances the Russians might give, and however often these might be repeated, the people of Afghanistan would place," he said, " no confidence in them, and would never rest satisfied until assured of the aid of the British Government," and this statement he frequently repeated.

† The Ameer also said,—

" I am at a loss to surmise what great difficulty has given rise to the deliberations which have taken place the second time between the British and the Russian Governments about the northern boundary of Afghanistan. It cannot be concealed that it is impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations. For instance, they could not remain firm in their engagements about the Crimea, even for a short period. My anxiety which I feel on account of the Russians will never be removed unless the British Government adopts the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and armaments of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border. And, further, if an emergency arises for the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government. Should the British Government desire that I should at once organize the Afghan troops, and make arrangements for the security of the border against the Russians on a favourable occasion, I think it is impossible to do so. No person has attained his object in this world immediately. It is jointly obligatory on the British Government to show their cordiality in this matter before anything happens. It is rather advisable that the British Government, for its own and my satisfaction, should set apart some property, either in India or in Europe, for my support, in order that if, which God forbid, a serious difficulty constrains me to quit Afghanistan, I may rely there with my family and children, and find both accommodation and maintenance there; and after this re-assurance I will work with zeal and high spirit day and night for the security of the border of Afghanistan, which it is truth the border of India. Time has approached very near when the Russians, after taking possession of Urga and Merve Shukeljan, will make communications for exercising some influence in my kingdom. It is as clear as daylight that, as soon as the Russians will take possession of Merve Shukeljan, the Turcomans will necessarily take refuge in Badkhis and Herat, and if they do not desist from their un-benign behaviour, viz. from causing injury to the Russians from time to time, the Russians will undoubtedly send messages to the Afghan Government that either the Turcomans should be prevented from aggression, or permission should be given to them (the Russians) to punish these hostile tribes. Under these circumstances, such difficulty will prevent itself to me that even the British Government, with regard to the interests of the Afghan and English Governments being identical, will have to adopt very serious measures for its removal.

† Besides this, as the British Government has approved of the cession of the bank territory of Sistan proper to the Persian Government, this decision will one day cause so much injury to Afghanistan, that it will not be surprising if its effects will be as widespread as far as India, as there is a straight road from Merve Shukeljan to India of Sistan. There will, therefore, be no person throughout this road to oppose the Russians as far as the border of India."

† Syad Noor Mahomed.

No. 75, Secret,
15th Sept. 1873.

‡ This intimation was sanctioned by Secretary of State's telegram, 1st July 1873.

" influence were invoked, and failed by negotiation
 " to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable
 " that the British Government would afford the
 " Ameer material assistance in repelling the in-
 " vader, but that such assistance would be con-
 " ditional on the Ameer following the advice of the
 " British Government, and having himself abstained
 " from aggression."

Lord Northbrook's Government stated that they suggested to the Ameer the expediency of deputing a British officer to examine the northern and western boundaries of Afghanistan, and it was added,—

" Though we think that the presence of ac-
 " credited British officers at Cabul, Herat, and
 " possibly also Candahar, would for many reasons
 " be desirable, we are fully alive to the difficulties
 " in the way of such a measure until the objects
 " and policy of the British Government are more
 " clearly understood and appreciated in Afghan-
 " istan. It is with the view of removing some
 " of these difficulties that we have proposed the
 " deputation of an officer to examine the bound-
 " aries."

After full deliberation with the Indian authorities on all the points which Shere Ali was anxious should be brought forward the Envoy returned to Cabul, which he reached on 16th October.

Meanwhile the Ameer, after taking counsel of his confidential Minister, decided at length to carry out his long-cherished wish (22nd November 1873) of nominating Abduallah Jan to be his heir apparent.* He also wrote† to the Viceroy, thanking him for the kindness shown to his Envoy, but making no direct allusion to the offer of a British Officer to inspect his boundaries.

And thus matters at the present moment stand, so far as Afghanistan is concerned.

It was intended by the writer of this Memorandum to have sketched the narrative of our general foreign policy towards Khelat, Yarkund, and other neighbouring States, in addition to questions relating to Persia and Turkey,—all combining to complete the history of the "Central Asian Question." But time and space will not admit of this except, if necessary, in a separate and supplementary summary. Suffice it to say that our relations with Khelat, at one time good, are not at the present moment cordial; that, in regard to Yarkund,‡ the best effects are anticipated from the Missions to that Court of 1870 and 1873, ending in the recent conclusion of a commercial treaty; and that our relations with Nepal and Burmah are not likely *at present* to give us much concern.

In regard to Persia, we have succeeded since 1869, after much trouble, in settling the important boundary lines between herself, Khelat, and Afghanistan, thereby effectually putting a stop to her dangerous encroachments eastwards towards India.

* He informed the Government of India of this on 30th November 1873. The Viceroy, in reply (21st January 1874), said,—

" I pray that your Highness many still enjoy many years of life and good health, during which the cords of friendship may be drawn yet closer, and that Sindar Abdoolah Jan, whom, with a view to the welfare of your kingdom, you have appointed to be heir apparent, may, under your Highness's tuition, learn to conduct the Government with the same wisdom and success."

(This letter was couched in the same terms as the reply to Dost Mahomed, intimating selection of Shere Ali in supersession of his elder brother, Afzul Khan.—No. 4, 23rd January 1874.)

† No. 7, Secret, 23rd January 1873.
 The Ameer's communication was worded in a cold tone.

‡ Mr. Forsyth's report may be expected very shortly. Meanwhile attention is drawn to an extract from a printed letter in the Appendix.

Our old and faithful ally, Turkey, has never ceased to cause us anxiety since the tearing up by Russia in 1871 of the Black Sea Treaty, and our implied desertion of her interests in acceding, without remonstrance, to this fatal act. Morally weakened in Europe, she is seeking a resting place in Arabia, and bidding for power in the East with a strange agreement of purpose, worthy of study with the Russ. She launched the Nedj expedition in 1871, giving an effectual blow to our suzerainty in the Persian Gulf and the north of Arabia, resenting with sarcastic words the remonstrances of her former friend;* claiming now the whole of our protectorate, she is establishing herself in Southern Arabia, interfering, under the palpable instigation of Ignatieff, with our tributary Chiefs, and attempting to weaken our position at Aden. The day may fast be coming when the aggressions of Russia in the north and those of Turkey in the south may for a season go hostilely hand in hand,—the latter far more dangerous to us in regard to excitable Mahomedanism in India than the intrigues of a Christian Power.

* "Russia has been and is," said the Grand Vizier in 1871, "that advancing towards the Indian frontier, and not a step is uttered or any step taken to prevent her progress, which sooner or later, will give serious anxiety to the British Government; and finally," observed he in an angry tone, "it does not behove a great Power like England to avail itself of the pretended weakness of the Porte to endeavour to countenance the Arabs, and interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, and affairs which are of vital importance to her."

PART III.

The question to be asked is,—
What is to be done ?

The Central Asian question has supplied material for lectures, newspaper articles, parliamentary debates, summaries, memoranda, and pamphlets, and yet no one appears to have solved it satisfactorily.

What is to be done ?

The question may well be asked, and it is indeed not an easy one to answer. So varied and changeable is the question from year to year that we can only in despair agree with the King of Burmah; "There is a beginning, a middle, and an ending to every thing," said His Majesty, "you should never take notice of the middle and ending unless you are sure of the beginning; you should never take notice of the beginning and ending unless you are sure of the middle; and you should never take notice of the beginning and middle unless you are sure of the ending," and this seems to be good advice.

Though the Central Asian question has been so freely ventilated, yet time has gone on apace and dragged it into a state of almost hopeless shipwreck.

Although a more reliable opinion on its many phases could be given a month hence† than now, a few considerations may not be thrown away at the present time.

The writer of this Memorandum approaches the subject with great diffidence, and he hopes that nothing he may say will be deemed to exceed proper limits, or the exact range of the question.

† For the practical reasons, that the Indian Foreign Secretary is daily expected in London, and the visit of Mr. Forsyth to Cabul, en route from Yarkund, is now, it is hoped, in course of accomplishment.

The first conclusion to be drawn from recent facts seems to be the necessity for a strong and well defined home policy.

It is inadvisable that the Governor General of India should "draw the cords of friendship" round the States bordering on India, if in home diplomacy we in any way nullify his exertions. Masterly inactivity, bad as it may be, is absolutely better than activity reduced by any mistake of diplomacy to suspicion and failure.

On the groundwork of "friendly understanding" with Russia, we have been unfortunately induced to write the Ameer of Afghanistan assurances which he distrusts; we have received hints from him that we have been deceived; and we have been credited in Central Asia with the responsibility of connivance in the ambitious conquests and the dangerous proximity of a rival Power.

Whilst those versed in eastern diplomacy have argued that England had only to take a firm stand, as in 1838, to induce Russia to give up or postpone her policy of conquest and advance towards India, we have perhaps too readily accepted her untruthful assurances, and helped to draw her on, by an apparent indifference, to her present commanding position.

Although it is almost unnecessary to recapitulate the proofs on which these observations are founded, they can hardly be refuted. We can only accept the lessons of the past to avoid the pitfalls of a future which is a difficult one.

If we wish to keep India we must be content to do so under more difficult and expensive terms than heretofore. We must never lose sight of the value in Asiatic eyes of determined self-assertion; we must cease to trammel ourselves with any more so called friendly understandings with a Power whose empire, since the days of Peter the Great, may be said to have been formed by withdrawal from promises and engagements.*

Russia seems to have traded on our good nature and forbearance, and we have ceased to remind her of our power.†

It must not be forgotten that the whole political welfare of India depends on what passes in London.

Asiatic diplomacy, in the old sense of the word, has ceased to exist; Asiatic questions are removed from India to Westminster; and the destinies of the millions of the East are settled in European fields of discussion. Although this state of things places us, as a constitutional Government, in a position of difficulty when dealing with an autocracy, yet that difficulty is not insurmountable.

In dealing with the Central Asian question, therefore, may we not ask ourselves has England a clear defined line of policy? It is not of the slightest

* See John McNeill's *Progress of Russia in the East* illustrating this fact in remarkable and forcible terms well worth careful study.

† That power is enormous if we ever cared to exercise it. We could in a few months organize the whole line of Sumite Mahomedans from China to Afghanistan, and supplying them with arms, money, and officers, turn Russia out of the whole of her positions. No one is more aware of this than Russia herself.

use attempting further steps in India until we are satisfied in regard to this point at home.

Should that policy be one of guarding our Indian Empire against all comers? If so, are we prepared, in the first instance, to keep up our influence at Teheran and Constantinople or not? Can we cheerfully agree to a little more trouble and expenditure or not? Do we believe that surrounding India with strong and friendly States is the right policy or not? Do we think it better to keep our supremacy in the Persian Gulf, or allow our men-of-war to absent themselves on the African Coast to make room for Turkish ships? Do we wish to keep Aden or not? If the answers are negative then there is, of course, an end to all further argument. If, on the other hand, the replies are affirmative, it leads to further considerations of importance.

It is obviously dangerous to deal piecemeal with diplomatic questions. We should carefully form a general policy on a fixed basis and work up to it. We should take *our own* measures for the protection of Afghanistan, and eventually of India, without trusting too much to the friendly assurances of another Power. We can do this quietly and easily whilst continuing on the *most friendly* relations with Russia.

We should strengthen our embassy at Teheran† by the appointment of an Indian Officer of high rank and ability, accustomed to Asiatic diplomacy.

And, considering the very decided advances of Turkey towards India, and the partial removal of her policy to Asiatic ground, there seems no reason to doubt the expediency of doing the same in regard to Constantinople where our influence seems to have been on the wane.

We should increase our naval power in the Indian waters, or restore the local navy,—do anything in fact rather than continue present arrangements.

Royal Navy ships are as unfitted as Royal Navy sailors for service‡ in the fiery sun of the Persian Gulf. What is the consequence? The ships are seldom there, or, if there, the sailors die of sun-stroke.

As regards our naval arrangements in the rest of the Indian waters, they are not commensurate with the importance of the situation. We should not forget that modern declarations of war are sudden and that there is a large and efficient Russian fleet in the China seas.

In regard to Aden, it should not be a burden on India alone. England might take it over or pay something towards putting it in a state of defence and quartering a proper force there. As matters stand at present Aden§ is in a bad state of organization and defence in the event of a European war. It is fortunate for us that the Turkish soldiers retired the other day when our little force marched

* There were, and probably are, several Turkish men-of-war in the Persian Gulf. At the time of the Nedj expedition, 1870-71, we could not for some weeks lay hands on a single one of our own! Our men-of-war, moreover, are out of service in the Persian Gulf.—(Vide "Indian Navy Correspondence," 1870-72.)

† What is the meaning of our loss of influence in Teheran and Constantinople? What are the original causes of all this Persian encroachment and Turkish aggression? It is to be regretted that the Teheran Mission cannot be given to India, and placed in charge of an Indian Officer of high rank and position, accustomed to deal with Asiatics. Persia is now lying at our feet although it is too late. She is in Russia's grasp, and Russia determined to get to the Persian Gulf. We may, however, postpone the evil day by strengthening our Mission and nominating a Power now entreating us to save her. According to an official return of some years ago, the Persian Mission cost 12,600*l.* a year, of which India was paying 12,000*l.*

‡ The railways now being constructed in Northern Persia—Baron de Reuter, under supposed Russian guarantee, undertake to fill more important for us to take some active steps in Persia.

§ This was strongly pointed out by Lord Mayo, and has been the subject of important correspondence. "Special ship should be constructed, and the vessels manned to a great extent by lascars with a proper reserve of marines and sailors.—(Vide "Indian Navy Correspondence," 1870-72.)

* As said before, we seem to have accepted too readily the peaceful declamations of Turkey in 1870 and 1873, whilst she carried on operations which became accomplished facts before our attention could be roused. The mischief is done, although the present firm tone of the Foreign Office correspondence may stop further aggression.

† Those who have studied the history of the Wahabee conspiracy, and learnt that every plot in India, even to campaigns on our border, has been hatched between Meera and Patna, will not think this an extravagant assertion or underrate the value, in an Indian sense, of keeping Turkey as our friend. The Sultan is prayed for in every mosque in India.

‡ Under the present system our Native Army is inefficient. Although enlisted for "general" service, we have never enforced it, but have always asked them to volunteer. A Native Army "volunteering" for war against Russia in Afghanistan, after their experiences of 1842, would be a novel sight, each regiment commanded by six Officers, most of whom would be on a bed of sickness or perhaps wounded before reaching Herat, and our army left unofficered!

The European army is too expensive. We must sooner or later return to a local army, or to special enlistment for India. The Short Service Act is simple ruinion. Even under the Ten Years Service Act, 20,000 recruits and discharged men of Cavalry and Infantry regiments now serving in India went backwards and forwards between England and India in an average of six years, ending in 1873, each man costing the country a large sum of money. Much may be said in regard to the European army, but it is not within the scope of this Memorandum to do more than hint at the question. (*Ibid* Parliamentary History, 23d June 1873.)

out to Lahej. Turkey may come again.* She has found out, under Russian instigation, the weakness of our position there and in the Persian Gulf, and is acting in an unfriendly spirit towards us.

A Turkish fleet in the Persian Gulf, or the landing of a hostile Turkish force at Aden, or even in Southern India, is not now a dreamy eventuality, and may some day like an electric spark raise the Mahomedanist of India against us.

Whilst attending to these questions in London,—and it must be repeated that any further arrangements in India are futile without a decided, although friendly and pacific, policy at home,—let us turn Eastwards and see what can be done there.

Our hold on India depends on boldness and self-assertion; it also depends on the personal characteristics of British Officers, the amount of support which the Viceroy receives from home, attention to administration in every branch, and the absolute keeping off of rival powers.

Are we to allow Russia to come to Merve and Herat, and do we expect to be able to launch an army of 30,000 men into Afghanistan against her? The first time we thus step hostilely across the border we may lose the Empire. Are we to allow her to come to the Indus and await attack in a strong position, with a happy contented population at our back, and an army of 100,000 men holding the fords and passes?

The idea is wild and untenable.

Should we not read past lessons? Do we remember the China campaign, when even the advocates of the Irregular system were obliged to attach 15 and 18 Officers to each regiment? Do we remember Sittana—a campaign hatched at Patna—a combination of 80,000 mountaineers against us, because our force was momentarily detained in a difficult pass, and a report spread about that we were defeated? Do we remember the Native regiments at Sittana, shorn of Officers sick and wounded, and Delhi "shaky," because we were compelled to withdraw regiments from Lower India, and to send all over the country for raw British Ensigns? Do we remember Abyssinia, and the practical disadvantages in the hour of trial of the Staff Corps and Irregular System; and yet can we talk of sending armies into Afghanistan or awaiting hostile attack on the banks of the Indus, with the imaginative idea of loyal populations behind our back? It is hardly too much to say that we could not without difficulty throw 30,000 men even at one point of the Indus. To send 8,000 to Sittana in 1863 against petty mountain tribes, forced us, as said above, to withdraw regiments from Southern India, gave rise to dangerous reports, and cost us much anxiety on account of the feeling shown at Delhi, Patna, and elsewhere. The first appearance of a Russian force at Merve or Herat may oblige us, not to launch a contented army,

backed by a loyal population by railroad to the Indus, but to send our men by cart road to look after Hyderabad, Gwalior, and Central and Southern India.

Are these arguments even partially sound? If so, can we realize the position of neither being able to defend India in Afghan battlefields, nor to await hostile attack on the banks of the Indus, or, at any rate, that either alternative is one to be avoided if possible?

Do not let us despise the best practical answer. Keep in the distance all chance of foreign attack or interference. Establish strong and friendly States, with fixed boundaries, round us.* Allow nothing to blind our eyes to the importance of giving these States, notwithstanding risk, disappointment and expense, friendship, warm support, and, at times suitable to ourselves, material assistance. Let us try and establish Agents at their Courts, and allow nothing to stand in the way of a frank and generous policy towards them. If they turn against us some future day never mind. Do not let any such anticipation lend weakness to our counsels. It is not likely. These States have entreated us to be friends for half a century, and the advance of Russia is redoubling their entreaties.

The importance of the establishment of friendly Native States around us becomes even still greater if we realize the fact that Russia does *not* at present meditate an armed advance. What she *does* intend is intrigue, and a stronghold over us prior to destroying the Turkish Empire in Europe. A circle of Native States under our influence would help to keep intrigue at a distance, and at any rate postpone the evil day, whilst Russian Agents or armies at Cabul or Yarkund, with England inactive, might be able to stir up every Native Durbar in India and force us to ruinous expenditure and endless anxiety.

If these arguments be worthy of consideration, should we not act accordingly? Whilst asserting ourselves and upholding our enormous position in India by a strong policy at home, should we not cordially strengthen the hands of the Governor General, treat Afghanistan, Yarkund,† Khelat, Nepal, Bhootan, and Burma with more decided friendship, allow the Viceroy 100,000*l.* a year secret service money, and leave the rest mainly to him.

Should we not encourage enterprising British Officers to travel in these neighbouring friendly countries, as well as in Persia. If by chance they are killed, what then? Do not let anticipations of loss of life uselessly complicate our relations, or be allowed to stand in the way of a well defined general policy.‡

Why need money stand in the way? What is 500,000*l.* in development of a policy, when it represents what we gave the descendants of Tippoo in 1864, or three years of the misspent pension of the

* This was a point of external policy on which the late Lord Mayo laid great stress.

† It is, of course, not intended to be said that this policy has not been already attempted by the late and present Viceroys, and with successful result. But it should be formally sanctioned from home, and be made an Imperial question.

‡ Many British Officers are only too eager to travel at their own risk, and spread British influence in the States round our borders and in Persia, and yet we fear to let them do so, and put the deaths of St. John, Conolly, Forbes, and Hayward—the annual of deaths since 1800—against the successes of Burnes, Pottinger, Abbott, Blakespear, Taimakov, Wood, Christie, Grant, and others; and we are almost obliged to depend for our geography on the records of 50 years ago!

Nawab Nazim of Bengal, or the equally misspent pension of the King of Oude, or only five times what we paid for the debts of Azim Jah?

Supposing that the general principle of strengthening our attitude at home, restoring our influence at Teheran and Constantinople, carefully watching Aden and the Persian Gulf, and warmly supporting the policy of a circle of Native States round India, be adopted at home, we could then turn to details and see what is to be done in regard to prominent features of these details; these are, at this particular moment, the establishment of Russia* on the Oxus and our relations with Afghanistan and Yarkund.

We cannot by force prevent Russia coming to Merve, and she *is* coming,—if not now, she will do so a year hence. The disapproval by the Russian Emperor of such an advance is according to past experience almost a certain guarantee of its accomplishment. Accomplished facts are strong arguments. We should make no secret of our resolute disapproval of the idea of any Russian attack on Merve,† and we should supplement it by independent action of our own. Kaufmann at Merve will be like Clive at Calcutta. As Clive when he landed at Calcutta practically had Bengal at his feet, so Kaufmann will have Afghanistan and Persia in his grasp; once in possession of Merve or Herat, he can fortify and defend them with great ease,‡ and by their possession disturb by intrigue the whole of India, throw every Native Durbar off its balance, and plunge us into a ruinous, because uncertain and undefined, expenditure in precautionary measures.

Although India is to be approached with comparative ease through Persia, Seistan, Candahar, and the Bolan Pass, or through Yarkund and Cashmere, yet for the sake of *moral influence* no rival Power would pass by Herat, which will always remain, as it always has been, in this sense, the key of India.§

Let us then quietly take some practical steps before driven to them by alarm. Russia has acknowledged our right to Afghanistan, has thrown on us the whole responsibility for her conduct; let us accept the position so far as to exercise our right of strengthening and defending her without further question.

Let us really and heartily stand by the Ameer, and assist him—the sooner the better—to punish Yacoub Khan, and re-establish his own undivided! power by money, by arms, or by Officers. There can be no playing a double game, let us play a bold one.

However much we may regret the turn matters have taken, we can no longer hesitate in our course, with the Ameer dissatisfied and Russia at Khiva. Let us then endeavour to establish Agents at Herat and Candahar. It has been done before and can sooner or later be done again. The Candahar Agency and our subsidy to the Dust saved India in the mutiny and may do so again. There

* Russia has acquired Trans-Caspian territory, including a portion of the northern boundaries of Persia, without diplomatic remonstrance or inquiry on our part. By a recent Imperial ukase, she speaks of the "line of the Attek" as forming the boundary between herself and Persia. The St. Petersburg *Vedomosti* (11th April 1874) speaks of the "whole mass of the Turcoman population" being "now included within the political limits" of the Russian Empire; and the whole line of the Attek is marked on Russian maps as a Russian boundary. This a very serious question, on which some distinct diplomatic understanding might be arrived at. Colonel Valentine Baker, Major St. John, and others, who have visited the Attek, speak of the ease with which an army could march either on Merve or into Persia from the mouth of the Attek, the fertility of the regions adjacent to that river being good, and the water supply plentiful.

† Whilst remonstrating against it, we should at once let Russia understand firmly and cautiously that we intend to defend Afghanistan against all foreign attack.

‡ Pottinger kept a Persian Army of 60,000 men seven months before Herat. Dost Mahomed was a year besieging it with the flower of his army, although defended by a small force.

§ We have no right to forbid Russia taking Khiva, Merve, or Yarkund. But we have a right by diplomacy to try and prevent her doing so, knowing as we do how such conquests disturb the peace and endanger the safety of India. It is not a question of right, but one of policy. We can hardly suppose that if Russia had been in possession of a Punjab Empire when Clive landed in Bengal she would not have protested, or at any rate have refused to have any connection of non-aggression coupled with an advance up to her very borders.

Yacoub Khan was always our *protege*, but our hope of persuading the Ameer to recognize him as her apparent, or by recommitting to him, has failed. The recognition of Abdoullah Jan is an accomplished fact, which we cannot now undo, and the sooner we see it in this light the better. Further than this, the Ameer may not be far wrong. Yacoub Khan's mother is inferior in rank to Abdoullah Jan's, and the selection of an her apparent has always rested on this ground. Shere Ali himself owes his elevation to it. Again, Yacoub Khan is an overrated man, although there is no denial that he has acquired considerable influence. He has always been a discontented bad character, plotting from the first against his father, and forcing him to make a protecting party in the person of Abdoullah Jan's adherents. No doubt Yacoub Khan did a great deal towards the restoration of his father to the throne, but they do not give him solely this credit in Afghanistan, but attribute it to the brave but unhappily deceased General, Feramorz Khan.

may be difficulties, but why hesitate over them until Russia carries out this policy before us? The Amcer has expressed his concurrence in this policy, and furthermore has asked us to help him to protect his country. Let us do so, if we do not want to lose our hold over it, and supply him with money to fortify his forts and roads, and agents to see it disbursed in a proper manner.

And why not send British Officers to drill his army?

Such suggestions may appear very incautious, but the time has come for us to realize the march of events within the last five years, and the necessity of a policy which, however troublesome, may almost incautious under other circumstances, is forced upon us by the advance of a rival Power.

Treating Afghanistan in this sense, let us act with equal decision in Yarkund, Khelat, and the other States.

To dream over our so-called unpopularity in Afghanistan, and to wait till a wish is expressed, as it is said, for the presence of British Officers, is as unfortunate as not to make canals or railroads in India till the Natives express a desire for them. That means *never*.

Having continued cautiously a bold and vigorous policy in the sense here advocated, and with the assistance of secret service money and enterprising British travellers re-established* our *prestige* outside India, we may then turn to internal administration.

Let it be first understood that no inside reform in Asiatic countries is of much use until we settle the outside policy.† What is every little petty Native Durbar saying at this moment? Thanking Lord Northbrook for remaining in Calcutta to overlook a Bengal famine? No. Thanking us for the blessings of Irrigation, Railways, Courts of Appeal, and Laws? No. Thanking us for spending millions on a starving corner of the Empire? No. Blessing us for peace and defence? No. It is hardly too much to say that many of them are secretly discounting the advance of Russia, or at any rate thinking more of it than of us.

Do not let us dream over the blessings of British rule in India or the assurance that those who enjoy those blessings are too loyal to throw us over at the first favourable opportunity if we do nothing to guard our position.

No Asiatic Empire is reliable without friendship mingled with power. We may as soon change a leopard's spots as change Asiatic character, nor have we any right to believe ourselves able to do so. We rule India practically by force of arms, tempered with the best administration we are able to give her. Our rule may some day be put to a severer test than it has yet undergone.

Let us not even ignore the fact that a *friendly* Afghan army may not be entirely thrown away in time

* No reward should be too great for a man who succeeds in this, at the risk of his life. There is not much risk of importance, and the gain is worth the risk of one or two lives.

† And this outside policy in Asia must always be settled years in advance. We cannot wait, in English fashion, till Russia reaches Cabul or Peshawar, and then take steps to repel her. When she reaches Merv or Herat she is practically in India, and it behoves us to realize this simple fact.

of need even for service in India; nor do not let us call men Russophobists who advocate the occupation of Quetta and the Koorum Valley, *if* it can be done with the full sanction and concurrence of Khelat and Afghanistan, and *if* such measures accord with a principle of friendship tempered with power and actual non-aggression.

An Affghan even more than an Indian requires the hand of friendship and the arm of power. Occupying advanced posts in a friendly way to control, by the moral influence of such outposts, Persia in Seistan, Afghanistan at Cabul, and Russia at Merve, is not such an idle dream as to be dismissed* before serious examination. Any move of the sort should be done quietly, and before *we are driven to it by alarm*. Russia at Herat will require some more potent medicine than a withdrawal from Peshawur and a mighty force of inefficient irregulars behind a fordable river, with half our army penned up in the North-West Provinces and Central India.

Let us, then, inquire into the general facts of British Rule, and strive for a reliable army and a contented population; let us look carefully to our taxation, abolish expensive Establishments, reorganize the European and Native Army, divide India into proper districts, take pains to be friendly with the mountain tribes, † putting the whole frontier from Peshawur to Scinde under one special Officer, and keep the fact well in view that the India of the present day, with its railroads and telegraphs, is marching on apace.

Far from these ideas being unpractical, they are arguments which have been repeatedly put forward by others and claimed the attention of succeeding Governors General.

The writer of this Memorandum hopes that he may be pardoned for the freedom with which he has expressed his opinions. He has deemed it his duty to allude to military and other matters forming an integral part of the Central Asian Question, without quoting unnecessary details.

The policy he advocates is neither new nor violent; it is absolutely cautious, for whilst inactivity and irresolution invite war, there can be no greater caution or a better preventative than activity and boldness, tempered with firmness, conciliation, and discretion.

O. T. B.

India Office, 30th April 1874.

Submitted to the Political Secretary for the consideration of the Secretary of State.

O. T. B.

* Jacob, Green, and Lumsden are, after all, men whose opinions are not to be lightly thrown over.

† No mention is here made of our policy towards Native States and their armies. This is a difficult point, however, not to be forgotten. The Appendix contains full information in regard to the armies of Native States.

**A MAP OF
THE SUCCESSIVE RUSSIAN ACQUISITIONS
IN ASIA**



MAP OF PART OF CENTRAL ASIA SHOWING



APPENDICES
TO
HISTORICAL SUMMARY CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION.

- APPENDIX I.—Question of Scistan and recent settlement of division of Province between Persia and Affghanietau.
- „ II.—Extract from War Office Book on Russian advances in Asia (1873), containing information on communication ; Russian memorandum on road to India.
- „ III.—Extract from papers by Mr. Shaw on road into India by Yarkund, Russian military position and roads in Turkistan, &c.
- „ IV.—Extract from a private letter from Yarkund Mission, dated 4th February 1874, containing important information.
- „ V.—Extract from memorandum showing number of troops, arms, &c. of Native States in India.
- „ VI.—Abstract by Mr. Robert Mitchell, showing tone of Russian Press from 1869 to 1874 regarding England and Central Asia.
- „ VII.—Copies of some curious Mahomedan prophecies at one time circulated throughout India and much thought of by the Wahabees.
- „ VIII.—Abstract by Mr. Robert Mitchell of the Area and Population of Russian Turkestan &c.
- „ IX.—Copy of a memorandum by the late Viceroy of India on Adu and its defences.

India Office, 30th April 1874.

O. T. B.

APPENDIX I.

SEISTAN ARBITRATION CASE.

Any settlement of the long-disputed boundaries between Persia and Afghanistan is obviously a question of great importance to our interests in the East.

It is difficult to realize the value of British arbitration as to Seistan without entering into the history of that province: our past line of policy in regard to it; its geographical and political value, and the probable effect of Sir Frederic Goldsmid's decision, now under review.

I propose to do this in four separate sections for the sake of clearness and to save trouble of reading to those already acquainted with any particular section.

I.

Brief abstract of Persian and Afghanistan History as connected with Seistan, including our policy in reference to that district.

II.

Geographical and Political value of Seistan.

III.

Progress of Arbitration in 1871-72, including a short account of Sir F. Goldsmid's journey.

IV.

Abstract of General Goldsmid's Arbitral Opinion.

SECTION I.—ABSTRACT OF PERSIAN AND AFGHANISTAN HISTORY IN REGARD TO SEISTAN, &c.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Seistan, Herat, and Candahar were more or less subject to the Saffavean dynasty of Persia. A.D. 1700

Shortly afterwards Candahar and Herat threw off the Persian yoke, and the Afghans under Meer Mahmood of Candahar overran and conquered Persia. 1718-22.

Persia became totally dismembered; she was unable to resist the encroachments of Russia, Turkey, and Afghanistan; and, distracted by internal strife, she was compelled to resign to them some of her best provinces.

It was not long, however, before a celebrated robber chief, Nadir Shah, sprang up on the ruins of his country. Seizing the crown of Persia, he quickly re-acquired the majority of the districts which had been detached from the Persian Empire. 1723.

He brought into subjection not only Candahar, Herat, Seistan, and Cabul, but even Balkh, Bokhara, and, in a lesser degree, the Panjaub. The Mogul Emperor of Delhi, terrified by his victorious entry into his capital and the slaughter of 1,000,000 of its inhabitants* gave his daughter in marriage to one of the conqueror's sons, assigning as her dowry all the provinces west of the Indus. The Amerr of Bokhara at the same time paid homage to the new Persian ruler.

It is important to bear in mind the limits of the Persian Empire under Nadir Shah from 1732 to 1747; for Persia's claims to Seistan, so far as ancient rights are concerned, are based very much upon that period, whilst Afghanistan argues that on *this* basis she can no more claim Seistan than Cabul, Bokhara, or the Panjaub. 1747.

On the assassination of Nadir Shah at Meshed in 1747, a short period of anarchy ensued, followed by the establishment of the Afghan Empire by Ahmed Shah, an Afghan adventurer in Nadir Shah's army. 1752.

Ahmed Shah was crowned at Candahar as the "chosen of God." His first act was to wrest Cabul from the Persians, to conquer Seistan and Herat, to make Khorassan feudatory, and acquire the Panjaub.

The limits of his empire from 1747 to 1773 were as follows:—

- N. The Oxus.
- S. Sea of Oman.
- E. Sutlej and Indus rivers.
- W. Khorassan and Kerman.

After Ahmed Shah's death in 1773, the Afghan Empire began rapidly to decay. Balkh asserted her independence; Scinde and Beloochistan withdrew from their allegiance; the Sikhs, under the influence of Runjeet Sing, threw off their yoke; and Persia began to assert her claims to Herat and its neighbouring provinces. 1773-98.

As regards Seistan itself a long blank ensued in her history, for she had not played any prominent part in the dissensions of the period and became practically independent from being

1836. ignored by both Persia and Afghanistan.
 Although Dost Mahomed on his ascension to the Afghan throne in 1826 was most anxious to bring Seistan more directly under his rule, he was too fully employed elsewhere in re-conquering Balkh and Badakshan and extending the boundaries of his kingdom once more to the Oxus, to be able to move against the province.

1834. The comparative rest which Persia was at this period enjoying, after a recent and disastrous war with Russia, encouraged the Shah to fill his imagination with the old dreams of extending the Persian Empire to its ancient limits.

Much stress was laid on the brief empire of Nadir Shah, and Herat was made for the moment the chief object of intrigue.

The British Government resisted the Shah's claims to Herat as strenuously as he made them. Our Minister at Teheran, whose policy was fully supported by the Home Government, wrote in 1834,—

"It is unsatisfactory to know that the Shah has very extended schemes of conquest in the direction of Afghanistan, and, in common with all his subjects, considers that his right of conquest over Herat and Candahar is as complete now as in the days of the Saffavidd dynasty. Wishing rather to ascertain the exact pretensions of the Persian Ministers than to discuss the question of right, I inquired how far they considered the dominion of Persia to extend. Their reply was, to Ghiznee. On former occasions, the Hajeer had mentioned the occupation of Herat as a proximate enterprise, and that of Candahar as one not far distant."

Again he wrote,—

"I feel quite assured that the British Government cannot permit the extension of the Persian Monarchy in the direction of Afghanistan with a due regard to the tranquility of India; that extension will at once bring Russian influence to the threshold of our Empire."

1838. Four years afterwards, Sir John McNeill, who had succeeded Mr. Ellis as our Minister at Teheran, wrote,—

Sir John McNeill to Viscount Palmerston, 11th April 1838. "At Kandahar our position is still very precarious, and I enclose a draft treaty between the Shah and the Chief of Candahar, Kohendil Khan, which has for its object to unite Herat and Candahar under a Chief who shall be nominally subject to Persia, but actually under the protection of Russia."

The treaty here alluded to and the open aid of Russia in the Persian Expedition against Herat at this time were made subjects of public complaint by Lord Palmerston against the Russian Government, and were acknowledged although weakly excused by Count Nesselrode.

1851-57. After repeated failures before Herat, Persia began to turn her attention more to Seistan, and loud were her claims to that province. Intrigue was made the prelude to possession, and in 1857 Ali Khan, the Chief Ruler in Seistan, was not only induced to go to Teheran, but to marry a Persian Princess, and acknowledge allegiance to the Shah. Unfortunately for himself, this allegiance was unpopular with his brother Chiefs and his own people, and on his return the following year to his capital, he was cruelly murdered.

1852. Minister for Foreign Affairs to Teheran Mission, 27th October 1852. Seeing the aggressive spirit by which Persia was actuated Lord Malmesbury wrote in the following decided language,—

"Her Majesty's Government most distinctly declare that they will not allow any systematic attempt on the part of Persia to effect a change in the state of possession in the countries lying between the Persian frontier and the British territories in India."

* "ARTICLE 5.

"His Majesty the Shah of Persia engages further to take immediate measures for withdrawing from the territory and city of Herat, and from every other part of Afghanistan, the Persian troops and authorities now stationed therein; such withdrawal to be effected within three months from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty.

"ARTICLE 6.

"His Majesty the Shah of Persia agrees to relinquish all claims to sovereignty over the territory and city of Herat and the countries of Afghanistan, and never to demand from the Chiefs of Herat, or of the countries of Afghanistan, any marks of obedience, such as the coinage, or 'khoodsch', or tribute.

"His Majesty further engages to abstain hereafter from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan. His Majesty promises to recognise the independence of Herat and of the whole of Afghanistan, and never to attempt to interfere with the independence of those States.

"In case of differences arising between the Government of Persia and the countries of Herat and Afghanistan, the Persian Government engages to refer them for adjustment to the friendly offices of the British Government, and not to take up arms unless these friendly offices fail of effect.

"The British Government, on their part, engage at all times to exert their influence with the States of Afghanistan, to prevent any cause of umbrage being given by them, or by any of them, to the Persian Government, and the British Government, when appealed to by the Persian Government, in the event of difficulties arising, will use their best endeavours to compose such differences in a manner just and honourable to Persia.

Matters at last came to an open rupture between Great Britain and Persia, followed by the war of 1856, the siege of Herat by the Persians, and the Treaty of 1857. Lord Cowley, in his conversations with the Persian Ambassador during the negotiations, held the same decided language as before, viz., that Her Majesty's Government were "determined that Persia should not disturb the existing state of the tribes on her eastern frontiers."

"ARTICLE 7.

"In case of any violation of the Persian frontier by any of the States referred to above, the Persian Government shall have the right, if the satisfaction is not given, to undertake military operations for the repression and punishment of the aggressors; but it is distinctly understood and agreed that any military force of the Shah which may cross the frontier for the above-mentioned purpose shall retire within its own territory as soon as its object is accomplished, and that the exercise of the above-mentioned right is not to be made a pretext for the permanent occupation by Persia, or for the annexation to the Persian dominions, of any town or portion of the said States."

of troops into Seistan, and the protest of the British Minister at Teheran which caused the abandonment of their design,—

Mr. Murray to the Safr Azim, 5th May 1858.

Although the Persian Ministers gave up sending troops to Seistan in deference to our remonstrances they did not relinquish in writing their claim to the province, for they said,—

The Safr Azim to Mr. Murray, 13th May 1858.

"The Persian Ministers have always considered, and do now consider that Seistan *ab antiquo* has formed an integral part of the Persian territory; and it is at the present time in the possession of the Persian Government, on whose part, there-

Mr. Murray (to Safr Azim, 15th May 1858) replied that,—

"The British Cabinet cannot admit the correctness of this view, which is indeed contradicted not only by the political history of Seistan, but also by its geographical position, which is represented in every existing map possessing any claim to authority as forming part of Afghanistan."

No further question as to Seistan arose until 1862, when Lord Russell informed the Persian Chargé d'Affaires that,—

"As Her Majesty's Government did not recognise the sovereignty of Persia over Seistan, they cannot admit that the demand said to have been made by Dost Mahomed for the submission of Seistan constituted a case in which, under the seventh Article of the Treaty, they can be called upon to acquiesce in any military operations against Afghanistan."

Mr. Eastwick to Minister at Teheran, 18th December 1862.

"There was reason to regret, with reference to the asserted claims of Persia to sovereignty over Seistan, that so much had already been advanced in opposition to those claims, and Lord Stanley was of opinion therefore that if the discussion of the subject should be forced upon the mission pending further instructions from England, it would be equally just and politic to adopt a less decided tone than that used by Mr. Murray in his recent controversy with the Persian Government."

Lord Russell to Minister at Teheran, 5th November 1863.

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government being informed that the title to the sovereignty of Seistan is disputed between Persia and Afghanistan, must decline to interfere in the matter, and must leave it to both parties to make good their possession by force of arms."

The Persian Government were not long in taking advantage of the permission apparently implied in this Despatch. The Shah not only renewed his claims to Seistan under his own seal but took the opportunity of occupying the province with Persian troops during the most distracted period of anarchy in Afghanistan, when the Ruler of that country was utterly powerless to resist encroachment.

One of the first acts of the present Ameer of Afghanistan after the reconstruction of his kingdom in 1868-69 was to protest against the Persian occupation of Seistan. Although after his visit to Umballa he brought Afghan, Turkistan, Qandahar, and Herat under a consolidated rule, he refrained from moving on Seistan partly in the hope that the British Government would arbitrate in the matter, and partly on account of the advice he received from the Viceroy of India not to enter into any warlike operations. The views of the Ameer Shere Ali, then unreservedly expressed at the Umballa meeting in 1869, are fully quoted in an admirable abstract on the case by Mr. H. Le Poer Wynne, of the Foreign Department, Calcutta, dated 29th June 1870.

The Persian Government becoming alarmed at the turn matters were taking began loudly to re-assert their counter claims to Seistan. They now argued on entirely new grounds that,—

"After Lord Russell's Despatch of 1863, Persia had retaken possession of Seistan, that she had not ceased from that moment to consider it as forming part of the interior of Khorassan, and that the Shah was determined to oppose Afghan attempts on that province by force of arms."

Mohsin Khan to Lord Clarendon, 19th March 1870.

The general sense of this language was embodied in Articles V., VI., and VII. of the Treaty of 4th March 1857, and was practically tested shortly afterwards by an attempt of the Persians to send a small body

"The occupation of Seistan, which is a part of Afghanistan, by Persian troops, would be a direct violation of the Treaty of Paris."

"The Persian Ministers have always considered, and do now consider that Seistan *ab antiquo* has formed an integral part of the Persian territory; and it is at the present time in the possession of the Persian Government, on whose part, there-

"Sure, it is not necessary that troops and soldiers should be sent, or a new occupation of the place effected."

1852-58

1862.

1863.

1865.

1868-69.

And again, "Les armées ont décidé en notre faveur, et depuis cinq ans le Seistan a fait partie de
 "Notre Province de Khorassan; par conséquent il ne
 "aurait relever de l'article six de notre Traité de
 "Paris."
 Mohsin Khan to Lord Clarendon, 5th April 1870.

1870-71.

Such being the position of affairs in 1870-71, Persia and Afghanistan, after it must be said some delay and prevarication on the part of the former State, consented to British arbitration, the course of which is described in another section.

The above designedly brief *resumé* of historical events may give some faint general idea of the political history of Seistan in sufficient detail for the consideration of the present question.

SECTION II.—GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL VALUE OF SEISTAN, &c.

Ancient Seistan was of much greater extent than the modern province. It was the country of Jumsheed and Rustoom, the heroes of the Persian Nama, as also of Jacob bin Seth, the conqueror of the Caliph of Bagdad; and although now reduced to an almost deplorable condition it once rivalled the most flourishing provinces of Persia.

The River Helmand, the ancient Etymander, rising in the mountains of Afghanistan, flows through the centre of Seistan into the so-called lake,—the ancient Aria Palus.

The province is described as flat and traversible throughout by wheeled carriage. From it can be reached Herat by a practicable road through Furrah, whilst Candahar is accessible by two easy routes. Nashed and other places in Persia can be reached by equally good tracts, whilst from Sikola is a road over the mountains into Kerman, as traversed by Meer Mahomed in his invasion of Persia. There are also said to be practicable routes to the Mekran Coast, to Noosky in Khelat, and to the Bolan Pass. Sir John Malcolm tells us that Nadir Shah in his invasion of Afghanistan moved an army of 80,000 men through Seistan with the greatest ease.

It will be thus seen, without attempting to go into further details, that the road communications are good, and that the province can be made, with the assistance of the River Helmand, a valuable base of operations for offensive purposes.

A careful study of the map, combined with modern gazetteers and the detailed information contained in General Goldsmid's and Colonel Pollock's Reports, will be sufficient to show the extreme political importance of any decision affecting Seistan not only to Persia and Afghanistan but to ourselves.

A few recent opinions on this subject may not be uninteresting or out of place.

Colonel Taylor to Lord Canning, 2nd February 1858.

In 1858 our Commissioner at Herat, Colonel Taylor, wrote,—

"Should Persia be permitted to continue the exercise of her influence in Seistan, she may have
 "it in her power to propagate falsehoods to the prejudice of India, and being so near the frontiers
 "of India they will be freely circulated."

Mr. Murray to Lord Malmesbury, April 1858.

Our Minister at Teheran wrote in the same year,—

"Seistan, hitherto considered mapped and described
 "as an integral part of Afghanistan, occasionally independent, at other times a dependency of
 "Candahar, is nearer to Candahar than Herat by 200 miles, and is also very considerably nearer
 "the British frontier of Scinde. In fact, if Persia be allowed a permanent footing there, our
 "respective frontiers will be separated from each other by a distance of 400 miles."

Colonel Phayre to Bombay Government, 14th January 1869, written on receiving a letter from Ibrahim Khan, saying that the Persians had driven him from left to right bank of the Helmand, had even taken Jelaniabad and Nad Ali on the right bank, and were gradually pressing on to Rudbar, &c.

The Political Superintendent of the Scinde Frontier, Colonel Phayre, wrote in 1869 that the position acquired by the Persians in Seistan was,—

"Well selected, both for defence against the Seistan
 "Belooches on the opposite bank, and for com-
 "manding the several lines of route that radiate
 "from Seistan eastward, viz., that by Shorawuk and the valley of the Lora to the Pishen Valley
 "and Quetta, and the kafila route to Noosky. The former of these routes is well watered and
 "supplied; the latter is desert although traversed by caravans, and a route whereby a force can
 "reach Kutchee and turn the Bolan Pass."

"In a strategical sense," adds Colonel Phayre, "and with reference to the well-known ambition
 "of Persia towards Afghanistan, her occupation of Hossainabad (Nasirabad) is a flank movement
 "of incalculable importance. By it she completely turns Herat, Furrah, and Lash Jowain,
 "neutralises them in fact without endangering her rear communications. Politically speaking she
 "lays the axe at the root of Afghan independence and neutrality; because in Seistan she holds
 "a more dominating position than the possession of Herat or Furrah would have afforded her."

"The present information dispels at once the idea so long prevalent that impassable deserts
 "interpose an inseparable barrier between Persia and Khelat. On the contrary, the facts
 "under report show that from a base in Persian Khorassan, which is a highly productive
 "country a large army can advance by water for nearly 200 miles to Kheirabad then to Candahar
 "is only 150 miles, or to the Bolan Pass 230 miles, both routes being well supplied and
 "watered."

The Afghan Vakeel who brought the letter containing the above information with an appeal for help from the Belooch Chief, Ibrahim Khan, exclaimed, "Salih the Persians are seizing the gates of Candahar."

The present Avner of Afghanistan has spoken constantly in the same sense:—

Cabot Diary, 18th March 1870, and sundry "Persia it will one day tend to great disturbances in

"Afghanistan. Troops from Seistan by the Helmand can come to Candahar without any hill or other impediment."

Another high Indian authority, acquainted with Seistan, wrote in 1872,—

"The capabilities of the Seistan district are of very great importance in a political military sense,

"and the possession of the district by Persia is not only a direct menace to the very existence of

"the Afghan kingdom, but to the security of the Western Provinces of India. The country on this

"side of the boundary range between Persia and Seistan is a vast level plain extremely fertile

"and capable of enormous development. It is abundantly watered by the rivers flowing to the

"Helmand, and possesses every facility for the maintenance and supply of a large army."

Other well known opinions in the same sense might be quoted, but probably enough has been said to enable us to enter upon the account of General Goldsmid's activities, with an adequate idea of the geographical value of the district and the importance to us politically of any decision affecting it.

Annexed is a rough itinerary of distances from Perso-Seistan to various important points according to General Goldsmid.

Rough ITINERARY, showing approximate Distance from Sekohain in Seistan to certain Cities and Localities inland or on the coast.

		Remarks.
To Meehad	About 600 miles	Fair road through Lash Juwain and Kayn, and practicable for wheeled carriages. Supplies good and plentiful, except at some three or four stages between Lash and Birland.
" Kandahar	250 "	} Two roads: one by Girishk, and one by Helmund at Hasar Jukt. Both good. Supplies.
" Herat	300 "	
" Noosky	390 "	Good road by Furrab, which is somewhat less than half way.
" Dolan Pass	300 "	Of which 191, to the Helmund, are through a country where provisions are scarce and water not always procurable.
" Dolan Pass	430 "	Via Kandahar and Girishk.
" Kirman	410 "	Via Bam and Nurmahist; then eastern skirt of Kirman desert. Supplies good and plentiful through nearly first half of road.
" Mekran Coast:		
Charhar	680 "	} Via Nurmahist and Bamapar. Supplies scarce for the first part, but good in large towns or villages.
Gwâdur	700 "	

SECTION III.—PROGRESS OF ARBITRATION, &c.

The arbitration of the British Government in regard to Seistan having been accepted by Persia and Afghanistan, Major-General Sir F. Goldsmid was appointed Arbitrator and left England on the 10th November 1871 accompanied by Colonel Pollock, Major Evan Smith, and other Officers.

His instructions were to ascertain the *status quo* of Seistan; to meet the Persian and Afghan Commissioners at some pre-arranged point; to acquire all the local information in his power; and after hearing the respective claims of the Commissioners to proceed to Teheran with a view to the discussion of the question and the delivery of an arbitral opinion.

The mission arrived at Boubay on the 3rd December 1871, when it was decided that General Goldsmid should proceed to Seistan by Bandar Abbas, whilst Colonel Pollock was to go by Candahar in company with the Afghan Commissioner.

General Goldsmid reached Bam on the 7th January 1872, at which place he was met by the Persian Commissioner Mirza Maasum Khan. Sekoha was reached on the 1st February, and Nasirabad on the 5th. This latter place, which appears to be a fortified post, is described as the Perso-Seistan capital.

General Goldsmid soon found himself in a position of great difficulty. The Afghan Commissioner had not yet joined him, whilst the Persian Commissioner stifled all local inquiry and assumed a tone which is described as defiant and unfriendly. The whole effort of the Persian Commissioner was to throw discredit on the Mission; for, whilst endeavouring to persuade General Goldsmid that under the terms of Lord Russell's letter no inquiry was necessary, he forbade the Mission bying the British flag, prevented its officers from entering towns or villages, gave them inferior quarters, cut

off their supplies when wishing to march to Rudbar or other places, used insulting expressions, in his correspondence,—in fact, did everything in his power to make all inquiry a failure.

General Goldsmid displayed great judgment throughout this disagreeable part of his journey; he dwells strongly in all his letters on the bad conduct of the Mirza; and he had the poor satisfaction afterwards of seeing him punished by a year's suspension from office in consequence of his (General Goldsmid's) strong representations to the Persian Government.

Colonel Pollock joined General Goldsmid with the Afghan Commissioner on the 8th of March 1872, near Nasirabad. But all attempts to bring the rival Commissioners together in friendly intercourse were failures, and from this and the other circumstances above narrated both General Goldsmid and Colonel Pollock were forced to agree that "all hopes of a fair inquiry were vain;" that "the palpable and shameless attempts to slide plain speech, to reject honest evidence, and to get rid of obnoxious witnesses, had culminated into unmistakably offensive expressions in letters," and made it evident therefore that "the sooner they moved away from Seistan the better."

The Mission accordingly left Nasirabad on the 11th of March for Meshed where they arrived on the 25th of April, and were given a most honourable reception by the Prince Governor, Sultan Murad Mirza, who is described as a man of considerable ability and power.

In one of General Goldsmid's conversations with the Persian Governor he understood the Prince to say, in reference to the relations between the British and Persian Governments, that he "upheld the theory advocated by the Persian Minister in London, that if England would support his nation by money as of old, she would find in her a true and faithful ally in carrying out the protective policy on behalf of India." He admitted however that we should do well to make the Afghan Ruler our friend, "provided the said Ruler had power to govern his own people and consolidate his own dominions."

From Meshed, which General Goldsmid left on the 3rd of May, the Mission proceeded to Teheran where they arrived on the 4th of June, after accomplishing a total journey from Bunder Abbass of 1,860 miles.

A delay of more than a month was here caused by the non-receipt of the statement of the Persian claims. General Goldsmid naively describes the little attentions he received during this interval, and the continued efforts of the Persian Ministers to get him to commit himself to an acknowledgment of their claims before delivering his arbitral opinion.

Fortunately General Goldsmid was the right man to deal with intrigue, and wisely avoided committing himself or uttering an unguarded word.

General Goldsmid to Secretary of State, 31st October 1872. The Persian statement was at length submitted, on the 10th of July 1872, four months after that of the Afghan Commissioner.

Both statements may be summarized as follows:—

Persian Statement.

That according to the principles of every civilized State, ancient and newly acquired rights which Persia holds in Seistan, dispense with the necessity of adducing proof.

That Article 6, 7, and 8 of the Treaty of 1857 prove that Seistan belongs to Persia.

That no Afghan has at any time been named Governor of Seistan.

That there is no similarity between the Afghans and Seistanees.

That Lord Russell's letter of 1863 obviates any discussion as to the present possessions of Persia in Seistan, and excuses the Persian Government from entering into such discussion.

That Seistan has, *ab antiquo*, belonged to Persia; that she now has firm possession of it, and that in addition to Persia's natural rights, Seistan belongs to her by conquest in accordance with the decision of the British Government, from *Tagnit*, in Jowain to *Kash Rud* above *Khash*, thence to *Kalch-i-Bist* and the desert called *Jaya to Jalk*, in Beloochistan.

Afghan Statement.

That it is as clear as daylight that Seistan belongs to Afghanistan.

That it belonged to the empire of Ahmed Shah and his successors and remained ever since under Herat and Candahar.

That Seistanees have often assisted the Afghan Government as can be seen from their graves in Afghan Turkistan.

That there are numerous instances of Afghan Rulers in Seistan especially under Yar Mahomed of Herat and others.

That the newly acquired sovereignty of Persia in Seistan is only attributable to the internal dissensions of Afghanistan, and in no way founded on right or might.

That, as regards Seistanees not speaking the Afghan language, the argument no more holds good than in the case of the Badakshanees, Uzbees, Hazarah Tribes, and others subject to Afghanistan.

General Goldsmid brought the Commissioners together with varied success on three different occasions, on the last of which, 19th August 1872, he delivered his arbitral opinion which will be described in the next section.

The Mission left Teheran a few days afterwards and arrived in England on the 12th September 1872.

It is impossible in a summary of this kind to do justice to the interesting descriptions contained in General Goldsmid's despatches in regard to his journey. They will form a valuable addition to future histories and gazetteers.

His final Despatch No. 21 of the 31st October 1872, contains a concise narrative of his journey and will repay perusal.

SECTION IV.—ARBITRAL OPINION.

As a prelude to his arbitral opinion, Sir F. Goldsmid gives his views on ancient rights and General Goldsmid to Secretary of State, 31st present possession. October 1872, Enclosure I.

As to "ancient rights," he says:—

"The Persian claims to Seistan on the score of ancient rights are not such as to warrant revival after the lapse of 100 years during which they have virtually been in abeyance; and I do not think that the English ministerial letter quoted (Lord Russell's letter) alters the position in this respect. It left the litigants to settle their quarrel together, but gave no right to Persia which she did not possess irrespectively. Therefore an unjust conquest in an arbitration is a right that cannot be considered just by virtue of this letter. If Seistan were in no way subject to Afghanistan when under the ægis of Persia, and subsequently garrisoned by Persian troops, then has her independence been assailed, and I cannot say that the acts of Ali Khan or his successor have satisfied me that their allegiance to Persia was the general desire of the inhabitants."

As to "present possession," General Goldsmid says:—

"It is not easy to define what in the present day is meant by Seistan. I see no better way than to illustrate the case by supposing two territories, one compact and concentrated which I will call 'Seistan Proper,' the other detached and irregular which may be designated 'outer Seistan.' Seistan Proper is composed of the country on the left bank of the Helmand, and extends to a distance of about 120 English miles in length, or from the vicinity of the *Charboli* and *Khaapar* *Ricera* north to *Rudbar* south, and its breadth variable. Seistan Proper is now, under certain reservations to be noted hereafter, in possession of Persia, whose Governor is Meer Alum Khan of Kayn.

"Outer Seistan, on the other hand, irrespective of the desert *Saha* and uninhabited tracts, is in possession of Belooch Chiefs who profess to acknowledge Persian sovereignty or do not admit allegiance to any power but Afghanistan."

General Goldsmid adds,—

"Briefly, being unable to justify the recent action of Persia in Seistan on the score of ancient rights to that province, as regards her present possession of 'Seistan Proper,' the fact is established, although the action of the authorities before described has unquestionably caused me to entertain misgivings on the attitude or sentiments of the population in certain instances."

General Goldsmid to Secretary of State, 31st The arbitral opinion is then summed up under seven heads,— October 1872, Enclosure No. II.

I.

That Seistan was undoubtedly part of Persia in ancient times, but that under Ahmed Shah it formed part of the Afghan Empire and had not been recovered to Persia.

II.

That ancient associations language and habits render its transfer to Persia by no means unnatural or strange, although a century of disconnection cannot fail to be a bar to validity.

III.

That facts of possession are all in favour of Afghanistan, and that circumstances show that Persia has exercised no interference in the internal administration of Seistan from the days of Nadir Shah till a very recent date.

IV.

That geographically, Seistan clearly forms part of Afghanistan.

V.

That, whilst Afghanistan has the advantage in claim, it cannot be denied that from year to year she has been relaxing her hold of Seistan; and although the manner of the occupation of the province by Persia cannot be admitted to correspond to the appeal to arms contemplated by Lord Russell's letter, yet, that Afghanistan failed to take any measure to counteract Persian influence in treating with the Seistan Chiefs.

VI.

That the rich tract of country which the Hamun river, on three of its sides, and the Helmund on the fourth, causes to resemble an island, is "Seistan Proper" and in absolute possession of Persia; whilst the district of "Chakhuuser" and lands of the Helmand above the Kohat Bund and Seistan Desert are known as "Outer Seistan," inhabited chiefly by Belooch Chiefs practically acknowledging Afghan sovereignty.

VII.

That the land designated "Seistan Proper" should be hereafter included by a special boundary line within the limits of Persia, to be restored to independence under Persian protection or governed by duly appointed Governors; and that Persia should not possess lands on the right bank of the Helmund.

General Goldsmid adds that "having given the most coveted, populous, and richer part of the Seistan province to Persia, it is manifestly fair that some compensating benefit should accrue to the losing side. It is indispensable, therefore, that *Nad Ali* be evacuated by Persian garrisons, and both banks of the Helmund above the Kohat Bund be given to Afghanistan."

General Goldsmid to Secretary of State, 31st October 1872, Enclosure II. and map.

The new line of boundary as adjudicated by Sir F. Goldsmid stretches from *Koh Siakh* on the north-west in a line south of *Laush Jowain*, to the Helmund, the main bed of which river before Kohat is to be the eastern boundary of Persian Seistan. The line then runs in a circular direction to *Mateh Siakh* on the chain of hills between Seistan and Kerman. The Persians are not to cross the Hamun river into Laush Jowain, nor are any works on either side to be carried out calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on the banks of the Helmund.

General Goldsmid to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, No. 46, 31st August 1872.

In delivering his arbitral opinion is the presence of the Persian and Afghan Commissioners, General Goldsmid states that he explained his decision in Persian besides giving each Commissioner a map.

The Persian Commissioner protested formally against it. He said that Persia must have the whole province or none at all. "Let it be decided," he said, "to whom Seistan actually belongs, and of what it consists, and then let a decision be given affecting the whole province."

The Afghan Commissioner said he quite agreed in this view. "It is quite impossible," he said, "that a Persian and an Afghan can live in the same house together." He then said in a less decided manner that he could not accept the decision.

The two Commissioners then made claims and counterclaims for compensation for raids. Some conversation ensued in which the Afghan Commissioner said that one village in Seistan Proper was worth the whole portion given to Afghanistan.

The Persian Commissioner, before leaving, repented his formal protest, adding that Persia "reserved her rights over the whole of Seistan." General Goldsmid understood that the word "protest" meant an appeal to the English Foreign Office.

At a subsequent interview with the Persian Prime Minister on the 23rd August, General Goldsmid found him "vraiment tourmenté" at the decision given. He remarked, that it was in accordance with the ancient lamentable policy of England which would not trust Persia, but preferred making a friend of Afghanistan, and he much regretted this new prof of this policy.

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs who joined them at that moment, remarked that he knew perfectly well the political reasons that had led to the Helmund being adopted as the eastern line of Persia's boundary.

General Goldsmid then entered into friendly explanations and arguments with the two Ministers, which appeared to have weight with them. They said that their greatest difficulty would be to evacuate *Nad Ali* and *Katch-i-fath*, and to induce the Shah to accept the decision. The drift of their remarks were such, General Goldsmid thought, as to justify a belief that they were really inclined to accept the arbitration.

In bringing his mission to a close, General Goldsmid brings prominently to notice the services of Major Evan Smith and Major Lovett, R.E.*

* Both since rewarded with the C.S.I. Of the former Officer he speaks in specially high terms for his ability and services in multifarious duties.

Colonel Pollock † is spoken of in high terms for the care which he had continually evinced to facilitate work, and to assist on every occasion in the best interests of Government.

† Since rewarded with the K.C.S.I.

The merits of Quartermaster-Sergeant Dower ‡ are much noticed, whilst the industry of Mr. Gerald Thomas is also praised.

Finally, Sir F. Goldsmid expresses his thanks for the assistance he received on all occasions from Mr. Ronald Thomson of the Tcheran Mission.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The preceding summary will show that General Goldsmid has carried out a difficult task with great judgment and discretion; and I trust that a few general observations on the subject may not be considered out of place.

The settlement by British arbitration of boundaries dividing powerful but uncivilized people beyond our border is a new feature in Indian policy, foreshadowing good or evil according to the manner in which it is followed up.

If in the light of Western arbitration we merely give a general approval to a boundary decision and leave the result in the hands of Asiatic Powers, we disregard our interests and weaken our policy.

If on the other hand in an Eastern point of view we treat the question as intimately affecting our prestige and position in Asia, we must be prepared to make our decision respected with firm language and firm measures.

The day has happily arrived when we are more alive than formerly to the necessity of keeping up our prestige in Central and Western Asia. Whilst frankly disavowing aggression, we are learning to appreciate the policy, so warmly advocated by the late Earl of Minto, of surrounding ourselves with friendly powerful and independent States, within a line of boundaries fixed in some cases by arbitration, all fearing our power, subject to our influence, and ready to act as our friends against foreign intrigue or aggression.

A policy with this basis, definitely fixed upon and boldly carried out, is a sure guarantee for the outward protection of India, a castle from which we may afford to laugh at alarm or attack.

Count Nesselrode wrote to Lord Palmerston in November 1838, however insincerely, that the policy of England and Russia was to maintain a complete reciprocity of pacific views and measures and to respect the tranquillity and independence of the countries then lying between them in Asia, in order to "prevent the possibility of a conflict between two Great Powers which, *that they may remain friends, require not to touch each other and not to come into collision in the centre of Asia.*"

If we regard this policy as applicable to ourselves, we at once see the importance which may some day be attached to the settlement of boundaries in Central or Western Asia, especially if those boundaries in a measure guard the approach to India or help to keep foreign aggression at a proper distance.

Although Russia has as usual not kept to the policy announced by Count Nesselrode, yet we have now but little power to resist her aggressions except in one countermove as purely affecting India, viz. :—

Strong and independent States outside us, fixed boundaries, our influence, and our money actively dispensed within those boundaries, encouragement to British travel and enterprise even at the cost of an occasional life within those boundaries; in fact a general policy of strength and activity which, without being sensational or springing from fear, will not only have a very wholesome influence on foreign invasion but immeasurably raise our prestige in and out of India.

In this sense Persia requires decided handling on our part. If we think that we gain her friendship by encouraging her encroachments towards India and leaving her very much to herself, we are mistaken. Had our policy our influence and our Mission in Persia been what it might have been, we should never have been involved in Seistan difficulties, nor would the Shah have remarked to the late Mr. Alison in 1869 that "he had repeatedly attempted to ascertain clearly the views and policy of Her Majesty's Government, and to see how far he could meet their wishes, but had hitherto met with, he confessed, some reserve on their side, and begged such a frank declaration of their views as would enable him satisfactorily to understand his position and the best course to pursue." Without attempting for a moment to wander into the Central Asian question, it is not inappropriate to draw attention to Seistan on the west and Yarkund on the north as two weak points in our Indian defence.

Enough has been said of Seistan to show the ease with which a hostile force could operate from that province as a base, and threaten if not enter India by one of the most accessible of our western passes—the Bolan Pass.

As to Yarkund, we are told on good authority that it is as fertile as Cashmere, and possesses means not only for the manufacture of warlike material, but for the support of an army. The capital of Yarkund contains 100,000 prosperous inhabitants, and from it, by a series of not difficult marches with obstacles readily surmounted by troops accustomed to Turkestan warfare, a hostile army could cross into Cashmere at a time of year when we might find it difficult to prevent it, or it could as easily cross over a small pass into the Chitral Valley, reaching the head waters of the Oxus within a few days' march of Peshawar.

It is not too much to say then that Seistan and Yarkund demand careful attention.

In respect to Seistan therefore we should use unmistakable language to Persia; reject at once her plea of "reserving her rights over the whole province"; and force her to evacuate the forts and positions east of General Goldsmid's line. We should at the same time give the Government of India full license to take such steps as may seem most desirable to assist Afghanistan in occupying and holding her share of the province, whilst keeping her from any aggression or warlike operations beyond the boundary; we should directly or indirectly subsidize the Helooche-Seistan Chiefs who now get allowances from Persia to the extent of some 200*l.* a year; and above all we

should station a reliable agent at Candahar to watch events and see our decision respected; we should finally leave no stone unturned by artifice or diplomacy to induce Persia to recall the restless and ambitious Meer of Kayn who has been the cause of all the trouble in Seistan. So important is Seistan to us that failing other means we should even occupy Quetta, could we do so with the full consent of Khelet and Afghanistan, in order to show our determination to guard our Western Frontier and enforce our arbitral decision.

Much more could of course be said in regard to our general Eastern policy, but it is not in the scope of this Memorandum. It may not be out of place however to briefly point to the extreme

* This ought to be at least 100,000*l.* a year. At present, if we give a few pounds to Afghanistan or Khelet it has to go into the Budget and is paraded throughout the length and breadth of Europe and Asia. the greater encouragement we ought to give to adventure and travel outside India, the opening up of trade routes with Central and Western Asia, the necessity for constant and friendly intercourse with the people on and outside our border, and the more decided tone which we might impart with advantage into our foreign diplomacy and action. Such a policy may bring many temporary disappointments but cannot avoid being eventually crowned with success as practically assuring, in combination with the proper settlement of boundaries, our security and peace in India.

O. T. B.

India Office,
19th November 1872.

Note, 20th March 1874.—Since the above was written the Ameer of Caubul and the Shah of Persia have reluctantly accepted Sir F. Goldsmid's arbitration on the Seistan boundary question. On the 16th July 1873 the Foreign Office forwarded to this department copy of a note which Lord Granville had received from the Grand Vizier of Persia, notifying the Shah's acceptance of the decision of the English Government; and on the 15th of September the Viceroy of India, in Secret Letter No. 74 of 1873, communicated to the Duke of Argyll, the Ameer Sheer Ali's acceptance.—O. T. B.

APPENDIX II.

EXTRACT.

RUSSIAN ADVANCES IN ASIA, WAR OFFICE, 1873.

From time immemorial the trade between Western and Eastern Asia has passed over two main routes, one following the course of the Syr, the other that of the Amu Daria; to these the Russians have added a third, running through Siberia to the Amour and Peking. The trade routes are shown on Map No. 1.

Russian trade routes.

The great northern route, commencing at Nijni Novgorod, runs through Kazan, Perm, Ekaterinburg, Petropaulovsk, Omsk, Tomsk, and Krasnoïarsk to Irkutsk, near the south-east end of Lake Baikal. Passing round the southern extremity of the lake, it runs through Verkhne-Udinsk, Chita, and Nertchinsk, to Amazar, on the left bank of the Amour. From this point it follows the course of the Amour to Novgorodski, 517 miles from Nikolaïevsk, at the mouth of the river. This route is connected with the Caspian by a road running from Petropaulovsk through Orsk, Orenburg, and Ural'sk, to Gurief, on the right bank of the Ural. The distance from Gurief to Novgorodski by land is 4,774 miles.

From Irkutsk there is a road to Kinkhita, Ourgan, and Peking, and from Semipalatinsk one to Kobdo, Ul'issutai, and Peking. There is also a branch road from Petropaulovsk to Chemkoud, but this is little used at present, the traffic passing along the road to Orenburg, and one from Omsk to Semipalatinsk and Fort Verne.

The Syr Daria route runs from Samara on the Volga to Orenburg, Kazala, Chemkend, Khulha, Manas, Khamil, and Western China, and into it fall branch lines, carrying the traffic from Bokhara, Kokan, and Kashgar.

The Amu Daria route runs through Balkh, Badakhshan, Yarkand, Khotan, and Khamil (Kumul) to Western China, with a second line running from Yarkand to Kashgar, Aksu, Turfan, and Khamil. Into the Amu route the Persian trade finds its way *viâ* Meshed and Merv or Meshed and Herat, and the merchandize of India, after passing through the Bolan and Khyber passes, *viâ* Herat, Balkh, or Chitral, or by the passes leading from Kashmir to Yarkand.

The two northern routes through Siberia and along the Syr Daria are completely in the hands of the Russians; the third will, by the recent agreement, remain open to general traffic, and be free from the prohibitive duties imposed by Russia on all foreign merchandize passing through her possessions.

As the Turkestan trade centres in Tashkend and Bokhara, whence it is distributed over the adjoining provinces, great importance is attached to the communications between European Russia and these towns, and various schemes have been proposed for their improvement.

Russian communications with Turkestan.

There are at present two routes to Turkestan, one by way of Samara, Orenburg, Fort Aral'sk, and the valley of the Syr Daria; the other from Kazan to Omsk and Fort Verne; the first is much the shortest, and forms the main line of communication. The time occupied by caravans from Moscow to Tashkend *viâ* Orenburg is from 70 to 90 days in summer, and from 85 to 105 in winter, and from Moscow to Bokhara, 63 to 77 days in summer, and from 78 to 93 days in winter. The cost of transport is 1 rouble to 1 rouble 30 copecks the pud of 36 lbs. from Moscow to Tashkend, and 2 roubles from Moscow to Bokhara.

Proposals have been made for the construction of a railway from Samara on the Volga to Buzuluk and Orenburg, to be extended to Ural'sk and Gurief on the Caspian in one direction, and to Tashkend in another. It is not improbable that the railway to Orenburg will be commenced ere long, but as the cost of the extension to Tashkend would be from 76 to 84 millions of roubles, and there would be little or no return for the outlay, that section could hardly be made without a Government guarantee.

Three routes have been proposed for shortening the land journey by starting from some point on the eastern shore of the Caspian; one from Krasnovodsk up the old bed of the Amu to Kuna Urgentj, another across the Ust Urt from Mertri Kultuk Hoy to Chernichef Bay in Lake Aral, and a third from the mouth of the Emila to Kazala. The first is that which has found most favour; for the last few years the Russians have been building barracks, wharves, forts, &c. at Krasnovodsk, and recent reconnaissances have shown that there is on the road to Kuna-Urgentj an ample supply of water, and brushwood sufficient for the sustenance of canals. Comparing this route with the existing one, we find that the distance from Samara to Bokhara *viâ* Orenburg is 2,030 versts land transport, and from Samara to Bokhara *viâ* Krasnovodsk, 2,777 versts by water and 800 by land,—*viz.*, from Samara to Astrakhan and Krasnovodsk by steamboat 2,227 versts; and from Krasnovodsk to Kuna Urgentj by land 630 versts, thence to Charjui by water 650 versts, and from Charjui to Bokhara by land 150 versts. There is, however, one great objection to this route, that the Volga is closed by ice for five months in the year, and that the northern portion of the Caspian is also frozen for some time. It is, therefore, not improbable that when the railway system is perfected the point of embarkation on the Caspian will be Petrovsk, where there is at present a good artificial harbour never closed by ice.

The proposed continuation of the Poti-Tiflis Railway to Baku on the Caspian has been abandoned for the present, but a line is projected from Rostov, the terminus of the present railway system to Petrovsk, and thence by Baku to Easelli, where it will be in connection with the railway to the Persian Gulf, for which a concession has recently been obtained from the Persian Government. It is believed that the section from Rostov to Petrovsk will shortly be commenced, and this, when finished, will give direct railway communication with the Caspian.

In a recent telegram it was reported that the Russians had abandoned Krasnovodsk, and removed their establishments to Chikisklar, and this, if true, seems to indicate an intention on their part to open up a road to Meru either by the line of the Turkoman Forts, or the Valley of the Atrak, and to make their main line of communication with Turkestan run through that place and Bokhara.

The great importance of the proposed roads from the Caspian, as facilitating and shortening the communications between Turkestan and the Caucasus is pointed out by General Romanofski in the following passage:—

"There is no doubt that whilst, on the one hand, it will be necessary for a long time to come to keep a large body of troops in the Caucasus; on the other, we shall also for a long time to come, with a small number of soldiers, be able to do a great deal in Central Asia. Experience has proved to us that it takes two years to move troops from the Volga to the Turkestan district; but it would take only a few weeks to transport troops from the Caucasus if a road were laid down in one of the new directions; and considering the immense force in the Caucasus, the detachment of two or three battalions—quite an army in Central Asia—from there would be a matter of no inconvenience, so that with easy communication, there would be no necessity for maintaining a special reserve in the new province."

Russian advances as affecting India.

Whilst the advances of the Russians in Central Asia must be looked upon as an unmixed benefit to those regions, and should, therefore, viewed in that light alone, be regarded with satisfaction by all civilized nations, it remains to be considered how they affect us in connection with our eastern possessions. The question of the use which the Russians may make of the influence they are acquiring in Central Asia to incite the inhabitants of Afghanistan, or of Chinese Tartary against us or to foment rebellion in India itself, does not come within the scope of the present paper. As, however, much has recently been written on the subject of an invasion of India by Russia, it will, perhaps, not be out of place to give a slight sketch of the routes which are supposed to be available for an invading army.

In the first place, it must be remembered that the points to which the Russians have now reached Samarkand and Khojend, cannot be looked upon as bases of operations for an advance on Hindostan of an army of any strength. The whole of the regions of Turkestan and of the Kirghiz Steppes are not, it is believed, of a sufficiently productive nature to afford supplies for an army of any magnitude, and consequently the greater part, if not the whole of the ammunition, equipment, and provisions which such an army would require, would have to be transported for a distance of three or four thousand miles, by indifferent roads, over barren tracts, and through mountainous regions, inhabited in many cases by hostile and predatory tribes; an undertaking which would probably overtax the resources of any empire.

It should also be remembered that all previous invasions of India have been through Afghanistan, and that in all probability any future invasion will be from the same quarter. The road from Herat to the Indus has on more than one occasion been traversed by powerful armies, and there is no reason why it should not be so again if the Afghans were friendly to the invader. If the Afghans were opposed to the advance of an army, and were assisted with arms and officers, any invasion of India by this line would be impossible. Though the accounts of the engagements in Central Asia would lead us to believe that they were of a serious nature, it is clear from the slight losses sustained, that the Russians have as yet encountered no resistance, such as our troops met with in the Kabul war, and that they would find it a far more serious matter to march a large army through a difficult country, and a hostile population of such a warlike character as the Afghans. "As to the physical difficulties, no one who has a knowledge of those that Russia has already overcome, or of the character of the Russian soldier, and the enterprise, skill, and ambition of his officer, will for a moment doubt, if an order were given for the advance of an army towards India, that all difficulties would be surmounted."* As to the difficulties of feeding an army on this line Sir Henry Green adds, "I believe that a modern army, consisting of from 50,000 to 80,000 men, highly disciplined, inured to war, and possessing a well-organized commissariat, is more formidable and easier fed and moved in a scantily provisioned country, than a horde of from 20,000 to 30,000 horse and foot left to forage for themselves."

The routes leading to India may be divided into three groups: those running from Tashkend, or Fort Tokmak, through Kashgar and Yarkand to Kashmir; those leading from Samarkand and Bokhara through the Chittral or Bamian passes to Afghanistan, and thence through the Khyber and Bolan passes to the Indus; and those which, converging on Herat, pass by way of Kaudahar and the Bolan to the Indus. These routes are shown on map No. 1.

1st. Troops advancing from Kashgar would first of all have to reach that place by the road from Tashkend through Kokan, or by that from Fort Tokmak, and the valley of the Naryn. Both these roads cross the Tinn-shan by passes upwards of 12,000 feet high, which, though the approaches on the north are said to have been made practicable for arbalis (two-wheeled carts), can hardly be considered suitable for an army with artillery, trains, &c.

* Sir Henry Green,—"The Defence of the North-west Frontier of India."

3rd. The third series of routes is that which presents the greatest facilities to an invading army, and when we consider the improved means of communication with the Caspian, which Russia will shortly possess, the presence of an army of 150,000 men in the Caucasus, fully trained and equipped for mountain warfare, the large and increasing means of transport which Russia possesses on the Caspian,* and the fact that she has firmly established herself at Chikishlar, a point favourable for disembarkation at the mouth of the Atrek, it is not impossible that in the event of another war with England, Russia may attempt to carry out one of the projects submitted to the Emperor in 1855-56 (Appendix IV.)

If, too, Russia were ever to make the road through Merv, one of her main lines of communication with Bokhara and Turkestan, Merv would become a place of the first importance as a *dépôt* of supplies, and base of operations against Herat.

The following routes would be available for the passage of troops to Afghanistan :

1. From Turkestan *viâ* Bokhara, Merv and Herat to Kandahar.
2. From Chikishlar by the line of the Turcoman forts to Merv, Herat, and Kandahar.
3. From Chikishlar up the Atrek and Giurgen Valleys to Khabushan, Meshed and Herat to Kandahar.
4. From Astrabad *viâ* Khabushan, Meshed, and Herat to Kandahar.
5. From Julia on the Araxes *viâ* Tabriz, Teheran, Meshed, and Herat to Kandahar.
6. From Julia *viâ* Tabriz, Teheran, Kashan, Nain, Noybunda, and Furreh to Kandahar.

The first route could of course only be used by troops coming from Turkestan, and it is hardly likely that any important reinforcements could be sent from the small force in that country.

The section of the second route between Chikishlar and Merv has never been traversed by any large body of troops, and there is no account of any traveller having passed over the whole of it. From the detailed manner, however, in which the road and the Turcoman forts on it are laid down on the most recent Russian maps, it is probable that the road has been followed by some Russian traveller. The very existence of these forts, and their number, shows that the district must be well supplied with water, and Colonel Markosof in his reconnaissance last year appears to have experienced no difficulty in advancing 33 or 40 miles beyond Kizil Arvat, the first fort of the series. In consequence of the unsettled state of the country, Merv is now in ruins, and contains a population of only 2,000 or 3,000; it was formerly a place of great importance, with a population of 20,000 to 30,000, and if once the Tekko Turcomans were brought under control it would soon regain its former prosperity. From Merv to Herat, a distance of 250 to 300 miles, the road lies through an open, well watered, and partially cultivated district. Herat itself is a place of great natural strength; but it is doubtful whether it could be defended by a native force, for any length of time, against modern artillery.

The remaining routes pass through Persian territory, they lie through regions which, nowhere entirely barren, are in some places uncommonly fertile, and inhabited by sedentary tribes. They present no insurmountable difficulties, and that from Teheran to Herat has been repeatedly traversed by Persian armies.

Since the recent famine Persia has become almost incapable of resistance, and bound as she is to Russia by treaties, she could easily be kept in check by the troops in the Trans-Caucasian provinces.

The fourth route from Asterabad is perhaps the easiest and most direct, and offers the advantage of a favourable place for disembarkation on the mainland opposite Ashurade, where one of the Caspian steamboat companies has a landing wharf, cargo hulks, &c.

The Russian settlement at Ashurade consists of a few wooden huts, occupied by the crews of some of the vessels on the Caspian, built on an island of loose sand, which in a strong northerly wind is nearly covered by water; the natural harbour is, however, a very good one, perhaps the best on the Caspian, and affords good anchorage.

From Kandahar two roads lead to India, that by Kabul and the Khyber Pass, and the easier and more direct road by the Bolau Pass. Both these passes could be easily defended, and if the invading army experienced the least check, the Afghans, however favourably inclined they may previously have been to its advance, would, in all probability, turn round and join the opposite side.

From Peshawar to Kurracl-e there are several passes through the Solymon Mountains practicable for laden animals; but the main roads by which an invading army would have to march are through the Khyber and Bolau passes. Various schemes have been suggested for the better defence of this portion of the Indian frontier: of these that which was proposed by the late General Jacob, and is now advocated by Sir Henry Green, viz., the occupation of Quetta, in advance of the Bolau seems to offer the greatest advantages.

A British force at Quetta would close the road through the Bolau to an invading army, and be in a position to operate on the flank or rear of any force advancing on the Khyber. Sir Henry Green also advocates as part of his scheme the connecting by railway the town of Dadur, at the entrance of the Bolau Pass into India, with the Indus railway system at Sukkur, on the Indus, and the connecting by railway of the Mediterranean Sea and head of the Persian Gulf, to form an alternate means of communication to India with the Suez Canal, and render England independent of the canal.

* The steamboats of the three Volga Companies, in addition to the Naval force on the Caspian.

From the sketch which has been given it will be seen that the Russians in any invasion of our dominions, whether from the side of Chinese Tartary or Afghanistan, would have most formidable obstacles to encounter. The distance from Samarkand by the Hamian to India is about 900 miles; the number of men to be transported would certainly not be less than 30,000 to 40,000, and when they reached India, they would find opposed to them a highly disciplined force under a British leader, with good railway communication, and a fertile country in its rear.

The war establishment of the army of the Caucasus is 196,414 men, (164,038 combatants), 40,897 horses, and 248 guns; of these probably 90,000 or 100,000 could be put in the field immediately.

Russian Forces
in the Caucasus
and Central
Asia.

In the district of Orenburg, 35,756 men, 24,614 horses, and 24 guns.

In Western Siberia, 13,000 men, 8,839 horses, and 8 guns.

In Eastern Siberia, 29,252 men, 6,792 horses, and 40 guns.

In Turkestan, 17,695 men, 2,938 horses, and 48 guns.

A detailed statement of these forces is given in Appendix No. V.

On the Caspian, Russia has 3 launches, of together 180 horse-power, and 794 tons; 10 steamers, of together 980 horse-power, and 3,523 tons; 4 steam launches, and 2 sailing transports, of together 729 tons. There are three steamboat companies on the Volga, each with a numerous fleet of fast steamers, besides a number of barges, steam tugs, &c.; some of these steamers ply on the Caspian, and one of the companies has landing wharves, &c., near Ashurade. There are also probably a few traders, sailing vessels, &c.

At Astrakhan there is a well-appointed Naval Arsenal, and a second at Baku, south of the Caucasus.

On the Sea of Aral there are 4 steamers, of together 170 horse-power, and about 650 tons, with 1 launch of 12 horse-power and 16 tons.

The detail of the naval establishments, extracted from the Russian Navy List, is given in Appendix No. VI.

THE ROAD TO INDIA.*

(FROM OUR RUSSIAN CORRESPONDENT.)

Berlin, January 26th.

The Augsburg "Allgemeine Zeitung" has been enabled to publish the following memorandum on the invasion of India, presented to the Emperor Nicholas at the time of the Crimean War, by General Duhanau, late Russian Envoy to the Court of Teheran:—

"When, towards the end of the last century, the Emperor Paul ordered an army to be concentrated on our Eastern frontiers, preparatory to the invasion of India, the English were greatly irritated by the measure, harmless as it then was. Since that time English journalism has never ceased to discuss the danger of a Russian invasion of India. Parliament, too, has more than once debated the question.

"The present war being destined to become a 'war to the knife,' it is incumbent upon Russia to consider whether she has the means to touch England in India—the only point accessible to our arms—or, at any rate, to force her to concentrate an army in Asia, and thereby lame her action in Europe.

"History records that nearly all the conquerors of India came from Central Asia and Persia. The roads chosen for this purpose by Alexander the Great, Gengis Khan, Timur Khan, Baber Sultan, and Nadir Shah are open to this day. Whether proceeding from Persia or the Oxus, all these roads converge upon Khorassan and Afghanistan? Caudahar and Cabul are the doors of India.

"The roads at our disposal are these:—

(1) From Orenburg to the Ust Urt Khiva, and further on to Cabul by way of Metz, Herat, and Candahar.

(2) From Orak or Orenburg to Aralsk, Bokhara, Balkh, Khulm, and Cabul.

(3) From Orak or Troitsk to Aralsk, Ak Meshed, Tushkend, Khokan, Khulm, Hamian, and Cabul.

(4) From Astrakhan by sea to Astrabad, and further on, by Kadushan or Shauid, to Meshed, Herat, Candahar, and Cabul.

(5) From Julia, on the Araxes, to Talriz, Teheran, Meshed, Herat, Candahar, and Cabul.

"The first three roads traverse the whole breadth of the steppe. Even if we could rely upon being assisted by the inhabitants of Khiva and Bokhara, many thousands of camels would be required to carry provisions.

"The fourth and fifth roads lie through regions which, nowhere entirely barren, are in some places uncommonly fertile, and inhabited by sedentary tribes. They neither encounter insurmountable passes of the Hindu Kush nor the broad and deep stream of the Amu.

" If the necessary number of transports can be collected in the Caspian, the Astrakhan-Astrabad route is the most convenient of all. It is a short cut to the East, and Astrabad being situate on the borders of Khorassan, there remain only 1,840 versts (about 1,300 miles) to Cabul.

" Perhaps infantry, artillery, and ammunition might be sent by sea, the cavalry and commissariat trains marching from Transcaucasia (Tiflis) through Persia. To march through Turkestan would be dangerous, the Khans and people being sure to rise up against us in our rear, attack our stragglers, and menace our communications; to cross Persia is safe. A half-civilized country, utterly incapable of resistance and bound to us by treaties, Persia can be easily kept in check by our troops in the Transcaucasian provinces. No doubt diplomacy will suffice to make Persia grant us magazines, camels, and the means of sure and safe communication. More than this we do not want. Were we to try and enlist Persian troops on our side, the deadly enmity existing between them and the Afghans would deprive us of the assistance of the latter. But an Afghan alliance is the *sine quâ non* of success.

" Naturally, England would take her precautions against us. The English might land in the Gulf of Persia, occupy the Isle of Karak or Bender-Bushir, and stir up the South Persian tribes against the Shah. But all this would be of no avail. If Russia guarantees the integrity of the Persian territory, and promised to help the Shah to recover Bagdad, Kerbelai, and a portion of Kurdistan, Persia could probably be induced to declare war against Turkey. All this recommends the Persian route as by far the most advantageous.

" From Afghanistan three roads lead to the Indus :

" (1) From Cabul to Jellalabad, Peshawar, and Attock.

" (2) From Ghuzni to Dera Ismail Khan.

" (3) From Candahar, by Quetta and Dadur, to Shikapur.

" The defiles crossed by these roads can be easily defended; still, it is worth notice that they can be more easily forced from the West than the East.

" The best, shortest, and healthiest road is the first, though the English chose the third when invading Afghanistan in 1839. At Attock the invading army reaches the road to Lahore and Delhi, the principal objects of the attack. Proceeding on this road, the army will stir up the Mahomedan population and carry rebellion into the very heart of the English territory. Allured by the prospect of plunder and territorial aggrandizement, the Afghans are likely to follow in our wake. If we succeed in inducing the Sikhs likewise to make common cause with us, all the better; if not, the Afghans alone are enough for our purpose. The negotiation of an Afghan alliance cannot early enough be taken in hand. All is gained if that can be gained; for not to conquer India, but only to destroy or shake the English rule, must be our object in invading the country. A moderate force, just strong enough to form the nucleus of a general insurrection, would be sufficient to attain our end. In proportion the enslaved nationalities gather round our standard, our troops might be reduced and the natives left to themselves."

From the year 1838-9 Russian influence in Asia has yielded to that of England. Ever since the march of the Shah against Herat, England's influence is paramount in Persia, as it has been in Turkey, since the destruction of the Kelessi treaty.

England combats Russia influence in every way, especially through her agents.

Russia seeks to maintain English influence wherever it is established. The instructions given to Russian agents have always been of a temporary nature; there was no comprehensive plan, no universal principle. They presented themselves in Central Asia only to disappear soon afterwards, and were quite powerless to destroy England's influence.

English policy in Central Asia has always been directed with a view to the future; Russia's policy has been confined to the present, for the guiding principle has been to be one with England, so that the peace of Europe might not be disturbed.

But England herself has now broken the peace of the world. The time has arrived to lay her to the dust with one powerful blow.

The best safeguard for a sure and vigorous development of her power lay in peace. She herself has rejected that safeguard, and the days of her dominion on the sea are even now possibly numbered, as were those of Genoa, Venice, Spain, and Holland.

The nervous system of her power lies in India; not so much the possession of India at any price, as to hold it in undisturbed peace, is the condition of the British rule.

To shake India is to hurt England from the high pedestal she occupies.

None but hoodwinked friends to England's policy in Russia can doubt the possibility of Russia damaging England in India.

The possibility of such a danger is especially recognized in the despatches of Ellis and McNeill, and in Lord Auckland's declaration of war against Afghanistan.

Since that time England has certainly strained every nerve to strengthen her position in India, whilst Russia remained an idle spectator.

In India there is a large army for service in the field; good communications by land and water exist; a line of arsenals is established in the north west. English merchants, English agents, and English money have penetrated into every corner of Asia.

But England, for all that, is vulnerable in India, and though Russia may not be able to conquer India, still less to maintain herself there as long as England rules the sea, her power may nevertheless be broken.

The Indian half-castes who are the equals of their English masters in education, and who recent most bitterly the unjust position which they are forced to occupy, constitute England's most dangerous enemy.

Afghanistan is her most dangerous neighbour.

With the aid of Persia and Afghanistan, India may be struck at, and diplomacy must prepare a path for the Russian armies. Russia must announce herself as the liberator of all the neighbours and subjects of England.

Fear alone keeps the Afghans quiet; they have no partiality for England. Nay, in 1836-37 they actually applied for Russian protection. To this day the ruins of caravanserais and bazars along the roads call to mind the English invasion.

Internal decay and strife which secure England a certain amount of influence may undoubtedly be traced to the Anglo-Afghan War. The first and most difficult task for the Russian agents will be to bring Afghanistan under a single rule.

This requires large sums of money, for Afghanistan must be placed in a position to take an active part in the campaign.

Persia need merely be required to remain neutral; an alliance with her is of little value; but her enmity, if aroused by England, might prove in the highest degree injurious.

First of all Persia must be gained over. (1.) By threats and intimidation; (2.) By presents and pensions; (3.) By treaties assuring her the possession of Kurlah and Nejed for all time. Russia must not bind herself to conclude peace with Turkey, unless those districts are ceded, for they are held sacred by the Shiite Persians, as the resting-places of the martyrs Ali, and his sons Hussain and Hussein. By this concession Russia will gain over the Persian priesthood, England, being allied with Turkey, is not able to make such an offer, and her influence in Persia will consequently be paralyzed.

The military concentration should be effected by means of the two roads, from Asia Minor, and from Astrakhan, by land and water, by way of Mazenderan, along the Giurgen and Atrek and their tributaries, by way of Budjurd and Kabushan to Meshed, thence to Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul.

The Island of Ashurade, 30 versts from Asterabad, offers a good roadstead for the Russo-Caspian fleet.

The road from Mazenderan to Kabul is throughout practicable for artillery; there is no want of water, except in a few desert tracts; rice and coffee are plentiful everywhere, as well as oats and pastures for the horses. The district of Astrabad, and the towns Budjurd and Kabushan are particularly important for provisioning the troops. A convenient caravan road conducts from Meshed to Herat, and the environs of Herat are celebrated for their fertility.

An army marching 25 versts daily, would accomplish the distance between the Caspian and the Sutlej in 120 days, viz.—

	Versts.	Days.
Astrabad to Herat	- - - - - 811	- 33
Herat to Kandahar	- - - - - 495	- 20
Kandahar to Kabul	- - - - - 556	- 23
Kabul to Peshawur	- - - - - 338	- 14
Peshawur to the Sutlej	- - - - - 614	- 25
Total	- - - - - 2,814	- 115

Appropriate seasons will have to be chosen for the march over certain districts.

A winter march from Kandahar to Kabul is hardly practicable; but winter is the best season for crossing the steppes. Troops reaching a hot climate in autumn, get acclimatized during the ensuing winter; if they arrive in summer they are exposed to the autumnal diseases.

The dress should be suited to the conditions of the march and the climate. Furs are of more importance in Asia in summer than in winter.

Some fortified position near the Caspian,—for preference between the Atrek and Giurgen rivers, 14 versts from Astrabad, 20 from the Caspian,—should be selected as a place of assembly for the army, its stores, and artillery. The ruins of Akhkate mark the spot referred to. Its environs are fertile, the climate healthy and agreeable; there is timber in the neighbouring woods for building houses and ships. The territory belongs to Persia by right; but it is now in possession of the Turcomans. Its occupation can be easily effected; but its maintenance is essential in order to ensure the communication with Transcaucasia by way of the Caspian, to threaten Persia, to intimidate the Turcomans, Bokharians, and Khivans, to animate the allied tribes of Central Asia, and to create a market for Russian products.

As soon as the march commences, proclamations should be published in Transcaucasia, Astrakhan, and Orenburg.

England has the choice of two alternatives, she must either march to meet her enemy in the north-west, or await the attack in India.

In the former case Russia announces herself on entering the lists as a liberator, and thus gives the signal for insurrection. This insurrection, or the part of it, will cause the army then advanced towards the north-west frontier to retire, or to divide and break up.

Under Lord Hardinge there were 270,000 men, of which there were but 10,000 Europeans, and 7,500 European officers. The native troops fight well if led by European officers; but as soon as their leaders fall they run away, as they did when opposed to Sikhs, Seindees, Afghans, and

others. In times of great excitement an English General would hardly venture to lead natives across the frontier into Afghanistan, to oppose the Russians. Should he nevertheless do so, the act would throw the Afghans into the arms of the advancing Russians. Afghanistan, besides, is unfavourable for military operations on a large scale, it is only suited for the movements of small bodies. A defeat in Afghanistan would entail the most serious consequences as regards England. Even the catastrophe of 1841 threatened to evoke an insurrection in India, and the Afghans then had no powerful army in their rear to back them up. The Sikhs would probably be the first to secede.

Suppose, on the other hand, England decided to remain on the defensive. She would then probably place three armies in the field, as supposed by Count Hjornstjanns, the first in the Panjaut, 100,000 men, including Sikhs, the second behind the Sutlej, 70,000 to 80,000 men, and the remaining forces as a reserve in the rest of India. But this would prove most costly. The Afghan campaigns alone have cost 24,000,000*l.*, the wars of 1839 to 1849 100,000,000*l.* The Indian finances exhibited a deficit of 2,138,000*l.* in 1840, of 15,264,484*l.* in 1849, although England had only 17,000 soldiers in 1839, and 54,000 in 1842.

The diaorganization of the Indian finances alone would be worth a campaign.

It is possible to attack India, and it is our sacred duty to attack it, in order to inflict wounds upon England, which will bleed now and for ever after. No sacrifice is too heavy if it is a question of breaking down the English supremacy. Let the Emperor demand this sacrifice at the hands of his people, and the sacrifice will be borne cheerfully.

The Russian people look upon the present war as a contest for supremacy between England and Russia.

No peace can exist between Russia and England until the latter power is annihilated.

Russia, the autocratic, the Christian, has nought in common with that birth-place of political intrigues, that cradle of democrats, demagogues, and atheists.

There can only be an armistice between England and Russia, during which preparations are made for a fresh struggle.

Peace, now concluded, would not receive a blessing from above.

The opponents of a Russian march to India point to the difficulties of the enterprise, to the great sacrifices in money and men, to the comparatively small success to be achieved, and to the risk of failing at the very outset.

But this is no question of an armed struggle to be entered upon without consideration. Our preparations for such a purpose are not perhaps complete, nor are we as yet perfect in our knowledge of the intervening countries, their relations and interests. The diplomatic influence of England is still too powerful there.

Our present task must be therefore directed to establishing diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and Turkestan, the rest will follow.

More embassies can do little. Russian agents can only cope with English agents in Afghanistan by being provided with a large retinue, on pretence of fearing an attack by robbers, and by a good supply of money.

Kabul can only be reached by the Russian ambassador entering each village authoritatively, and leaving it impressed with his good intentions. Rather do nothing at all, than do things by halves.

It is next objected that the despatch of an army, or even of an armed embassy before the establishment of a fort on the Giurgen, would compel Persia to throw off her forced neutrality, and the only consequence would be a fresh war. It is also said that England, who attacks with energy even now, when her material interests are not threatened, will act with the utmost vigour, if pushed to it. The resources of England are said to be inexhaustible. She could bring all Europe into the field, and Russia would be opposed by a coalition which no power on earth could resist. And all this for the sake of a chimera.

But this very fear of England on a previous occasion induced Russia to surrender a capital position in Central Asia.

If the present war continues another year, a rupture with Persia is certain, for whilst Russian influence had only to combat that of England in former times, at present it has to meet the combined efforts of Murray and Bource, and will finally be compelled to yield to Anglo-French threats and bribes. In spite of his personal ability, the Minister Anichkof will effect nothing. Things will happen as in 1811-26, when England gained over Persia by furnishing officers and money, whilst Russia looked on an idle spectator until the outbreak of the war.

Persia need not be feared as an opponent if the right steps are taken. Russia, to enable her to take the offensive, requires in addition to a good general, merely a division of 20,000 men, besides the troops now stationed in Transcaucasia.

At all events, if there is to be another war with Persia let us make timely preparations, rather than neglect them.

A move in the direction of India does not necessarily mean war with Persia. Persia would have no cause to complain of an infringement of her neutrality, if a small army were sent along the road from Astrabad to Herat, to protect an embassy; the ambassador himself travelling by way of Teheran. The troops are shipped across the Caspian, and landed at Astrabad, or move to the old castle at Akkikale, 14 versts beyond, in order to escape the unwholly lowlands. As they would have to remain there for two months before the ambassador could arrive by way of

Teheran, they can hardly be prevented from fortifying their position against the attacks of Turkomans, and from building houses for their accommodation.

It will then depend upon themselves to what extent they entrench, or whether they throw up fortifications.

An *accomplished fact* will meet with little opposition. Besides, the territory strictly belongs to the independent Turkoman tribes, who are not under the influence of the Persian police, and who even last year were permitted to carry off Russian fishermen from the neighbourhood of Astrabad without punishment, and the Persian Court has complained more than once to the Russian Embassy about the want of subordination of the Yassale tribe. In the very interest of Persia this territory ought to be rendered safe. The country is fertile, the three "happy villages" alluded to by Diodorus in his account of Alexander's campaign in Hyrcania, were situated there; and Baron Bode tells us that oats bear 50-fold on the northern slopes of the Elburuz, and sesamen even 500-fold. A native grass furnishes capital fodder for horses; vines grow wild, together with figs, oranges, and mulberry trees, and the silk-worm is cultivated extensively. Everything invites to rest and enjoyment, and Persia may consider herself fortunate to be protected against the inroads of the Turkomans. Should Persia not consent, despite this, the new fortress on the Giurgen must be maintained in spite of her.

The ruins upon whose site it will be built lie at a distance of 20 *versts* from the Caspian. Thirty *versts* from Ashurade, the roadstead of the Russian fleet. Ashurade is reached from Baku in two days, from Astrakhan in four, by steamer. The forest near the ruins furnishes timber for a tramway to the sea. The place itself can easily be defended where the Giurgen and Karasu, flowing between high and steep banks, approach within three *versts* of each other. An army, marching 25 *versts* a day, can appear before Teheran in a fortnight, and Herat in 35 days.

English foresight has recognized the danger which might at any time threaten from that point. An article on the "designs of Russia" in the "British and Foreign Quarterly Review," No. 2, 1835, warns England against any Russian settlement in the south-east corner of the Caspian, which would give the command of Persia, Turkestan, Bokhara, and Khiva.

When Russia once establishes herself at Akhkale, Afghanistan will perceive that Russian protection is at hand, and who can tell that England, threatened in India simultaneously from the Giurgen, from Kokan and Kashgar, may not listen to conclude peace in Europe. The fortress on Akhkale might then justly bear the epithet of "Strakhonghan"—i.e. the terror of her enemies.

Five thousand men, with heavy guns supplied from the arsenals of Astrakhan, Baku, and Derbeet, would have to be sent from Transcaucasia to construct this fortress. The larger portion of these troops would remain as a garrison. An escort commanded by a general, and accompanied by 20 officers of the different branches of the service, especially of the general staff, would attend the ambassador on his journey to Afghanistan. These officers would survey the country. Some officers also, of engineers, and of the line (to instruct the Afghans, &c., in tactics), 1,500 privates (including 800 regular Cossacks, 200 sharpshooters, and half a battery of mountain artillery); but particularly a large number of non-commissioned officers of all arms, for the sake not only of the Russian troops which are to follow, but also for organizing local military levies. Add to these 500 horses and 200 camels for transport purposes.

The road to the Indus would lead through districts scarcely belonging to Persia, even nominally; only Budjind, Kabushan, and Meshed can be considered Persian territory. Persian neutrality would be still less affected were the route along the Giurgen and Atrak selected, for it leads through districts which pay no taxes to the Persian Government. The transport will cause no difficulty there when the Turkoman tribes are once gained over.

The great question will then be to gain adherents in Afghanistan, and to stir up the Sikhs. The 1848 has shown that an alliance between Afghans and Sikhs is possible. England will not be in a position to despatch many troops to the north-west frontier of India. Neither Nepal nor Burma are enemies to be despised. Ten millions of Mahomedans in Hyderabad only wait for the opportunity to shake off the yoke of the infidels, and regain their pristine glory. Terrible enemies will rise in and around the very heart of the country, and although England has hitherto been able to suppress local insurrections, and has even availed herself of them to strengthen her position, she may not be able to repress a simultaneous insurrection of the entire country. The effort to do so, even if it succeeded, would exhaust her beyond measure.

The defence would cost England ten times as much as Russia's attack. Nothing is impossible to the Czar; let him summon his people.

RUSSIAN NAVAL FORCES IN THE CASPIAN AND ARAL SEAS.

Caspian Sea.

	No.	Guns.	Tons.	Horse Power.	Draught of Water.	
					Aft.	Forward.
Launches	1	3	306	40	5-8	5-0
	2	3	294	70	6-0	5-0
	3	3	294	70	6-0	5-0
	1	5	327	160	9-9	8-8
	2	2	146	80	3-0	3-0
Steamers	3	5	537	160	9-9	8-8
	4	4	300	100	5-0	4-8
	5	...	219	100	5-0	4-8
	6	...	441	190	6-0	6-0
	7	...	118	50	2-3	2-0
	8	5	409	80	8-10	7-0
	9	5	409	80	8-10	7-0
	10	5	409	80	8-10	7-0
	1	15	3-6	3-0
	2	15	3-6	3-0
Steam Launches	3	8	1-8	1-8
	4	1	...	8	1-8	1-8
	1	...	364	...	6-6	5-6
Sailing Transports	2	...	364	...	6-6	5-6

Aral Sea.

Steamers	1	5	140	40	3-0	3-0
	2	3	149	40	3-0	4-0
	3	1	70	30	4-0	4-3
Launches	4	4	...	70	6-6	8-6
	1	2	16	12	3-3	2-0

APPENDIX III.

EXTRACT FROM PAPERS BY MR. SHAW, 11th DECEMBER 1869.

The difficulties to be encountered between Klokand and Kashkar are here somewhat exaggerated. The lofty Thim-Shin range in its westerly prolongation loses much of its rugged character, and though still a snow range as seen from Kashkar (where it is called Karantagh), yet sinks into an easy pass further west. The neighbourhood of the Terek Pass is inhabited by pastoral tribes of Kirghiz who keep the pass open in winter by driving their cattle through the snow, and thus beating down a road. Even camels can cross all the year round, except when a heavy storm closes the road for a day or two. But an invading army would naturally not choose the winter season. In spring and summer, supplies are plentiful almost at every stage.

Once across the Terek Pass, the Russians would have no difficulty in reducing the whole plain country of Eastern Toorkistan, including the fortresses of Kashkar, Yung-hissar, and Yarkand, which lie on the route towards India. To suppose that they would at once push on to the Himalaya through this hostile country would be to ignore the whole history of their past advances in Central Asia. We may, therefore, suppose that they would establish and strengthen themselves in Yarkand, as they did in Chienkend, before advancing on Tashkend, and in Tashkend before attacking Khojend, Jezik, and Samarkand. The cities of Yarkand and Kashkar contain populations of at least 100,000 each, far advanced in the arts of civilization, as they are understood in the East. The fertility of the cultivated country equals that of Cashmere, while its extent is of course incomparably greater. The expression "high table-land of Turtry" conveys, I think, a wrong idea, though, strictly speaking, it is correct. The height of the table-land is between 4,000 and 5,000 feet (lower than the valley of Cashmere), and nowhere, not even in that favoured valley, are the crops more luxuriant, or supplies cheaper or more plentiful. All the materials for the manufacture of warlike stores exist in the country. Gunpowder of very decent quality has, from time out of mind, been made in Turtry, while mines of iron, copper, and lead, exist and are worked to a considerable extent. Coal is not found in Eastern Toorkistan, but could be brought across the Terek Pass, as it is met with at Oosh on the Upper Syr-Daria.

I may remark, *en passant*, that the unsettled state of Eastern Toorkistan has ceased for three or four years. The country is now under the firm rule of the Ataligh-Ghâzer, Mahomed Yakoub Ber. This fact, however, only affects the present question, in so far that the resistance offered to the Russians is likely to be more concentrated than if the country were still unsettled.

I return to the consideration of the facilities and obstacles of a *physical* nature which would affect a Russian advance *via* Yarkand.

We must now suppose that they have formed a fresh base of operations in Eastern Toorkistan without, as yet, breaking with England. Their boundary, as successors to the present rule, would be the Karakorum watershed and the high plains north of Chang-Chenmo. Between them and India extends a mountainous country, divided into two zones; the former, extending as far as Cashmere, is the Tibetan region, a high land supported by mountains. South of Cashmere are the mountains which support it, or in other words, the broken edge of the Tibetan plateau. In addition to this difference of physical character, the snow-fall exhausts itself on this outer edge of the plateau, and scarcely touches its inner districts. Between Cashmere and India the Pir Panjal (11,500 feet) is impassable for three or four months of winter; while between Cashmere and Yarkand, the Karakorum (between 18,000 and 19,000 feet) is crossed throughout the year.

Thus there is first a broad region of easy roads, where supplies are only to be got at intervals, and extending over about forty-five days' journey.

In this region the Kuen-lun Range has first to be crossed, which separates Toorkistan from the high plateaux at the heads of the Yarkand and Karakash Rivers, under the so-called Karakorum Range. The Kuen-lun Range resembles a letter Y placed horizontally thus — . One route leads across its double part, and another across its single part. Both the passes by the former route are difficult, and one of them impassable for laden horses (goods are carried on yaks). This is the Shahitoola route, and leaves the plains of Toorkistan at Sanjoo or Kilian. The other or "single-pass" route leaves the plains at Koogiar, and crosses the tail of the Y by a singular depression, and at a most easy gradient. This route is now partly closed on account of robbers, but it is evidently the line that would be taken by an invading army. Grass, wood, and water are plentiful right up to near the Karakorum range (so-called), and artillery could be brought, I believe, the whole way without being dismounted.

Having crossed the Kuen-lun Range by the more *western* route, an army would next choose the more *eastern* line over the Karakorum watershed. For all the streams beyond it drain south and west into the Indus. Hence by keeping to the east, we get into the high open country near their sources, instead of the deep gorges which they cut lower down in their course. This gives the preference to the Chang-Chenmo route over the Karakorum Pass route. For though the passes are equally high, yet there are fewer of them, and they hardly rise above the level of the

table land, so high is the latter. During this part of the route, it would be necessary to carry all supplies, even fodder for the cattle, as the grass, which is sufficient for ordinary caravans, would not suffice for an army. In fact, here a Russian army would have to fulfil the same conditions of success as they have already been accustomed to in the passage of the enormous deserts of the Kirghiz which divide their possessions in Kookistan from Russia. The difference caused by this Tibetan desert being at an enormous elevation, and exposed to the extremes of cold instead of those of heat, may be dismissed as immaterial. The slopes by which this plateau is reached and

crossed are nowhere greater than are to be found on where, however, a few sappers could make an English turnpike road,* and to Russian soldiers cold is less formidable than heat. Nowhere on the road is perpetual snow or glacier crossed, notwithstanding the immense elevation; a small quantity of snow of course falls in winter, but not deep. The road is extremely well suited for camels, which have often made their way to Cashmere, even by the more difficult Karakorum Pass route. By that route, also, the fertile valley of Noobm used to be exposed to incursions of mounted hordes from the north. Of this fact, ocular evidence is preserved by the presence, in two places, of stone walls barring the road. These two places are also infested by a certain poisonous weed called "lungton," which the natives of Noobra affirm was sown there by their ancestors in order to poison the horses of the invaders. It is certain that the caravan horses are to this day carefully led through the dangerous spots, and that this poisonous plant, common in cultivated fields, is found nowhere else on the barren road, but at these two places.

It has been lately argued that although barbarous hordes can traverse these regions, armies with civilized appliances of war cannot do so.

The argument is valid if we apply it to rugged countries like Alyssinia, and add the condition that the advance should be opposed by a civilized foe.

Half-wild horsemen, with their luggage carried on their own saddles, can traverse roads where laden baggage-animals and artillery cannot go. But where the road itself (as in Tibet) opposes no obstacle, scarcity of supplies forms no greater obstacle to civilized armies than to barbarous hordes.

A thousand horses require as much food when carrying Tartar horsemen as when laden with ammunition chests. Again, where supplies have to be carried, and can be carried, the only limit is the capacity of the country which furnishes them. The rest is only a question of expense. I believe these physical characteristics of the road in question have not been known or weighed by those who maintain that they alone form a sufficient obstacle to the advance of an army which has for years been accustomed to the crossing of the deserts between Orenburg and the Syr-Daria.

The distance for which the entire supplies for the horses would have to be carried is 14 days' march, viz., from Kapuloong on the Yarkand River to Lookoong in Lalak. Provisions for the men would have to be carried for double that distance.

There is thus, I believe, no physical impossibility to prevent the advance of an army with civilized appliances from Yarkand to Ladak. An itinerary accompanies this paper.

Of course this supposes an unopposed advance. The case would be very different were a British army interposed between these deserts and fertile Ladak, and defending the passes which lead into it. With supplies close at hand, and open roads of inter-communication along its rear, even a Native army could successfully block the way, retiring, if overpowered, from one line of defence to others equally good.

After passing Ladak, there are still 15 days' march through the Tibetan zone of country, of which, however, the latter part begins to partake of the Himalayan character of narrow gorges, although the snow fall even here is not sufficient to close the passes entirely in winter. Supplies are here more plentiful, and with the assistance of the Native rulers (which might perhaps be counted on in such an event), sufficient food for an army might be collected from the still more fertile districts further down the Indus as well as from Cashmere. A difficulty about food would, however, to a certain extent, exist, proportionate to the numbers of the invading army. This difficulty would cease on its entering Cashmere. Here end the forty-five days' march through the Tibetan region. But Cashmere is separated from India by 15 days' march through and over the outer Himalayan ranges, where the passes, though much lower than those of Tibet, are far more difficult, and are entirely blocked up with snow during the whole winter season, while the gorges are deep, and the hill-sides precipitous. There are two paths by which letter-carriers and lightly-equipped foot-passengers can generally make their way out of the valley even in winter. These are the gorges of the Jhelum and the Banihal Pass leading to Jummoo. The regular route by the Pir Panjal is closed to all traffic from November to May; and it may safely be said that no route is available for the passage of troops between Cashmere and India during three months every winter.

It is thus not impossible for Russia, if ready to make sufficient sacrifices of men and money, to place a small army with artillery in Cashmere at a time of year when the British troops in India could have no means of moving up to oppose it, and during the season when no Englishman

is allowed to remain in the territories of the Maharaja, who might get news of the movement in time. Cashmere is also well adapted for defence against attacks from India.

I have been reviewing the *physical* possibilities deduced from a personal inspection of the route, not the political probabilities.

The distance by road between Khokand and Kashkar is about 500 miles (see Davies' Trade Report, Appendix xx. B. 1).

From Kashkar to Koogiar is 206 miles of plain country. From Koogiar to Cashmere about (Kashkar to Yarkand - - - 185.) 736 miles through the mountains. (See itinerary (Yarkand to Koogiar - - - 71.) annexed.)

(13.) The Chang-Chenmo route described above.

14. See Davies' Trade Report, Appendix iv. B., for the itinerary of this route given by the Yarkandee merchant Mahomed Ameen. The copy of this book published in England by order of Parliament does not contain the routes given in the Appendices.

The Chitral valley is the only one which comes down from the back-bone of the watershed between India and Toorkistan, and conducts, it may be said, right down into the plains. Here, by crossing only *our* pass, and that a most easy one, the head waters of the Oxus are reached. (This most important route is, however, practically closed to European explorers.) (A man can reach the pass and come back again in 20 days, starting from Peshawur.)

		Miles.	
Kashkar to Yarkand -		135	
1.—Peeknm -	-	15	Town.
2.—Kargalik -	-	20	Ditto.
3.— -	-	-	
4.—Koogiar -	-	36	
		206	
5.—Ak Musjid -	-	-	Here begin 45 days through mountains of Thibet Cross ridge called "Toop-dewau."
6.—Chiklik -	-	-	
7.—Tunlik -	-	-	
8.—Pillaah -	-	-	
9.—Doba -	-	-	
10.—Door-ighil -	-	-	Easy Pass "Yung-dewau."
11.—Oankoor -	-	-	
12.—Kooloomuldee -	-	-	
13.—Kirghiz jungle -	-	-	In valley of Yarkund River.
14.—Takhna -	-	-	
15.—Lata Jilga -	-	-	
16.—Kapuloong -	-	-	
17.—Malikshah -	-	184	
		482	
23.—Lingree-tung -	-	120	Cross "Dubaa Serkol" Plains S.E. Then over ridge into Upper Karakush Valley, which leave by another easy pass, and enter plain of Lingreectung.
24.—Nischoo -	-	15	
25.—Camp about hot-spring -	-	-	Cross high easy pass "Chunglungda."
26.—Gogra -	-	35	
27.—Puntzul -	-	18	
28.—Pangloong -	-	14	
29.—Masimik -	-	10	Cross high easy pass.
30.—Lookoong -	-	16	Cross Chang-lu (easy pass).
34.—Ladäk (Leh) -	-	70	
		736	
50.—Cashmere -	-	254	
		942	
Kashkar to Cashmere -		942	See Montgomery's Route Map (several marches can be doubled up).

N.B.—This route is not at present used owing to temporary causes discussed in another communication.

MR. ROBERT MITCHELL'S PAPER ON RUSSIAN MILITARY STRATEGICAL POSITION
AND ROADS IN TURKESSTAN.

The Russian position in Turkestan is well illustrated by taking Dijon, some point north of Lake Constance, and Zug, to represent respectively Samarcand, Vernoo, and Kurika, in the order in which they are named.

The Russians, however, labour under the great disadvantage, in this comparison, of being separated from their different points by far greater distances than the forces disposed round the north and north-west of Switzerland.

Vernoo and the Russian military post on the Naryn are farther apart by half a degree of latitude than Zug and some one point on the north shore of Lake Constance,—say Ravensburg. A position on the Neckar—Stuttgart would perhaps correspond better with the situation of Vernoo.

There is also about a degree and a half of longitude more between Vernoo and Samarcand than between Ravensburg and Dijon.

From Vernoo to the military post on the Naryn, the distance, round by the eastern extremity of Issyk-Kul lake, may be put down at about 213 to 215 miles.*

From Vernoo to Tashkend by Aulié-Ata the distance is about 486 miles, and to Samarcand, by Khodjend, 304 miles more, making the distance from Vernoo to Samarcand about 790 miles.

The Russians have a military force stationed at a place called Ak-Su, at the south-eastern extremity of the lake Issyk-Kul to the north of the Zaïkô pass.

Routes and Distances.

From Tashkend to Kokand	-	-	-	216	versts.
From Kokand to Kashgar, about	-	-	-	500	"
(By the Terekty pass)	-	-	-	716	" or 477 miles.
From Samarcand to Herat.					
From Samarcand to Karshi (4 days)	-	-	-	96	miles.
" Karshi to Kerki (on the Oxus)	-	-	-	75	"
" Kerki to Maimené	-	-	-	143	"
" Maimené to Herat	-	-	-	299	"
Total	-	-	-	613	miles.

From Kerki to Herat, according to Vâmberî, the distance is 592 miles. |

From Samarcand to Karshi and to Kerki on the Amu-Daria (Oxus),—

1st stage, Robati Khaús	-	-	3 fars. (about 16 miles).
2nd " Naiman	-	-	6 " " 32 "
3rd " Shur-Kudak	-	-	4 " " 21½ "
4th " Karshi	-	-	5 " " 26½ "

18 fars. or 144½ vrs., or 4 days (96 miles).

From Karshi to Kerki,—

1st stage, Feizabad	-	-	2 fars. (about 10½ miles).
2nd " Seng-Sulak	-	-	6 " " 32 "
3rd " Kerki (ford across the Oxus)	-	-	6 " " 32 "

14 fars. or 112 vrs., or 7½ miles or 3 days' march.

From Kerki to the Oxus to Maimené (according to Khanikof),—

	Vrsts.	Miles.	
1st stage, Akhehó (village)	-	-	65 43½ or 2 days' journey.
2nd " Andkni	-	-	50 33½ " 2 "
3rd " Hirabnd	-	-	30 20 " 1 "
4th " Kafir-Kala	-	-	35 23½ " 1 "
5th " Maimené	-	-	35 23½ " 1 "

Total - - - 215 143½, or 7 days' journey.

* The road to the Naryn (south-east of Kokand and leading to Kashgar) from Vernoo and Tashkend has been made practicable for carriages.

† 140 versts (30½ miles), or only 3 days' march according to Khanikof.

‡ Kerki, according to Khanikof, is 180 versts (120 miles) from Karshi, or 4 days' journey. From Karshi to Herat, according to Khanikof, it is from 22 to 24 days' journey.

From Maimené to Herat,—

	far.	vera.	miles.
1st stage, Kaisar	-	8	64 = 42½
2nd " Charshembé	-	3	24 = 16
3rd " Kalé Veli	-	3	24 = 16
4th " Marghlnl	-	7	56 = 37½
5th " Bmgul	-	4	32 = 21½
6th " Turshik	-	4	32 = 21½
7th " Chngurek	-	7	56 = 37½
8th " Kushk-Asiab	-	7	56 = 37½
9th " Kokh-Robat	-	7	56 = 37½
(pass)	-	-	-
10th " Yovvane	-	3	24 = 16
11th " Herat	-	3	24 = 16
Totals	-	-	56 448 = 298½

Vámbari.

	vera.	miles.
From Kerki Andkui, is -	-	144 = 96
From Kerki to Maimené -	-	164 = 109½
From Kerki to Kaisar -	-	32 = 21½
Kalé Veli - - - -	-	144 = 96
Kalé No - - - -	-	120 = 80
Herat - - - -	-	120 = 80
Total from Kerki to Herat -	-	492½
And from Maimené - -	-	386½

Thus from Samarcand to Herat the distance is,—

	Miles.	Miles.
To Kerki, about	-	170½
From Kerki to Maimené	-	149½ or 205½ according to Vámbari.
" Maimené to Herat	-	298½ " 386½ " "
Total, about	-	612½ 592 " "

There are several roads from Samarcand to Karshi, all lying across steppes and passing through Uzbek villages. Some little difficulties by these roads are encountered at the passes over the rocky spurs of the Karshi hills; there is, however, grass enough, and sufficient water in the wells all along this road.

In Bokhara the roads are very heavy in the spring and autumn, owing to the overflowing of the rivers and canals.

Communication between all the principal towns of the Khanat passes either along the left or right bank of the Zerafshan.

From Samarcand to Shahr-i-Subz the distance is about 67 miles; the road passes through Kitab, and is practicable only for horses.

The shortest road from Bokhara, and therefore also from Samarcand, to Herat is that by Karshi, Andkui, and Maimené.

From Bokhara to Herat the distance is estimated at about 576 miles, and is performed in 20 to 25 days.

From Maimené the road is more difficult, so that horses are used. The road proceeds to the Murghab river; all the way from there to Herat the road is good; it passes through Kush-Asiab, from which point it diverges to Merv. The country is well populated and cultivated.

An alternative road from Murghab to Herat, lying to the east, trends across the mountains, and over a very tedious pass, nearly reaching the snow line. The other difficulties along this road are two defiles (*derbends*) by the banks of the Murghab, and a tedious pass over the Telkgezar mountain. The journey by this road is accomplished in four days on horseback, and in eight with camels; preference is given to this route only because it is free from robbers.*

From Bokhara to Merv by Chardjui the distance is 227 miles (9 to 12 days). From Merv to Meshed 9 to 10 days more. From the Amu-Dar'ia to Meshed the country is infested by Turcomen of the predatory tribe of Tékk.†

* From Maimené to Khulm the road passes through a populous and well irrigated country. It offers every facility for the passage, not alone of caravans, but likewise of an army with heavy artillery. The stages are,—

Maimené,—			
1. Kafir-Kalé	-	90 miles.	
2. Ibrásed	-	12 "	
3. Rohal-Alefulla Khan	-	38 "	
4. Sibirghau	-	28 "	
5. Akché	-	20 "	
6. Melik	-	16 "	
7. Halkh	-	28 "	
	8. Mazar	-	8 miles.
	9. Khulm	-	52 "
	Total	-	192 miles, or
			48 farsangs.

At Khulm the road divides into two branches, one striking off to Cubul in the south, and the other to Badakshan in the east. The former, by the Banián pass, is the main caravan road from Central Asia to India; although the difficulties of this road are very great, and although the Hadjkhak pass at Kulu, south of the Banián pass, is blocked with snow in the winter, it can be traversed by artillery.

† Route from Bokhara to Meshed by Chardjui.

From Bokhara,—

Stages 1. To Kamkul town	-	-	-	48 versts.
" 2. Ford across the Oxus	-	-	-	52 "
" 3. Chardjui	-	-	-	6 "
" 4. Shik-robot well	-	-	-	60 "
" 5. Nizashurk	-	-	-	85 "
" 6. Merv (or Shah Djigmo)	-	-	-	70 "

341 - or about 227 miles, or from
9 to 12 days' journey.

From Merv to Meshed, through Sarakhs, caravans take from 9 to 10 days. From Bokhara to Meshed 18 to 22 days. There are wells with good water, and a sufficient quantity of fodder along the whole line of this route. The Murghab river at Merv is waded; heavy goods are conveyed across it in boats.

	Miles.
From Bokhara to Balkh by Karshi, Kelef on the Oxus, Akché, and Meilik	310 or 12 days.
From Balkh to Khulum	47 or 3 "
	<u>357 miles.</u>

From Bokhara to Kunduz, 410 miles (or 14 to 15 days' journey).

From Balkh to Cabul through the Bamian pass, about 347 miles (or 12 days).

From Bokhara to Cabul, 657 miles (or 24 days' journey).

Pack horses alone are used on the journey to Cabul. At Khulum the road enters the mountain system of the Hindu-Kush.

From Khiva to Herat, by way of Merv, from which latter place the road proceeds southwards along the Murghab and Kutchka rivers; the distance is calculated at about 900 *vershs*, or 600 miles, traversing the Turcoman steppes between the Oxus and Merv.

The Russians proceed to the new fort on the Naryn, where Kurtka stood, by way of the Zaiikú pass at the eastern extremity of the Isayk-Kul lake, from which to Kashgar the distance over a high table land, and over not less than 10 different passes, ranging from 10 to 16,000 feet high, is about 387 miles.

From the Russian post on the Naryn to Kashgar the distance is 167 miles. The road lies across several high passes blocked with snow in the winter, and open from March to October.

From Yangishar the road proceeds to Yarkend across a barren desert.

From the sources of the Kashkar to Peshawar the distance is about 600 geographical miles.

ROBERT MICHILL.

29th April 1869.

Captain MONTGOMERIE'S, R.E., MEMORANDUM, 20th July 1861, published in Mr. Davies' "Report on Trade."

	Geographical miles of 0.9 = 1 degree direct distance.
Distance from Kashgar to Yarkend	115
and from Yarkend to Ichi or Khoten	118
and between Yarkend and Leh	250*

There are several roads from the Punjab to Eastern Turkestan, but three only are likely to be available,—

1st, *via* Cashmere and Leh (by Skardor Ladak (Leh)).

2nd, *via* Mundeé, Kullu, and Leh (from Noorpore, Umritsur, or Ludianah, by Kullu).

3rd, *via* Simla, Garoo, and Rudok (traversing the Chinese territory).

All these except the last go by the Kara-Karum pass.

The road by Jhelum and Cashmere to Leh and Yarkend is, in Captain Montgomerie's opinion, the most direct, best, and cheapest for traffic from the sea to Eastern Turkestan. From Jhelum to Leh the road over the Himalayas is good, none of the passes exceeding 13,300 feet; open for seven or eight months in the year.

The greater portion of the traffic between the Punjab, Leh, and Turkestan is carried on by the Mundeé and Kullu route, but the passes are very high, without any villages. (Niuo or tea marches over this.)

1st route, from Mooltan to Leh, 798 miles.

	Miles.
2nd route,—	
From Mooltan to Lahore	300
„ Lahore to Umritsur	35
„ Umritsur to Sealkote	64
„ Sealkote to Cashmere	195
(515 miles, or 40 marches by the Kashmere route.)	
„ Cashmere to Leh	256
	<u>830</u>

	Miles.
From Umritsur to Noorpore	90
„ Noorpore to Mundeé	112
„ Mundeé to Sooltanpore	36
„ Sooltanpore to Leh	287
	<u>525</u>

Mundeé route

(or about 41 marches.)

* Calculated by Arrowsmith, 365 geographical miles as the crow flies.—R.M.

Ladakh is the furthest point to which Captain Montgomerie carries his comparison of routes. Goumah is 16 marches from Umritsur. The Cashmere route is now five miles longer than the Kullu route. Camels can go 23 marches along the latter. Carts can be taken 16 marches to Goumah.

Mr. Forsyth says that it is possible to open up a new route by the Changechenno pass, avoiding the Kara Karum passes, by the Karakash river to Leh, and so to Yarkend. There is a pass called the Changh pass, 17,040 feet; then by the Tanskie valley to the Pangong lake, six marches from Leh; then the Changechenno valley. (Fifty-five days' journey from Palumpore to Yarkend.)

Communication with the East Coast of the Caspian.

From Astrakhan* to Fort Alexandrofsk, 24 hours.

Ditto to Balkan Bay, 48 to 60 hours.

Ditto to Ashurade, 72 to 84 hours.

During strong westerly breezes these passages are longer, and entrances into the harbours or creeks is effected under difficulties.

From Petrofsk and Baku to Fort Alexandrofsk and to Krasnovodsk, with a fair wind, the passage lasts only 24 hours. The distance in both cases is not over 127 miles.

From Ashurade, in Astrabad Bay, to Gomushtepa, 1½ hours.

Ditto to Hassan-Kuli, 3½ hours.

Ditto to Cheleken Island, 16 hours.

Ditto to Balkan Bay (185 nautical miles), 20 hours.

Two private Steam Navigation Companies are bound, under contract with the Russian Government, one of them to keep fifteen steamers on the Caspian and a corresponding number of barges, and both Companies to transport troops and stores, &c., at certain rates, from Astrakhan, Petrofsk, and Baku, to the east coast of the Caspian. There are other vessels belonging to these Companies and to merchants of Baku, besides Turcoman vessels,† which are suitable for navigation along the shallow eastern coast.

Steppe Routes from the Caspian.‡

1. To Khiva from Novo-Alexandrofsk (a former fort) in Kaidak Bay (410 miles), across the Ist-Urt to Aibugir Bay on the Aral. Turpmi, an Armenian, rode this way to Khiva in seven days in 1834. A caravan would be three weeks travelling.

2. The Mangyshlak caravan route, through Bakikuduk, by Tabyn-Su and Aibugir, 569 miles, a month's caravan journey. Water scarce, and fodder only along the first few stages.

3. To Kune-Urgendj from Kinderlinsk Bay, 420 miles. Little water. Here, however, proceeding more to the south, the Mangyshlak road may be struck, reducing the distance to 316 miles.

4. From Krasnovodsk: the Sary-Kamysh road, according to Muravief, 546 miles, but according to Markozof about 486 miles. Markozof's route, in all respects the best, falls in with Muravief's at Beshdeshik, and proceeds by that.

5. From Hassan-Kuli (the Degeli route) by Gesli-Ata, and then following Markozof's route, twice crossing the old bed of the Oxus, 360 miles.

6. The Ortokui route, between the two last-mentioned, leaving the first at the fourth stage, and so reducing the distance by 53½ miles.

7. From Gomush-tepe, across the embouchure of the Attek, and then partly following the Degeli route, and partly over a separate route by the Shargel Lake,—Vämber'i route.

8. The Teké route, also between the above two (4 and 5), to Chiin-Mahomed and Ortokui. This is the shortest (533½ miles).

9. From Balkan Bay along the old bed of the Oxus to Kune-Urgendj. Only partially surveyed to Topistan well. It is expected that more fodder, fuel, and water will be found along this route. From Dandevii's inquiries (1859) it would appear that the distance to Kune-Urgendj, from the eastern extremity of Balkan Bay, is 385½ miles, which can be effected in eight days. Fresh water at each night halt.

10. From Krasnovodsk to Kizyl-Arvat, through Mulla-Kari (253 miles). This route was traversed in 1870 by a detachment. No fodder, however; sands, and little fuel. This route crosses the bed of the Oxus at Aidin well, and then passes along the northern side of the Kurren-daght mountains. Beyond Kizyl-Arvat it proceeds eastwards along the base of the Keppet-daght mountains, through the country of the Teké Turcomans; Karys fort 83½ miles beyond Kizyl-Arvat; 73½ miles further is Ashabad; and about 200 miles further still lies Sarakhs, from which, says Mr. Veniukof, Herat is about 133 miles away. The distance from Krasnovodsk to Herat, by this route, Mr. Veniukof considers to be about 633 miles.

11. From Astrabad to Herat the road passes through Indjaur (200 miles); Meshed (362 miles); equal to 26 stages through a populous country. Entire distance to Herat 580½ miles.

* The bar at the mouth of the Volga has a depth of only 1½ feet, so that vessels have to wait for a south wind bringing up a sufficient quantity of water into the estuaries, in order to enable them to pass out.

† The Turcomans have about 500 large and small boats on the Caspian.

‡ See Table of Distances along the East coast of the Caspian, and itineraries of routes.—Appendix.

Mr. Veniukof says, referring to this route,—
 " Properly speaking, this great trade route lies beyond the limits of Turcomania, within those of Persia; but it is in a strategical sense the most important of all, even with respect to the Turcoman country alone, which it flanks on the south."

The other routes through the country of the Turcomans are but little known, and Mr. Veniukof observes, that they are of secondary military importance. All but the last are pure steppe routes, and troops proceeding by them cannot calculate on finding more than a scanty supply of poor fodder or fuel, and of water. With respect to the march of troops, he observes,—

" In consequence of this scarcity of fodder, fuel, and water, the march of a large force can be made only in parallel columns, or *en échelon*, at intervals of three or four stages. In 1871 this system was carried out successfully; the first *échelon* advancing 66 to 100 miles, halted for several days, raising an entrenchment around its camp. The men cleared the wells, gathered fuel, &c.: in a word, this *échelon* prepared a halting place for the next. On the return march, fuel, water, and fodder were found in sufficient quantities.

The means of transport is limited. They are not to be obtained when the Turcomans decamp before an approaching force. The Turcomans are not rich in cattle; they cannot be depended upon in this respect, even if they be friendly. The Türk Turcomans have the largest herds; but they are the most warlike and independent of all the Turcoman tribes."

Distances between Main Points on the East Coast, from Tuik-Karagan to Astrabad
 (from Blarenberg).

	Miles.
From Cape Tuik-Karagan to Peschanni (Sandy) Point -	116½
" Peschanni Point to Kinderlinsk Bay -	83½
" Kinderlinsk to Kara-Bugaz Bay -	120
" Kara-Bugaz to the extremity of Krasnovodsk Spit -	100
" Krasnovodsk Spit to extremity of Dervish Promontory -	26½
" Dervish to Kok-Tepe -	70
" Kok-Tepe to Ak-Tepe -	20
" Ak-Tepe to Hassan-Kuli Bay -	16½
" Hassan-Kuli Bay to Gomush-Tepe -	26½
" Gomush-Tepe to mouth of Kara-Su -	20
Total -	600

Itineraries of Routes.

Sary-Kamysh-Yol (road).

Names of Wells.	Number of Days' March.	Depth of Wells in Fathoms.	Quality of Water.
Sogreshem, in Balkan Bay, by the Ok Mountains -	—	1	Good.
Burnak -	½	3	Ditto.
Siulmen -	1½	10	Ditto.
Siuli -	1½	25	Bitterish.
Yazi-Eshem -	1	2	Ditto.
Er-Oilan -	½	7	Ditto.
Tuer -	2	3	Good.
Diren Dumpe -	1½	1½	Brackish.
Osiun-Kui -	2	20	Bitterish.
Besh-Deshik -	2	1½	Good.
Khivan territory -	3	—	—
Days -	15½	—	

At all the wells on this route there is sufficient brushwood for fuel.

Degeli-Yol.

Springs and Wells from Dardja Peninsula.	Number of Days' March.	Depth of Wells in Fathoms.	Quality of Water.
Orna well -	2	1½	Good.
Gesli-Ata ditto -	1	2	Ditto.
Tuer ditto -	2	3	Ditto.
Dongra spring -	2	—	—
Ak-Kui well -	1½	—	—
Degeli ditto -	2	3	Ditto.
Ak-Nabat ditto -	2	3	Ditto.
Khiva town -	2	5	Bitter.
Days -	14½	—	—

Orta-Kui-Yol.

Names of Localities, beginning from Bugdali Well.*	Number of Days' March.	Depth of Wells in Fathoms.	Quality of Water.
Denala spring -	1	—	Tolerably good.
Yasga lagoon -	2½	—	Ditto.
Eshab ditto -	1	—	Ditto.
Dikchó well -	1½	1	Bitterish.
Djamolsi ditto -	1½	2	Good.
Arbatchi ditto -	½	2	Bitterish.
Orta-Kui ditto -	3	3	Good.
Nefes-Kuli ditto -	1	5	Bitterish.
Sokarcha-Aga ditto -	2	12	(?)
Khiva -	1	—	—
Days -	15	—	—

* The Bugdali well is within 20 miles east of Rys-Mama, and two days' march from Hassau-Kuli Bay, to the north.

Along this road there is a well every four or five miles.

Muraviev's Route to Khiva in 1811.

(Counting at a speed in travelling of between two and three miles per hour.)

	Miles.
Sudji-Kabil well, to the north-east of Krasnovodsk Bay, where Muraviev anchored -	18½
Siulmen well -	40
Siuli well -	16
Water bad, depth of well 15 fathoms.	
Demur-Djem, in the hollow of a former lake -	20
No brushwood except a little way off on the right hand side of the high road. Yasak-Djem well occurs on this road, but the water in it is bad, so that caravans do not stop there.	
Geroidan well -	6½
Water not very good; a little way off the road.	
Tuer well -	72½
Six wells together; good water, but no brushwood. Here the road divides, one track leading straight, the other striking off to the left towards the north-east; this latter road is longer than the other by 48 days' journey; it leads by—	
Diren well -	42
Paved with stone; the water is foul and buckish.	
Besh-Deshik well -	144
Good water; within 4½ miles' reach of this well a spring of fresh water called Sary-Kumysh occurs in the old bed of the Oxus.	
First Water conduit -	130
Ak-Serai conduit -	22½
Khiva town -	33½
Total distance -	546

Muraviev's Return Journey.

From Il-Geldy to Buz-Gemen	Miles.
Laat water conduit in Khiva.	21½
Slah Senem	Days' Journey.
A ruined fort and a pool.	4
Akh-Nabat well	2
Engiudji	2
Deli, or Degeli, well	2
Midway between Khiva and Krasnovodsk.	
Ak-Kui	1
Tongra, from Degeli 60 miles	1
Tuor, 20 miles	1
Demur-Djem	1
Siuli	½
Siulmen	½
Krasnovodsk Bay	2
Total days' journey	17

Names of Places and Localities forming the Limits of Khorassan.
(Blarenberg's Statistical Notes on Persia 1841.)

		Distances between the Places as named on opposite Sides in the List below.		
		Farsaogla.		
Kain	{ Kain	20	Hodjoh	} Ferrah.
	{ Durukh	17	Kaleka	
	{ Sharekhs	30	Ukel	
Khaf	{ Avaz	30	Guren	} Herat.
	{ Meijannabab	20	Pereh	
	{ Nisulad	20	Chemen-i-Piri-Neilaz	
Bakhera	{ Feresueh.		Shebesh	} Badkhis.
	{ Kusan	45		
	{ Pishrabad on the Heri-Rud.	5	Djem-Stidi and other	
	{ Nemeksar } River	{ 5	Oimaks	
	{ Neutoni } Heri-Rud	{ 9		
	{ Puli-Hatun on the Heri-Rud.			
	{ Sorakhs	12	Place where the water of the Heri-Rud runs to waste	} Country of Tedjend
	{ Kelati-Nadiri	5	Camping grounds of Turcomans	
Deraguz and Northern Koorlistan	{ Eitek	2		} Ditto of Akhal Turcomans.
	{ Abiverd	3	Camping grounds of Turcomans	
	{ Hermah	5		
	{ Koord-Kalé	5		
	{ River Attrok	6	Camping grounds of Turcomans	} Ditto of Yamud Turcomans.

RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES IN TURKESTAN.
(This refers to the Establishments of 1871.)

The Russian troops in occupation of the Turkestan province consist (according to the Establishment of 1871) of 19 battalions of infantry, 44 sotnias of Cossacks, with 52 field pieces and 14 mountain guns.

The numerical strength of the forces in the Turkestan military circuit is as follows:—

Officers	711
Rank and file	26,543
	<u>27,254</u>

These are divided into Field Forces and Local Forces.

The *Field Forces* are composed of—

Infantry,—12 Turkestan battalions of the Line,
1 battalion of Foot Cossacks
1 Turkestan Rifle Brigade* or 4 battalions.
1 company of Turkestan Sappers.

Foot Artillery,—2 Turkestan Brigades (three batteries in each Brigade).

Of No. 1 Brigade—

No. 1 Battery, 9-prs.
Nos. 2 and 3 Batteries, 4-prs.

Of No. 2 Brigade—

Nos. 1 and 2 Batteries, 4-prs.
No. 3 mountain guns.

Cavalry,—44 Cossack Sotnias.

Horse Artillery,—1½ Battery of Horse Artillery, Brigade of the Orenburg Forces.

One rocket battery of 10 stands.

The *Local Forces* are composed of—

No. 69, Tashkend battalion (of 4 companies).
No. 70, Vernoi battalion (of 2 companies).

In the Syr-Darjan region—

Five district companies (Kazala, Perofsk, Chemkent, Ailiétá, and Kodjend).

Two local companies (Kazret-i-Turkestan and Chinaz).

Three district companies (Tokmak, Kopal, and Sergiopol).

Four companies of garrison artillery, with 120 guns (Perofski, Tashkend, Chinaz, and Vernoi).

The greater portion of the field forces is located in the Syr-Darjan region, viz., eight battalions of the line, three rifle battalions, one battalion of foot Cossacks, and one company of Sappers; total, 56 companies of foot, and 33½ sotnias of Cossacks, 36 field pieces, six howitzers, and 10 rocket stands.

In the Semirechenak region there are four battalions of the line (20 companies), 11 sotnias of Cossacks, 16 field pieces, and six howitzers.

The Syr-Darjan troops are massed chiefly in the Zaratshan district, viz., in Samarcand, three battalions, four sotnias, 12 guns, and six rocket stands.

At Katly-Kurgan (west of Samarcand), one battalion, two sotnias.

In the Syr-Darjan region the principal forces are located in Tashkend. One battalion of the line, three rifle battalions, and a company of Sappers, three sotnias, and 16 guns.

The remaining battalions of the line and Cossack sotnias are in garrison, in the forts on the Jaxartes, in Hazret-i-Turkestan, Chemkent, Ailiétá, Chinaz, Hodjend, and Urtepe.

The troops in Hodjend are the 7th Turkestan battalion of the line, No. 2 Battery of the 1st Turkestan Artillery Brigade, and a sotnia of Cossacks.

The greater portion of the cavalry,—eight to ten Cossack sotnias, composing the reserve of Cossack horse,—is grouped at Chinaz.

The troops of the Semirechenak region are quartered in the different towns:—In Vernoi, Tokmak, Kopal, Sergiopol, and in the forts of Nayin, Karakol (Issyk-Kul) in Lepinsk, Nadejdinsk, Sofisk, Lindovni, Iliisk, and three military stations,—South Turbagatai,† Borokhudzir, and Urten-Muzart,‡ as well as in Kuldja.§

The troops at present garrisoned at Petro-Alexandrofsk, near Shurakhán on the Oxus (in the newly constituted Oxus district) consist of four battalions, or nine companies of rifles, and four sotnias of Cossacks, with eight pieces of artillery, i.e., half of the No. 2 battery of the first Turkestan Artillery Brigade, and half a battery of mountain artillery. The armament of the fort consist of two howitzers or small mortars, two rifled muzzle-loading guns, four 20 lb mortars, and four Khivan guns.

* One battalion of this Brigade has served in Orenburg, and, though included in the Turkestan force, has never joined it.

† The Turbagatai force is stationed at Bokhta, opposite the ruins of Chuguchak, for the protection of the north-east frontiers of the region.

‡ The Urten-Muzart force is in the valley of the Zekes, near the entrance into the Urten-Muzart defile, leading to the Muzart Pass, and to Akba in Kashgar.

§ In Kuldja two points are occupied, Kuldja and Chia-ebahodai, where there are four companies of infantry, three sotnias, and six field pieces.

APPENDIX IV.

EXTRACT from a PRIVATE LETTER, dated Kashgar, 4th February 1874, from an OFFICER of the BRITISH MISSION.

We are sending off our treaty to Calcutta for Lord Northbrook's signature, by a Hindlar of our escort. He will have a cold and difficult time of it crossing the Kara Korum at this season. The Ameer has accepted the whole treaty as proposed from Calcutta, which it must be remembered he asked for without the slightest prompting from the Indian Government. He no doubt intends it to counterbalance the Russian treaty which was forced on him last year. Kaulbars told him when it was concluded that he was the first sovereign in Central Asia who had accepted commercial treaty from Russia without war, which says something for the Ameer's sagacity. They have no hesitation in telling us here, that they were offered the choice of the treaty or war. The chief points of our treaty are as follows:—

Free coming and going and equal rights to all traders who are British subjects. Formerly nobody was allowed to leave the country without special permission, and traders were frequently detained for months, so that they lost most of their profits. Formerly also restrictions were placed on Hindoos, they paid double duties, were not allowed to ride in any city, or to wear a turban. This is now all at an end.

In future duties are not to exceed 2½ per cent. British European subjects may travel in the country being provided with passports in Calcutta, this privilege will have to be used sparingly for some time.

A British Resident is to reside permanently in Kashgar, and a Kashgar Envoy in Calcutta.

These are the principal points, but there are minor ones concerning criminal and civil suits against British subjects. Altogether it is a very great innovation on the old exclusive policy of Central Asian States, and one that marks the beginning of quite a new state of affairs. As regards trade, I do not think a large one will spring up for some time to come, but much is to be done. The Kara Korum cannot be abolished by treaty, and must ever remain a tremendous obstacle to all intercourse and enable Russia to compete with us in many things, which under ordinary circumstances they could not,—still the tea and sugar trade of India ought to be able to cut out both Chinese and Russian. There is a tolerably large trade in chintz and coarse iron ware, and caravans from Almatz are arriving weekly, but the market is a very small one, the population of the country has been much over-rated, and is a very poor one. I do not think that Yarkund and Kashgar between them could muster 50,000 inhabitants, the tremendous wars and factions of all sorts that have taken place here for the last 80 years, and especially the last 17, have helped to decrease the population, but the Government is now one of the strongest that Asia has seen for years. No man dare wag his finger without the Ameer's knowledge, and if left in peace for a few years, there is every chance of a great increase of prosperity, as it is a country of great latent capabilities. The way in which the Ameer assumed the title last week is very remarkable and you may safely say, that Central Asian politics are entering on a totally new phase. Up to the present time he has refrained from calling himself an independent prince, but has coined money in the name of his old master Moola Khan of Kokand, who died in 1863, being at enmity with the present ruler. I have got coins bearing date nine years after the death of the man whose name they bear. Now he proclaims himself to the world as Khan of Kashgar for the first time under the Sultan's firman, and issues money for the first time nominally from the Kashgar mint, bearing the name of Sultan Abdul Aziz, Khan of the protected state of Kashgar. In this way an attack on him by Russia becomes a *casus belli* with Turkey, and brings him into the circle of European politics. What secret understanding he may have with Turkey is difficult to guess, but it is not hazardous too much to say that things point to a general religious crusade against Russia, should hostilities break out between it and the Sultan, in such a contingency I believe the whole of the Russian acquisitions since the Crimean war would be lost to her, that is always supposing that sufficient occupation for Russian armies in Europe was found. The Ameer is evidently bent on establishing the character for himself of a champion of religion, and his antecedents as a soldier show that he will be the toughest adversary that Russia has met with in these parts for some time. Meanwhile he rules strictly according to the Sharyat, and has established a state of security for life and property, such as no Central Asian State has known for a very long time.

As regards the military view of the question, it is very important for us that Kashgar should be independent. We need never fear that a Russian army may some day march over the Kara Korum, though it might be used as a secondary or auxiliary line, but one of the principal, indeed the principal road to India from the north, is down the Chitral Valley, and nothing now lies between Russia and that, but the small states of Karatjin, Durwaze, and Hissar. No army could however advance on India by Chitral with a hostile force at Kashgar and Yengi Hissar on its flank, and the almost unlimited amount of food and horses that this country yields would make it

most valuable to draw upon. As far as taking the country at present, Russia would find no difficulty in doing so, the people are not warlike, having more Chinese blood in them than the people to the west, nor have they any arms which would enable them to cope with European armies, on the other hand they are a patient, much enduring race, and with training would make good soldiers, and the Ameer is so well aware of his deficiencies in armament that his sole thought is how to get arms into the country. The Russians are most careful that no arms find their way across the frontier from the north, having an eye to the future. All that we need do is to allow free trade in arms and offer facilities for their import, whatever faction is uppermost in the country will use them, and the natural frontiers are very strong and easily defensible. I believe the Foreign Office has been unwilling to press the matter of the Wakhan boundary to a settlement, which I should think is a mistake, as it is a question that must come up for settlement in the next few years; in the meantime misunderstandings are much more likely to arise while things are in a state of uncertainty. The fact is that Russia does not wish to have any settlement, but wants things to remain in a state of uncertainty, so that as opportunities arise, she may profit by them, without our being likely to do more than grumble when the thing is done, and well knowing that we are not likely to advance from the south. If the Foreign Office should decide on taking up the question again, the present will be a good time. Russia will have her hands full with Khiva for the next two years, but it will result in her taking Merv, from which to Candahar is but a step, this is a thing that should not be overlooked. By the bye the Yomuts, with whom Russia is now in hot water, were in no way subject to Khiva, the attack on them was therefore an act of pure aggression. We cannot find out exactly what has taken place, but it is said that the whole force left in Khiva has had to capitulate with the exception of a few hundred men, many of them being wounded, who have arrived at Bokhara. It is said that the capitulation has been respected, and it is to be hoped that the report is true, as if the prisoners are murdered, all the sympathy of Europe will be excited on side of Russia. We shall know more about it before long, as a special messenger has been sent to enquire.

We are all flourishing here but have now been without news from India for over three weeks, and the last news we had was due a fortnight before it arrived. We shall have much reading to do when the missing mail bags arrive. We are all getting anxious to hear how Wolseley is getting on. Our winter though severe has not being long, a most wonderful change having taken place in the last few days. I hope to get away and have a crack at the Ovis Poli soon, but it will be very cold there still.

I have faint hopes of getting to Aksu, but our prospects of travelling are limited.

APPENDIX V.

EXTRACT FROM MEMORANDUM.

NATIVE STATES AND ARMIES.

There are 153 Native States in India ruled over by their own Chiefs, who have varying powers up to life and death, but are advised and controlled by British Agents. These Native States comprise a roughly estimated area of about 600,000 square miles, with 48,000,000 of inhabitants, this total area is exclusive of Mysore and Berar (the Assigned Di-stricts), which are at present under our direct administration, and which would add about 40,000 square miles and 6,500,000 of inhabitants to the foregoing estimate.

Such is the mild character of British rule that whilst we protect these Chiefs against insurrection and foreign invasion we allow them to draw the whole revenues of their States, with the exception in some cases of a small tribute; we do not interfere with them except when disloyal or tyrannical, and not one of the vast populations under them contribute directly towards the general taxation of the country.

At the present moment every Native State in India south of the Himalayas, as well as Cashmere, is a feudatory of the Queen, and presents the "nuzzur," or token of submission, to Her Viceroy. Our relations with them are of the most varied kind, although from a variety of treaties and engagements made at different periods we may draw three conclusions as common to all:—

1. There is not one that has the right, or that we would permit, to make war upon its neighbour or upon any foreign power;
2. There is not one that we are not bound to protect;
3. There is not one, whatever may be the nature of our treaties with it, in which we would permit for a moment anything like armed revolt.

It has been only by assuming the commanding military and social position of a Paramount Power that we have been hitherto able to secure the general peace of India, which, as Sir John Malcolm said, "could not be even partially disturbed without involving us in war, or placing us "in a condition which, from its effect on our reputation and resources, would be more embarrassing than war itself."

But whilst many of the smaller Native States, such as in the Himalayas and in Bengal, are in such complete subordination to ourselves as to form almost part of our own territory, our relations with the larger States are more difficult.

Amongst these latter may be named—

Cashmere.	Travancore.
Central India States.	Cochin.
Rajpootana States.	Baroda.
Hyderabad.	Cutch.
Mysore.	Bhawalpore (Panjab).

The position of Cashmere, for instance, is peculiar. The Maharajah pays a small annual tribute to us in acknowledgment of our supremacy; he is bound to refer to us in all disputes, and cannot extend his territories without our consent; yet, exposed as he is beyond the line of the Himalayas to invasion from Central Asia, we find it difficult to restrain him from keeping up a large army or extending his territory northwards under varied pretences.

As regards the other States named, we maintain subsidiary forces in some, such as in Gwalior, Indore, Hyderabad, Travancore, Cochin, Baroda, and Cutch; whilst others are only bound to subordinate co-operation with us, such as Bhawalpore Rewah, Oodeypore, Jeypore, Jodhpore, Bhopal, and other States in Central India and Rajpootana.

A few States, such as those marginally noted, contribute directly to Local Corps under our control, or towards military purposes, in addition to their common obligations to furnish troops on our requisition. But an instance of the inequality of our treaty engagements with Native States is seen in Rajpootana, where many of the States pay an annual money tribute, such as—

	£				£
Oodeypore - - -	20,000		Jhullwar - - -	8,000	
Jeypore - - -	40,000		Pertabghur - - -	5,688	
Jodhpore - - -	9,800		Banswarra - - -	3,912	
Kotah - - -	19,472		Doongurpore - - -	2,738	
Boondee - - -	12,000		Serohi - - -	698	

Whilst the following States, of the same district, pay no tribute at all, viz:—

Tonk.					Bhurtpore.
Kerowlee.					Uluur.
Kishengurh.					Bikaneer.
Dholopore.					Jeysulmeer.

In the Appendices will be found an Abstract Account of Tributes and contributions from Native States, the assignments out of Revenue for 1870-71 under Treaties and Engagements, a table of Tributes from Native Chiefs, and a list of Feudatories and Pensions, &c., all of which may be useful for reference.

Our information in regard to the strength and armament of the troops of Native States is not as yet very complete. The returns attached to this Memorandum give an abstract of the information available in India up to 1872. The numbers can only be looked upon however as fairly approximate, and subject to correction as our information becomes more accurate. From these returns it will be seen that the armies and armaments of Native States amount to a total of 5,226 guns and about 320,000 Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, including armed police and fort garrisons. Of the guns, 3,454 are serviceable, of which

* According to the last available Returns (January 1873) our effective force in India consists of 396 field guns, 59,866 British and 92,406 Native troops, besides Local forces under the Government of India amounting to 53 field guns, and 33,521 Native troops; or a total of 448 effective field guns and 194,513 British and Native troops, exclusive of Police.

980 are field guns. Of the men, 8,856 are gunners, 16,311 are Regular Cavalry, 79,693 are Regular Infantry, whilst 48,076 are Irregular Cavalry, and 166,487 Irregular Infantry.* Besides these troops we must remember that in many of the Native States, especially in Central India and Bundelcund, are many

parts, besides a vast armed population which are liable to come into the field in the cause of rebellion and disorder. But however large the armies of Native States may sound numerically, they are in reality a mere rabble. Undrilled and unorganized, the men are kept up for purposes of rivalry and show, and considering the large area for whose peace and well being they are supposed to be answerable their number is not much larger than might be expected.

We must however bear in mind the necessity for watchfulness and care, especially in regard to the increase of these troops, or the casting of rifled guns, whilst we must on every possible occasion carry the Native States with us by non-interference and kindness or instant and heavy punishment as the circumstances of the case may from time to time demand.

There is a certain difference of opinion as to whether it be better to exercise a control over the armies of Native States by appointing our own Officers to them and rendering them an efficient and useful auxiliary in time of trouble, or whether it be more advisable to leave them alone. Past experience and present public opinion in India incline to the latter view, with the recollection that our local Native Contingents almost to a man deserted us in the military rebellion of 1857-58, and became our most formidable opponents. Our present policy would seem to be to content ourselves with keeping a watch over gun foundries such as are said to exist at Indore, Cashmere, and in some parts of Bundelcund, for the manufacture of ordnance or rifles of a superior kind; to control the military aspirations of Chiefs like Scindiah who are unable to ensure the fidelity of the disciplined armies they create, and to keep alive a good military feeling between ourselves and our Native feudatories by the employment of their troops whenever we may see a chance, either in camps of instruction or in real expeditions within reach of their States, even if it be only for escorts or baggage guards.

I have made this memorandum as brief as possible, and taken much of the information in it from an able paper written by the Foreign Secretary at Calcutta in July 1871, and from other documents of more recent date.

O. T. B.

India Office, 4th April 1873.

Note.—The Native States of India have an area of 596,790 square miles, equal to:—

	Area, square miles.
France - - - - -	201,900
Spain - - - - -	182,758
Portugal - - - - -	36,510
Great Britain and Ireland - - - - -	119,924
Belgium - - - - -	11,412
Switzerland - - - - -	15,233
Bavaria - - - - -	29,347
- - - - -	-
	597,084

Or nearly equal to Persia, which is the eighth kingdom of the world in regard to territorial extent:—

	Area, square miles.
1. Russian Empire - - - - -	7,861,330
2. British Empire - - - - -	4,677,432
3. United States - - - - -	3,603,844
4. Brazil - - - - -	3,100,104
5. Ottoman Empire - - - - -	1,812,048
6. Chinese Empire - - - - -	1,297,999
7. Mexico - - - - -	1,030,442
8. Persia - - - - -	648,030

O.T.B.

Name of State or Agency.	Artillery.										Cavalry and Infantry.				Remarks.		
	Guns.					Equipment.					Cavalry.		Infantry.				
	Field Guns.	Serviceable.	Other Guns.	Serviceable.	Total Guns.	Total Serviceable.	Artillery.	Artillery.	Artillery.	Artillery.	Regulars.	Irregulars.	Total.	Regulars.		Irregulars.	Total.
Indore	39	39	43	43	102	102	350	...	300	3,000	...	3,000	5,300	5,000	10,300	10,300	Much secrecy is said to be observed in the arsenals at Indore. No outsider is allowed to go to the workshops, and the workmen are kept in the Secret Department. Grenades are manufactured at the Arsenal at the rate of about 2,000 lbs. a year. There is supposed to be about 20,000 lbs. stored there, besides 35,000 rounds more, 50,000 cartridges, 100,000 fuses, and 300 Sigsbee's. The arsenals employed are very clever. The manager has been to England, and visited the workshops in England. The cavalry and infantry are good. There are a large number of irregular infantry, but their arms are not good.
Gwalior	102	102	106	61	210	168	513	304	500	1,099	4,076	6,068	5,143	10,907	16,050	16,050	The 23 field guns are English guns, well equipped and mounted. Six regiments of infantry are armed with the old percussion musket. The army is well trained and disciplined. There are no brigades of mounted infantry. The regular Gwalior army is by twenty companies limited to 48 guns, with 480 gunners; cavalry, 6,000; infantry, 5,000 drilled soldiers.
Bhopal	14	12	25	20	39	32	321	50	36	694	500	1,194	3,100	3,266	4,766	4,766	Neither guns nor troops are formidable. There are warlike tribes in the country, which are not to be despised. The regular Gwalior army is by twenty companies limited to 48 guns, with 480 gunners; cavalry, 6,000; infantry, 5,000 drilled soldiers.
Three Petty States in Bhopaw Agency.	15	15	27	25	42	40	66	338	323	661	985	867	1,253	1,253	Neither guns nor troops are formidable. There are warlike tribes in the country, which are not to be despised. The regular Gwalior army is by twenty companies limited to 48 guns, with 480 gunners; cavalry, 6,000; infantry, 5,000 drilled soldiers.
Four Petty States in Western Malwa.	29	12	29	13	80	85	355	340	420	1,300	1,730	1,730	Neither guns nor troops are formidable. There are warlike tribes in the country, which are not to be despised. The regular Gwalior army is by twenty companies limited to 48 guns, with 480 gunners; cavalry, 6,000; infantry, 5,000 drilled soldiers.
Three Petty States in Bhopaw Agency.	8	2	8	3	...	21	...	115	391	505	290	1,231	1,331	1,331	Neither guns nor troops are formidable. There are warlike tribes in the country, which are not to be despised. The regular Gwalior army is by twenty companies limited to 48 guns, with 480 gunners; cavalry, 6,000; infantry, 5,000 drilled soldiers.
Four Petty States in Gwalior Agency.	6	6	6	6	80	...	50	1,000	1,000	1,000	Neither guns nor troops are formidable. There are warlike tribes in the country, which are not to be despised. The regular Gwalior army is by twenty companies limited to 48 guns, with 480 gunners; cavalry, 6,000; infantry, 5,000 drilled soldiers.
Rawah and four Petty Chiefships.	5	5	37	15	42	30	343	20	40	...	1,049	1,040	800	1,480	2,280	2,280	Neither guns nor troops are formidable. There are warlike tribes in the country, which are not to be despised. The regular Gwalior army is by twenty companies limited to 48 guns, with 480 gunners; cavalry, 6,000; infantry, 5,000 drilled soldiers.
Thirty States in Bundelkand.	143	141	278	174	421	315	784	9,677	9,677	375	31,286	32,163	32,163	The cavalry are badly mounted and armed. There is one regiment of regular infantry armed with smooth-bore Eskeville. The troops are all irregular without training or uniform of dress. They are fine sturdy men. There are no armoured caissons.
Five Petty States under Bhopal Agency.	16	6	16	6	21	358	358	975	544	823	823	The cavalry are badly mounted and armed. There is one regiment of regular infantry armed with smooth-bore Eskeville. The troops are all irregular without training or uniform of dress. They are fine sturdy men. There are no armoured caissons.
Total	397	390	318	338	915	688	2,410	935	978	6,234	9,490	18,714	16,200	46,483	61,685	61,685	

Grand Total, Central India Agency: 15
 Guns - 15,714
 Cavalry - 16,200
 Infantry - 65,095 (including Gunners).

II.—RAJPOOTANA ARMY.

Name of Agency or State.	Artillery.						Cavalry and Infantry.						Remarks.		
	Guns.			Equipment.			Cavalry.			Infantry.					
	Field Guns.	Other Guns.	Serviceable.	Total Guns.	Total Serviceable.	Artillery.	Artillery.	Regulars.	Irregulars.	Total.	Regulars.	Irregulars.		Total.	
Oshty pore (Mysore)	108	480	155	638	363	1,354	300	5,940	6,240	1,200	13,200	15,100	<p>The Oudypore troops are not formidable or highly disciplined. The guns there are 31 tons in weight. There are no animals, and all manufacture is done in the State. The army is badly armed and inefficient. The regular cavalry are particularly good. The troops are without drill or discipline. There are 31 tons to Oudypore. This is the only Mohammedan state in Rajpootana, and particular attention is paid to the army.</p> <p>A great many forts in Bundel. The infantry are good, and armed with matchlocks and broads.</p>
Jaypore	54	270	150	394	174	768	630	3,630	3,630	2,000	6,700	10,700	
Jodhpore (Marwar)	30	100	100	290	110	350	...	150	600	3,000	3,000	1,000	2,000	4,000	
Kanwar	30	99	81	119	101	360	200	500	700	2,000	2,000	4,000	
Bharatpur	21	10	17	...	38	130	450	1,010	1,460	2,000	2,000	4,000	
Bhanwar	23	22	31	...	53	130	160	2,180	2,340	1,410	4,000	6,510	
Udaipur	10	10	54	274	24	109	...	300	160	3,240	3,400	1,410	4,800	5,240	
Thakpore	8	11	55	555	610	600	2,650	3,650	
Cooh	8	45	45	53	58	175	480	...	400	2,000	1,500	3,000	
Jhalawar	15	15	75	73	90	150	400	...	200	200	1,000	2,000	
Bundel	12	12	56	50	68	
Kanwar	40	6	40	6	89	...	60	240	300	200	3,200	3,200	
Alwar	3	10	10	12	12	30	...	12	...	500	300	200	200	400	
Sisodi	5	30	30	35	35	150	375	375	...	350	350	
Kishangarh	4	4	125	375	...	350	350	
Banswara	4	4	6	375	375	850	100	950	
Jaipur	4	4	375	375	850	100	950	
Donipore	4	4	57	57	583	100	633	
Sheopore	100	100	250	30	380	
Total	350	273	1,633	1,907	1,385	2,840	52	385	3,433	20,737	21,168	17,891	50,037	67,948	

Grand Total, Rajpootana Agency:

Guns 1,985

Cavalry 41,164

Infantry 71,676 (including Europeans).

III.—PUNJAB.

Name of State or Agency.	Artillery.												Cavalry and Infantry.				Remarks.				
	Guns.						Equipment.						Cavalry.		Infantry.						
	Field Guns.		Batteries.		Serviceable.		Total Guns.		Total Ser.		Total Viable.		Guns.		Artillery.			Horse.		Total.	
	Field Guns.	Batteries.	Other Guns.	Serviceable.	Total Guns.	Total Ser.	Total Viable.	Guns.	Artillery.	Horse.	Artillery.	Batteries.	Regulars.	Irregulars.	Total.	Regulars.		Irregulars.	Total.		
Cashmere	12	12	84	84	96	96	798	124	84	84	84	1,393	...	1,393	14,465	5,000	19,465				
Punjab	31	31	78	78	103	103	338	200	3,098	411	3,443	3,020	1,281	4,401				
Jhelum	4	4	6	6	9	10	79	302	...	302	1,234	406	1,640				
Nabha	12	12	10	10	32	32	50	50	271	277	548	648	501	1,144				
Mulhar Kofa	5	5	11	...	11	211	57	268				
Kapurthala	3	3	47	...	47	98	146	239				
The 34 Hill States	34	34	20	18	42	52	108	119	3,570	1,169	4,732	1,500				
Bhawalpore	31	31	49	49	60	60	153	308	39	360	1,477	1,007	3,484				
Other Minor States	12	10	1	...	13	10	20	30	140	...	140	350	480	810				
Total	133	148	340	183	400	339	1,469	404	104	4,612	1,150	5,762	36,543	10,100	36,643						

Grand Total, Punjab :-
 Guns 5,762
 Cavalry 36,543
 Infantry 10,100
 Total 52,405 (including Gunners)

The Artillery consists of 16 batteries, each of six guns. Amongst the guns are 10 mortars. The batteries are German, with the exception of two British batteries. The guns are honeycombed, and not very serviceable. The Cavalry consists of two regiments, and the Infantry of 24 Regiments of the Line, besides Irregulars, &c. The Dogras constitute the bulk of the Maharajah's army. They are cowardly, and of no use against an enemy in the plain. There are some of our munitions in the hands of the Maharajah's Cavalry. The army costs the Maharajah and considerable attention is paid to their drill. The army costs the Maharajah about 1,90,000*l.* a year. The number (14,065) of Regular Infantry includes 1,000 Sappers and Miners. There are 34 forts of sorts in Cashmere. Besides the arms in the hands of the Troops, there are several magazines in Cashmere, containing 10,000 muskets, 1,750 mules, 1,600,000 rounds of ball, 1,000,000 lbs. of powder, 38,185,000 rounds of cartridges, 1,065,682 cannon balls of iron, 700,000 drakey loads of gunpowder. Guns, rifles, and gunpowder are made in Cashmere. The Maharajah makes fire-arms both in his private workshops and by contract. The outbreak in 586 annually. The Maharajah has often referred to his Army to the Political Officer as "a better security at the disposal of the British Government whenever it likes to call for its services." The disaffected temper of the Troops towards the Maharajah requires to be watched, and also the progress made in the manufacture of rifled weapons. These are not at present of much account, but improvement may rapidly be made. The guns are forced, the rest are for bullocks. Cavalry and Infantry only are efficient. Cavalry and Infantry both very good and efficient. Last year the Raja impounded 310 breech-loading carbines for his Cavalry. The Cavalry and Infantry are inefficient and badly disciplined. The Kappoortalla guns are serviceable, and the Troops efficient. The guns are serviceable and the Troops fairly drilled and equipped, especially Sherwan and Belpawan. One of the Cavalry and Infantry (forming the escort) are efficient, the rest are inefficient.

IV.—NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES.

Name of State or Agency.	Artillery.										Cavalry and Infantry.				Remarks.
	Guns.					Equipment.					Cavalry.		Infantry.		
	Right Guns.	Serviceable.	Other Guns.	Serviceable.	Total Guns.	Total Ser-viceable.	Guns.	Artillery.	Artillery.	Artillery.	Light Cavalry.	Total.	Regulars.	Irregulars.	
Kunson Rampore	6	6	32	10	54	16	264	...	400	...	502	502	929	970	1,899
Benares, Maharajah of	6	4	6	4	20	45	155	49	208
Vishnagar, Maharajah of	3	6	3	3	100	100	...	50	150
Petty States of Rampore, Gonda-ware, and Gonda-ware, under Commissioner of Jhansi.	32	32	66	264	...	400	...	50	622	672	1,084	1,168	2,252

The Rajah of Kunson has no guns nor trained soldiers. The Artillery are a mere rabble, more likely to go against us than with us in the event of a disturbance. They are bigoted Mahomedans. The guns are merely used for escort duty. The Infantry are merely used for show and sentry duties.

Both guns and troops inefficient, and not worthy of note.

V.—CENTRAL PROVINCES.

13 Petty Chiefs	3	2	3	3	140	140	...	2,111	2,111
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The Cavalry and Infantry are a mere rabble.

VI.—HYDERABAD.

Hyderabad	71	47	654	504	726	551	965	80	200	1,400	6,809	8,202	12,775	14,115	36,890
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The Irregular troops are composed of Amba, Shikhs, Rohillas, Sindhees, and Africans. The Nizam's "Reformed Army" numbers 5,000, and are well dis-ciplined. There are 44 forts in the Nizam's dominions, merely ruined and useless.

Grand Total, North-Western Provinces, Central Provinces, and Hyderabad :—
 Guns 8,015
 Cavalry 8,015
 Infantry 41,802 (including Guns).

VII.—BENGAL.

Name of State or Agency.	Artillery.										Cavalry and Infantry.				Remarks.			
	Guns.					Equipment.					Cavalry.		Infantry.					
	Field Guns.	Battery.	Other Guns.	Battery.	Total.	Other Guns.	Total.	Other Guns.	Total.	Other Guns.	Other Guns.	Other Guns.	Total.	Other Guns.		Total.		
Cuttack Tributary States (11 Petty Chieftains).	83	...	83	There are no Cavalry or Infantry, except a few men armed with bows and arrows, rusty spears, and a few matchlocks.
South-Western Frontier States	100	100	The Petty Chief of Chota Nagpore keep no guns nor any regular force. They could on an emergency bring into the field some 3,000 good bowmen, and 500 matchlock men.	
Cooch Behar	2	...	2	100	100	The guns were given to the Rajah by Lord Auckland. The troops are merely Police.	
Hill Tipperah	5	...	5	412	412	The guns are small pieces used merely for salutes. The Infantry are merely Police.	
Total	3	2	84	2	96	4	4	238	314	612	612	612		

Grand total, Bengal :

Guns - - - - - 96

Cavalry - - - - - 4

Infantry - - - - - 612

VIII.—MADRAS.

Trensvore	6	4	6	4	30	60	1,211	...	1,211	The guns are all old muske-loaders of English make, usually kept in a gun shed in the open, and in small supply of ammunition kept for saluting purposes only. The Cavalry is simply a body guard. Many of the men keep their seats with difficulty. The Infantry are divided into "the Nair Brigade," to which five European Officers of the Madras Army are attached. They are armed with smooth-bore Enfields, and the clothing and equipment are furnished by the Madras Government on payment. The men are quiet, and the regiment is only used for ceremonial. The men are drilled below the Madras Depot.
Cochin	3	...	3	300	300	Only old "winning" guns. No equipment, papers, nor carriage. No Cavalry. The Infantry are a slowly diminishing of the Nair Brigade of Travancore, and are used for jail guard, &c. &c. Some are a miserable rabble, altogether undisciplined, and with arms of all descriptions.
Pondicherry	6	...	6	20	150	3,400	3,550	Number of these States are believed to have a single serviceable gun, nor an army of any kind.
Sondoor	
Bungabally	
Grand total	6	4	9	15	4	30	80	1,331	3,700	4,031	

Grand total, Madras :

Guns - - - - - 15

Cavalry - - - - - 80

Infantry - - - - - 4,031 (including Gunners).

Name of State or Agency.	Artillery.						Cavalry and Infantry.				Remarks.			
	Guns.			Equipment.			Cavalry.		Infantry.					
	Field Guns.	Other Guns.	Breakable.	Total Guns.	Total Serviceable.	Carriage.	Artillery.	Regulars.	Irregulars.	Total.				
Baroda	28	3	...	30	28	66	139	98	5,000	3,098	1,786	9,214	11,000	<p>All the guns (with the exception of four brass six pounders, which are loaned) are drawn by bullocks. The Regular Cavalry are used for body guard. The 2,000 Irregular Cavalry are the (casualties which Baroda is bound by treaty to place at disposal of British Government when required. They are employed in ordinary police duties, and are badly mounted and armed. The Regular Infantry is a respectable force, although generally inferior to our own Native Infantry. It is kept in training by the British Government, and is well equipped for all purposes. Amongst the Irregular Infantry are two battalions of Muzumdar's Rifles, commanded by British Officers, and in a good state of discipline. The other Irregular Infantry are unmounted and without uniforms. Rifles are manufactured at Baroda, and they have made models of the Armstrong and other breech-loading guns, and other field guns are being made. The guns are used for saluting purposes, and the majority of them are mounted guns.</p> <p>Guns of fair quality can be made at the capital. All the principal towns in Kutch are well, and can mount from two to six guns. The only fortress in the country is Bhuj, which dominates the capital Bhuj. It is in the hands of the British Government. The Irregulars are all Arab mercenaries, unmounted and untrained, and useful only behind a shelter. Kutch, like the other parts of Gujarat, is well disciplined. We have a Government armory at Bhuj, and a Government armoury, valued at Rs. 20,000, at Bhuj. The Government armory, valued at Rs. 20,000, at Bhuj.</p> <p>Of the guns, only ten are in actual use. Kolhapur is naturally strong, full of natural forts and walled round. The Marathas of Kolhapur are a plucky tough race, fond of adventure. The population was dispersed in 1858-59, and could not make any efficient resistance to our authority. The population is now generally returned to their original habitations, and the Government has reconstituted the country under the Political Agent and two European Officers. It is a backward and inefficient Corps. The guns are small guns. There are no forces of Cavalry and Infantry in those States, only a limited number of men armed with swords, as personal escorts to the Chiefs. The Chiefs are powerful, in a military point of view.</p> <p>The guns are old, rusty, useless, and dismantled. There is a Sowars Ware Local Corps, under the name of Sowars, but they are not in any way efficient. Only 490 are mounted on 600 mules.</p> <p>The guns are of all calibres and makes; two of them are of enormous size. The fort at Junjira is strong, and situated on a rocky island, completely commanded from the main land. The troops are inefficient and undisciplined.</p> <p>Neither guns nor troops serviceable.</p> <p>The guns are all unserviceable. The troops are all undisciplined and chiefly used as Police.</p> <p>No manufactures for arms, but powder of fair quality is made. 250 Cavalry and Infantry are under the Political Superintendant, and are efficient; the rest are undisciplined.</p> <p>Mostly an undisciplined rabble.</p> <p>N.B.—There are a few remaining Native States in Bombay:—Meer Ali Moamad of Sind, Dharmpur, Bansa, Sutchery, Salaria, of which none have guns or troops worthy of record.</p>
Kattywar (38 petty States)	106	68	409	160	508	378	68	12	6,432	3,601	4,038	14,251	15,306	
Kutch	13	12	26	30	36	32	15	...	48	300	300	600	600	
Kolhapur and its dependencies.	...	258	156	558	156	30	3	134	154	360	973	1,502	3,000	
Southern States (eight in number)	...	25	25	25	25	
Sawant Ware	...	34	3	84	3	12	
Junjira	...	40	12	40	12	210	300	
Maheswar Agency:	
Edor	...	2	3	...	8	2	16	2	216	316	406	606	600	
Other petty Chiefdoms	600	600	600	600	600	
Bavn	...	16	...	16	316	198	1,482	1,620	1,620	
Basni Agency (six petty States)	...	91	18	6	528	522	...	1,110	1,110	
Pahnapore Agency (three petty States)	...	8	8	400	400	...	600	600	
Cambay	
Total	178	186	375	1,050	512	322	78	180	530	9,121	9,651	3,569	99,435	31,004

Grand Total, Bombay:—
 Guns - 1,050
 Cavalry - 9,651
 Infantry - 23,336 (including Gunners).

X.—TOTAL GENERAL ABSTRACT.

Name of State or Agency.	Artillery.										Cavalry and Infantry.					Total Cavalry, Infantry, and Gunners.	Remarks.
	Guns.					Equipment.					Cavalry.		Infantry.				
	Field Guns.	Serviceable.	Other Guns.	Serviceable.	Total Guns.	Total Serviceable.	Guns.	Artillery Horses.	Artillery.	Ambulances.	Regiments.	Irregulars.	Total.	Regiments.	Irregulars.		
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.																	
I.—Central India.	397	360	518	338	915	698	2,410	295	926	5,224	9,400	13,714	16,202	46,483	63,685	80,809	<p>Note.—There is besides, a local force of 4,758 men in Mysore, called the Mysore Local Army, which is not sent under our direct administration, I have not included this force amongst the Armies of Native States.</p>
II.—Rajputana.	350	275	1,625	1,047	1,895	1,222	3,240	53	585	3,435	20,727	24,163	17,491	50,057	47,348	96,050	
III.—Punjab.	158	148	848	185	400	333	1,409	404	104	4,413	1,150	5,753	36,543	10,100	36,643	43,814	
IV.—North-West Provinces.	6	6	22	22	38	38	264	...	400	...	622	672	1,064	1,168	2,252	3,208	
V.—Central Provinces.	2	2	2	2	140	340	...	2,115	2,115	2,255	
VI.—Hyderabad.	71	47	654	504	725	551	261	80	200	1,400	6,809	8,208	12,775	24,115	36,890	45,253	
VII.—Bengal.	2	2	94	2	96	4	80	20	4	238	314	616	
VIII.—Madras.	6	4	9	...	15	4	30	30	80	1,231	2,740	4,031	4,141	
IX.—Bombay.	178	156	672	376	1,050	512	528	78	190	350	9,121	9,651	3,562	29,435	33,004	43,177	
Total.	1,164	980	4,062	2,474	5,226	3,454	8,856	909	3,285	16,911	48,076	64,387	79,628	166,497	246,180	319,483, or 348,180 Infantry.	
INDEPENDENT KINGDOMS AND STATES.																	
I.—Afghanistan.	
II.—Rohil.	
III.—Yarkand.	
IV.—Sogd.	
V.—Burmah.	
VI.—Munipore.	
Total.	

The Artillery of Nepal is, in the main, good, but is divided into 90 regiments, dressed and drilled after English model. These numbers are taken from the Report of the Resident, but attached to this are several more. Report sent to me from India on the 25th July, which is interesting, and gives a better number of troops.

O. T. B.

MEMORANDUM by Captain BIDDULPH, A.D.C., on the NEPAUL ARMY, dated Calcutta,
6th March 1873.

The time I have lately spent in Nepal has been so short that I am unable to give a very detailed account of all connected with the army there, but so little is at present known of the military resources of Nepal, that the information I was able to acquire concerning them may be of some interest. My visit to Nepal comprised a shooting excursion in the Terai, accompanying Sir Jung Bahadur's camp, and a short visit to Katmandoo, during which I visited Patun and Darignoon, the next two largest towns in the Valley.

The Nepalese Army consists of about 13,000 Infantry, divided into twenty-nine regiments, and about 2,000 Artillerymen. There are about 150 mounted men, armed with sword and lance, but beyond this there are no Cavalry.

The whole army consists of Ghoorkhas, with the exception of some Sikhs among the Artillery, but what proportion there is of these latter I did not ascertain. The Niwars do not furnish a single fighting man. The men are kept with the colours for three years, at the end of which time they are sent back to their homes but continue liable for service when called upon. What number these reserves amount to I could not ascertain. Sir Jung Bahadur told me he could place the reserves in the field with a month's notice, but, considering that there are no telegraphs, posts, or good roads, and the mountainous nature of the country, it would, I fancy, take longer.

Nearly the whole army is kept in the valley of Nepal, which is partitioned into three divisional commands, viz., Katmandoo, Patun, and Darignoon. No force is kept permanently in the Terai. I saw altogether upwards of 10,000 men paraded at these places, forming twenty-two or twenty-three regiments of Infantry and a force of Artillery. The largest force is at Katmandoo itself, where, on one occasion, I saw between 7,000 and 8,000 men, and about 60 guns on parade. The Infantry are armed with the Enfield rifle and bayonet, made in the Katmandoo workshops, but the locks are bad and liable to get easily out of order, and the arms themselves badly kept. A certain amount of target practice goes on, first at a close distance, with old smooth-bore, by recruits, and afterwards with the Enfield, in a shooting gallery 350 yards long. Over that distance I doubt if there is any practice, nor do I think, from their appearance, that the rifles would make good shooting.

On the occasion above mentioned the troops did not manœuvre, and I believe that they possess no knowledge of working in brigades or divisions, but are fairly up in battalion drill. All words of command are given in English, and on one occasion I saw some recruits at skinning drill, which was smartly done. Drill of some kind was being daily performed. Every regiment has a number of coolies, mostly Niwars, attached to it for transport purposes, &c., who are regularly kept on the strength of the army.

The full dress of the Infantry is red, but they have also an every-day working dress of a kind of butcher's blue, which is very serviceable.

Every man and coolie carries the national knife, with which they are very expert. Whilst marching in the Terai we had about 5,000 men, soldiers, and coolies with us, who were all well hatted within two hours of arriving in camp.

I had no opportunity of seeing much of the Artillery; the guns I saw on parade were smooth-bore brass field pieces of the old English pattern, and of different sizes from three to eighteen-pounders. Only about eight or ten of them were horsed. When independent firing was ordered, they were quickly served. The men are dressed in dark blue.

Whilst at Katmandoo I visited the Cannon Foundry, Small Arm Factory, and Workshops, also the Artillery Magazine, and three Small Arm Magazines. In the Artillery Magazine there were about eighty field guns, not including the guns I saw on parade, of various calibres, from six to eighteen pounders, and twenty or thirty mortars, one or two of which were of large size. All were of brass and smooth-bore. There were also two small rifled guns, which I was not able to inspect closely. I believe these were turned out more as an experiment than for service. There were also a large quantity of iron cylinders strengthened with iron hoops (I cannot call them guns), weighing about 24 lbs., large enough to throw a 3 lb. shot, which are kept for mountain warfare; they become disabled after three shots, but are easily carried by one man, and could be taken on ground where our mountain batteries could not go; they are, however, rude and barbarous weapons, and could only be of use against an enemy armed with smooth bore muskets.

The Cannon Foundry is a very small one, and its productive power extremely limited. The guns which were being turned out were brass smooth-bores. There is but one small steam-engine employed. In the Small Arm Factory, cap-machine machines, supplied by Messrs. Charles Lancaster were in full work. Enfield rifles were being made, but there was no machinery, and all the boring was done by hand; the productive power is therefore slow and limited; the out-turn was said to be 300 rifles a month, but I much doubt if it is so much. The rifles, when finished are neat, and well turned out to look at, but the locks are weak and bad.

All the carpenter's work is particularly good, and is done by Niwars, but all the higher class of work is done by Hindustanis.

I also saw very neatly turned out specimens of breech-loading rifles, including copies of the Sharp, Martini-Henry, Chassepot, Snider, and Westley-Richard rifles, but I believe the want of machinery to make proper cartridges is at present an insuperable obstacle to their adoption for the army, though this need not be the case with the Westley-Richards. The small-arm ammunition is made out of the valley, at some place to the westward, probably Ghoorkha. The

small-arms magazines which I visited were situated, one in the middle of the city, one about a mile to the westward, and one by the Artillery Magazine. They contained mostly smooth-bore muskets, of which I must have seen upwards of thirty thousand stand, about a quarter being flint and steel. Amongst them were several thousands of British manufacture, said to have been looted at Lucknow in 1857. I saw very few Enfield rifles in store, and imagine they must be kept in another magazine which I did not visit.

Though the command of the army devolves *ex officio* on Sir Jung Bahadour, and there is little doubt that he would assume command in the field, his brother Runnoodeep Singh is nominally Commander-in-Chief, and all the high commands in the army are held by Sir Jung Bahadour's nearest relations. In several regiments there are boys of ten and fourteen years of age holding command as Colonels and Captains, and the professional knowledge of the officers generally is not worth commenting on.

The large number of elephants, upwards of six hundred in number, belonging to the State should not be overlooked as a means of transport. They are all kept in the Terai, and much attention is paid to their condition, and with them a force of 2,000 men could easily make a forced march of seventy or eighty miles in twenty-four hours.

Katmandoo is not fortified; the old town had a containing wall, which it has outgrown, nor did I see any fortified place in Nepal. An old fort, out of repair, and not garrisoned, exists at Seesagurry, on the road from Segowlie to Katmandoo, at the top of a very steep ascent of 1,800 feet. The road, though good in parts, is quite impracticable for any but mountain batteries.

TOTAL ABSTRACT of Amounts of Tributes or Contributions from Native States in India.

	R.	A.	P.	£	s.	d.
I. Rajpootana - - - - -	15,88,005	4	0	or	158,400	0 0
II. Central India - - - - -	5,87,635	14	10	or	58,763	0 0
III. States in Bombay Presidency - - - - -	8,25,983	1	3	or	82,599	0 0
IV. States in South of India - - - - -	11,04,540	8	10	or	110,454	0 0
V. Chiefships in Lower Provinces of Bengal - - - - -	1,04,623	3	5	or	10,462	0 0
VI. Chiefships in Punjab - - - - -	2,80,087	0	0	or	29,008	0 0
VII. Chiefships in Central Provinces - - - - -	1,35,236	0	0	or	13,583	0 0
Grand Total - - - - -	Rs. 46,26,111	0	0	or	£462,511	0 0

The following extract from "Annals of Indian Administration," corrected up to recent date may be interesting and useful:—

Since the conquest of the Punjab by Lord Dalhousie in 1849, and of Pegu in 1852, the boundaries of the British Empire of India, excluding Aden and the Straits Settlements, have been the Suliman range, the Kurukorum and the watershed of the Himalayas on the north, except at Nepal and Bhootan; the sea on the west and south; and a jungle line, marked by no natural features, stretching from the Youm range irregularly in a south-easterly direction through Burma to the tenth parallel of latitude. Roughly, British India may be said to be included within latitude 8° and 37° N. and longitude 66° 44' and 99° 30' E., involving 11,260 miles of external boundary. From Tenasserim by the Himalayas to Cape Monze in Sindhi, the *inland* frontier is 4,680 miles, while the *coast* line from the Straits Settlements to Kurrachee is 6,580. The length of India from the Indus to Cape Comorin, on the Meridian of 75°, is 1,900 miles. The extreme breadth is 1,800 miles, on the parallel of 28°. The whole Peninsula contains an area of about 1,577,698 square miles, and a population of 241,000,000. It is thus thirteen times the size of Great Britain and Ireland, and contains ten times the population. Contrasted with the colonial possessions of Great Britain, the dependency of India stands thus:—

	Square Miles.	Population.
India - - - - -	1,577,698	241,000,000
Falkland Isles - - - - -	7,600	662
Natal - - - - -	16,145	193,103
Cape of Good Hope - - - - -	200,610	566,158
St. Helena - - - - -	47	6,860
Gold Coast - - - - -	6,000	151,346
Sierra Leone - - - - -	468	41,806
Gambia - - - - -	21	6,939
North America - - - - -	632,360	3,328,672
Straits Settlements - - - - -	1,095	282,231
Ceylon - - - - -	24,700	2,098,027
Mauritius - - - - -	708	310,050
Labuan - - - - -	45	2,785
Hong Kong - - - - -	32	115,098
Australia - - - - -	2,582,070	1,662,063
Dermoda - - - - -	24	11,796
Honduras - - - - -	13,500	25,635

	Square Miles.	Population.
West India - - - - -	12,583	534,197
British Gulana - - - - -	76,000	148,026
Gibraltar - - - - -	1½	15,462
Malta - - - - -	11½	139,502

Contrasted with other empires of great territorial extent and population, if we except China, India still maintains its pre-eminence in both combined:—

	Square miles.	Population.
India - - - - -	1,577,698	241,000,000
China - - - - -	1,297,999	367,000,000
Russia with Turkestan - - - - -	7,731,881	93,000,000
Netherlands India - - - - -	445,411	18,000,000
Turkey - - - - -	1,812,048	35,000,000
United States - - - - -	1,486,917	31,445,089
Mexico - - - - -	1,030,442	8,000,000
Brazil - - - - -	7,677,800	3,100,000
Persia - - - - -	648,000	4,500,000

British India, non-feudatory and feudatory, is slightly less in area alone than the extent of all Europe without Russia, which is 1,686,117 square miles, but the population of Europe is only 189,475,968. The whole Peninsula of India and a large portion of Burma is governed by Great Britain, with the exception of the small territories held by Portugal and France. By the last census of 1868, the whole population of the French possessions was 229,000 souls, and their superficial extent 49,000 hectares, or 122,500 acres:—

Name.	Locality.	Square Miles.	Population.
French:—			
Chandernagore - - -	On the Hooghly - - -	19½	39,670
Karikal - - - - -	Comorndel Coast - - -		
Pondichery - - - -	Ditto - - - - -		
Yanaon - - - - -	O ion Coast - - - - -		
Mahé - - - - -	Malabar Coast - - -		
Portuguese:—			
Goa - - - - -	Western Coast - - -	1,056	368,788
Daman - - - - -	Concan Coast - - -	Not known.	44,808
Diu - - - - -	South Coast of Kattywar - - -		

The detailed survey of the area and population of the ten Provinces of non-feudatory India, according to the latest returns, yields the following general results for all India showing a total area of 1,577,698 square miles, and a population of 241,000,000, if the Parliamentary returns for the 153 Feudatory States be assumed to be correct:—

	When formed.	Government.	Capital.	Square Miles.	Districts or Counties and States.	Population.		
The Ten Provinces.	1773 1784 1828 1861	Her Majesty's Viceroy and Governor General of India in Council	Calcutta -	Grand Total.	Grand Total.	Grand Total.		
				1,577,698	374	241,000,000		
1. Madras - - - - -	1689			Governor in Council, with a Legislature.	Madras -	140,726	30	31,250,000
2. Bombay and Sind -	1662			Ditto - - - - -	Bombay -	131,298	19	14,000,000
3. Bengal or Lower Provinces.	1853	Lieutenant Governor, with a Legislature.	Calcutta -	246,499	56	66,750,000		
4. North-western Provinces	1835	Lieutenant Governor -	Allahabad	88,687	36	31,500,000		
5. Punjab - - - - -	1849	Ditto - - - - -	Lahore -	101,890	32	19,000,000		
6. Oudh - - - - -	1858	Chief Commissioner -	Lucknow -	94,060	12	19,000,000		
7. Central Provinces -	1856	Ditto - - - - -	Nagpore -	111,321	18	9,850,000		
8. British Burma - - -	1862	Ditto - - - - -	Rangoon -	93,879	13	2,500,000		
9. Bazar - - - - -	1853	Two Commissioners under Resident of Hyderabad.	Oomrawattee and Aboolah.	16,900	6	3,380,000		
10. Mysore - - - - -	1838	Chief Commissioner -	Bangalore	28,442	8	4,000,000		
Coorg - - - - -	1834		Mercara -	2,400	1	130,000		
153 Feudatory States -		Total Non-Feudatory		880,908	321	192,000,000		
		Total Feudatory		596,790	153	48,000,000		
		Grand Total		1,477,698	474	241,000,000		

The following figures show the area and population of the principal States of Asia:—

States or Countries.	Square Miles.	Population.	Population to Square Mile.	Capitals.	Population of Capital.
Held by Europeans:—					
India - - - - -	1,577,698	241,000,000	152	Calcutta - - - - -	1,000,000
Ceylon - - - - -	34,454	2,066,777	86	Columbo - - - - -	45,000
Straits Settlements - - - - -	1,095	283,831	260	Singapore - - - - -	25,000
Labuan and Sarawak - - - - -	55	10,000	180	Labuan - - - - -	3,000
Victoria - - - - -	29	125,504	4,327*	Hong-Kong - - - - -	125,504
Mauritius - - - - -	708	324,517	455	Port Louis - - - - -	40,000
Turkistan and Siberia - - - - -	5,788,700	24,000,000	4	Orenburg - - - - -	18,000
Netherlands India - - - - -	445,411	17,552,803	40	Batavia - - - - -	60,000
Philippines - - - - -	52,647	2,673,360	50	Manila - - - - -	15,000
Goa, Timor, and Macao - - - - -	—	1,298,483	—	Goa - - - - -	10,000
Cochin China - - - - -	25,000	3,000,000	120	Saigon and Cholon - - - - -	100,000
Hélanion - - - - -	1,408	255,000	174	St. Denis - - - - -	10,000
French India - - - - -	191	229,000	1,200*	Pondichery - - - - -	35,000
Held by Asiatics:—					
Afghanistan, Scistan, and Balkh - - - - -	400,000	4,000,000	10	Kabul - - - - -	63,000
Beloochistan - - - - -	180,000	500,000	3	Khelat - - - - -	4,000
Burma - - - - -	260,000	6,000,000	23	Mandalay - - - - -	50,000
Siam - - - - -	250,000	11,000,000	47	Bangkok - - - - -	400,000
Anam - - - - -	140,000	8,000,000	47	Hue - - - - -	100,000
China - - - - -	1,397,399	367,533,307	263	Peking - - - - -	1,250,000
Japan - - - - -	156,604	35,000,000	229	Yedo - - - - -	700,000
				Miako - - - - -	475,000
Persia - - - - -	648,000	4,400,000	6	Teheran - - - - -	85,000
Tibet - - - - -	1,000,000	5,000,000	5	Lassa - - - - -	25,000
Eastern Turkistan - - - - -	309,000	1,200,000	4	Kashgar - - - - -	5,000
Arabia - - - - -	1,200,000	6,000,000	7	Mecca - - - - -	30,000
Turkey (in Asia) - - - - -	550,000	16,000,000	29	Smyrna - - - - -	150,000

* Chiefly in towns.

England thus rules a population of 241 millions in Asia, Russia of 24 millions, Holland of 18 millions, Spain of 2½ millions, Portugal of 1½ millions, and France of 3½ millions. England directly rules, independently of the number whom she indirectly influences, five times more of the population of Asia than the other five Powers of Europe together.

APPENDIX VI.

MR. ROBERT MICHELL'S ABSTRACTS OF REMARKS OF RUSSIAN PRESS.

Abstract No. I.
1869. The
Exchange
Gazette.

The "Exchange Gazette" 16th April 1869 considered that the cession of the Khurum valley demanded of the Amir of Afghanistan at the Umballa meeting on the 27th March 1869 would practically open the road to Cabul, and advised the Amir to take into consideration that this would bind him to an alliance with England, who was purchasing it with money and arms merely in order to prevent his becoming the friend of Russia. If the Amir gave an evasive answer to the demand it must have been because he had this in mind, and knew that if he acceded to the request of the Governor-General he would be disabled from choosing between the Russian and English in his leanings at any future time.

Abstract
No. II., 1869.
The Vest,
16th and 20th
April 1869.

The "Vest" was much struck by the generosity of the English Government, which, it said, was noted for its parsimony, in giving the Amir at Umballa so much money and such a large quantity of arms. The object of the Umballa durbair was evidently to dazzle the Amir and to impress them with the brilliancy of the Governor-General's court, and give him an exaggerated idea of the wealth and power of England. But notwithstanding the magnificent presents and the endeavours to persuade him that England had an army at her command four times larger than that of Russia, that England alone could be his support, and that Russia was his sworn enemy, the Amir was not impressed, and the desired effect and result were not attained by Lord Mayo.

Commenting on the change of opinion in England on the Central Asian question (the *Vest* (News) observed:—

"When the movements of Russia in Asia first engaged the attention of England, and when Lord Palmerston, then at the head of the Government, pointed out the danger to be apprehended from them, the English public and press seemed to be quite indifferent. No one contemplated the possibility of a collision between England and Russia on the confines of India. Lord Palmerston's apprehensions were considered exaggerated, or completely without foundation, and in fact it was impossible to foresee that Russia would make such gigantic strides in so short a time.

"The indifference of the British public continued even when the Russian advances began to engage great and universal attention; the English remained extremely indifferent to the efforts of Russia to establish her supremacy in Central Asia even after the fall of Samarcand. It was only when the Russians crossed to Jaxartes that the English began to be impressed with the gravity of the case. But even then the tone of the English press was remarkable for its moderation, the cause of this being Sir John (Lord) Lawrence, who advised a mutual understanding rather than a war between England and Russia. Pointing out the services rendered to civilisation by the Russian conquests Sir John Lawrence influenced both the press and the Government.

"Lord Mayo, however, inaugurated a complete change of view. He entered into negotiations with the Amir of Afghanistan, and did everything to serve him. His efforts seemed to be crowned with success, and the English papers indulging in joy at an imaginary triumph suddenly changed their tone. Nothing more was heard about conciliating Russia.

"An alliance with Afghanistan was mooted which was to have had the effect of stopping the victorious advance of the Russians, and of compelling them to withdraw from the banks of the Jaxartes.

"The Amir, however, would not or could not enter into any engagement with the British Government, and the English were therefore very much disappointed in their expectation of a triumph over Russia. Having failed in their attempt to win over the Amir, England again sought to conciliate Russia, the English press suddenly ceased to inveigh against Russia, advised conciliatory measures, and pointed out that the interest of England and Russia were identical in Central Asia. The rapprochement between the British and Russian Governments was, indeed, a cause of serious apprehension to Turkey, but the coolness which had existed between them had necessarily been injurious to both, and in obedience to the inexorable laws of nature England and Russia are bound to acknowledge that they must not alone hold fast their actual possessions in Central Asia, but also extend them."

Abstract
No. VI., 1869.
16 June.

In an article published January 1869 in the "Europieiski Vestnik," the writer, in allusion to the negotiations then going on between the courts of St. James and St. Petersburg, observed that England would probably not try to bind Russia to any conditions to the preservation of a *status quo* in Central Asia.

Speculating on the nature of the negotiations, the writer said that they had probably taken the form of a proposition to neutralise a zone, including Afghanistan, Bokhara, and Kokand. With regard to the first England had something to tell Russia, with regard to the last two she had something to ask. The English policy had changed, a subsidy was paid to Shere Ali, because, as the "Times" had then said, there was danger threatening from the Russian side, and it was necessary to check with energy the conquering tendencies of Russia. These apprehensions were, however, groundless, seeing that the question of the evacuation of Samarcand was on the tapis.

England may take advantage of the decision of the Russian Government on this point by expressing her intention to respect the inviolability of Afghanistan, and of even saying that she considers it a neutralized State. She may ask the Russian Government to make a similar declaration with respect to Bokhara and Kokan. A negative answer could not be returned, and one in the affirmative would give England a pretext for making formal representations on the slightest Russian advance. An answer in the affirmative might not be a binding obligation, nor would the pretext thus given materially increase the power of England to injure Russia in that quarter, yet every unnecessary word in diplomacy is prejudicial to it.

It appears on the confession of Russian journals that the policy of the Russian Government is a wavering policy, a policy very much guided by a study of the temper of other States. The *Europeiski Vestnik*, in an article on Central Asia in January 1869, describes it as a policy of *taténement*, and implied that the Russian Government was so undecided, and that the various members composing it differed so strongly in their views and opinions, while they each aimed at different objects, that there was no one there who could even tell what was the nature of the negotiations then being conducted between England and Russia.

The "Exchange Gazette" observed on the 31st June 1869 that in the then aspect of political affairs there was no prospect of hostile relations between England and Russia. With reference to the Eastern question English statesmen adhered to the principles which guide the Russian Government: which were that it was better to leave events in the East and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire to take their own natural course. So long as England's commercial interests are not affected she has no concern in what takes place.

The "Moscow Contemporary Chronicle" characterised the active measures which England was taking as a demonstration, and the debate on Central Asia in the House of Commons as a *farce*.

Referring to an article in the "Times," where the necessity of completely subjugating the Bokharians, Khivans, and even Turcomans was "recognised," and to which, according to the "Times," sought "to reconcile the English public," the "Exchange Gazette" expressed an astonishment that there should be any equivocation on the part of Russia in the matter of its projects and intentions, when the "Times" "approved" and "saw no danger to England in further coercive measures." Quoting an expression in the "Times," to the effect that England was the only power which could possibly prevent Russia from making all Central Asia her own, and which could place obstacles in the way of any further Russian encroachments on Khiva, the "Gazette" signified its astonishment at the statement, and doubted the fact. Abstract, No. XVII, 24th December 1869.

The "Moscow Gazette" thought that the policy of England in that year was not one of masterly inactivity, but one of action against Russia. The "Times" article of the 6th February had too much in it on the necessity for a clear understanding between the two countries, and anticipating the probability of attempts being made in the most insinuating manner and cruelly plausible excuses to obtain guarantees from Russia and to involve Russia in intricate and onerous obligations. The "Moscow Gazette" observed that relations between England and Russia in Central Asia did not and should not exist. England, it said, was seeking to establish false rights and to impose obligations merely to counteract Russian interests.

The "Exchange Gazette" of the 5th January 1871, noticing that the "Times" did not express any alarm at the Russian doings on the east coast of the Caspian, advised immediate and open action, otherwise the advance of "Mars and Mercury" would be long delayed.

Treating on Kashgar, on the subject of the negotiations with the Kashgar envoys in India, on the neutralization scheme, the "Moscow Gazette" thought it strange that England, in her bustling solicitude to introduce the European system of balance of power among the Khanates, did not call upon Russia to enter into an engagement not to overstep the Chinese wall, or to recognise the neutrality of Mongolia.

At this period all the Russian papers openly declared that the cause of England's endeavours to conciliate Russia, or by various means to neutralize her power and influence, was the great anxiety she felt in India on account of the disaffection to English rule. "They have," in the words of the "Exchange Gazette," which were echoed by all the papers, "every reason for anxiety, because their pride, their greed, their object of enriching themselves as quickly as possible, have engendered in the native population a deep disaffection to their rule and hopes of deliverance from it."

From the "Golos" 3-15th April 1870. "For the greater security of their dominion in India the English propose to convert Afghanistan into a neutral territory (of course under British protection), which is to prevent any contest between British India and Russia. As for the rest they give us *carte blanche* to do what we like in Central Asia. They urge us on to further appropriation, referring to the mission which is ours of being the civilizers of the far East."

A well-informed writer in this monthly magazine acknowledged that there was a great inconsistency between Russian words and deeds, but he was confident that war would not be declared against Russia on account of Khiva or Bokhara, although he thought that the papers anticipated a collision of some kind.

The "Turkestan Gazette" recommending the strengthening of the Russian position on the east coast of the Caspian, said that no regard should be paid to what England would say or Persia would think. The English would in no case cross the Hindu-Kush. She is, moreover, weak

Abstract
No. VI.
16 June 1869.

Abstract
No. VIII.
16th July 1869.

Abstract No. X.
30th July 1869.
Moscow Gazette on debate in the House of Representatives.
No. XVI.
24 December 1869.

No. XVII.

Abstract
No. XXI.
21/1/70.

Abstract
No. XXVII.
8th April 1870

Abstract
No. XXIX.
22 April 1870.

Abstract
No. XXXIX.
11 November 1870.
Europeiski Vestnik.
"New step into Central Asia."
Abstract
No. XXXIX.

occupied with the danger she sees menacing her on the side of Eastern Turkestan and Cashmere, and Persia will appreciate the benefit of a secure northern frontier.

Abstract
No. XLII.
16 December
1870.

The "Turkestan Gazette," endeavouring to stimulate the Russian Government to action in the direction of Kashgar, said (9-21st October), alluding to England:—"This nation knows that commercial impotence goes hand in hand with political power. 'Dieu et mon droit' is the proud motto of our rivals: it vexes us, it makes us envious. England never cedes any of her rights, never draws back a step. *This universal nation of shopkeepers has spread her colonies all over the world, and now seeks to establish a trade route to Yarkand, where our interests should alone predominate. Yet the boastful exclamation that England is monopolising the Yarkand market does not disturb the peace. What would be the effect of such words as Russia has monopolised the markets of Cabul and Herat?*"

Abstract
No. XLVIII.
24 February
1871.

The "Exchange Gazette" had no faith in the opinions of the English papers. The "Times," for instance, which is considered a fifth estate, while her correspondents are in a manner diplomatic agents, is as constantly changing its tone and opinions, its convictions, sympathies, and antipathies. It had said that a collision between England and Russia in Central Asia was inevitable, and it had contradicted itself by saying such a thing was not to be thought of. The "Times" announced that Prince Gorchakof's note (on the Black Sea question) had produced a great agitation in India, and went off into a pathetic tone, assuming next one of menacing prophecy. Its threats and arguments were perfectly illogical.

Abstract
No. XLIX.
10 March
1871.

With reference to the London conference and to Prince Gorchakof's note on the Black Sea Treaty, the "Golos" said:—

"Although the signatory powers reserved to themselves a perfect freedom in the consideration of the question at the conference, yet they had no inclination to make it a cause of open rupture, and indeed they could not help conforming their views with the announcement made by Prince Gorchakoff *since* Sir Andrew Buchanan had reported to his Government that the Emperor's decision was irrevocable."

Abstract
no. XXVI.
24 December
1872.

The "Exchange Gazette" referring to the article in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg* of the 4-16th December, in which the views of the Russian Government with regard to Khiva were set forth, observes that if Russians chose to operate in Central Asia they could do greater things than merely seize Khiva. "A single division of Russian troops could freely march from Teheran in Persia to the Indus, and from thence through Turkestan, Mongolia, and Manchuria, and occupy half of China. The Russians were glad to receive England's acknowledgement of her incapability of aiding and defending Khiva. But that very acknowledgement was an insult to Russia. The reception of the Khivan envoy by Lord Northbrook was an insult to Russia, and the English Viceroy's refusal to grant the assistance craved by the Khan of Khiva was expected to be taken as a service rendered to Russia, which was also offensive."

The "Russian" does not disguise the fact that the Russian proximity to the British possessions in Asia will be an enormous advantage to Russia. England has been Russia's most bitter enemy, she has always circulated reports in Europe which have been damaging to Russia. When the two powers are contumacious the English will doubtless prove to be the best friend of Russia and will give up intriguing. Then all in Asia that does not belong to England will be Russian and *vice versa*.

Abstract
no. XXX.
30 December
1872.

The same Gazette was confident that the difficulties raised by the Khivan question would be removed after the expected explanations in Parliament, for the "Times" which was the first to heat a retreat after the newspaper attack on Russia, had expressed itself in the most assuaging terms.

Abstract
no. XXXII.
14 February
1873.

The "Moscow Gazette" commenting on the "Times" articles, said, "We know very well how the English Government manages to refer to the pressure of public opinion in justification of its proceedings. If Russia had resolutely declined to enter into negotiations on the subject of her proceedings in Central Asia, and if she had found it necessary for some reason to adopt measures against Afghanistan as well as against Khiva, even then England would not have made up her mind to go to war and all the agitation would have subsided, leaving no traces, just as the agitation subsided which had been created by the Polish campaign."

Saying that Russia was determined to remain mistress of her own affairs England would have calmly returned to her own, and she will, perhaps, be more careful, a little more reserved in her future relations with Russia. That the English will take measures of precaution against Russian advances, and that too, in a very short time, is a matter of certainty.

Various Russian papers at this period observed that the English press had evidently arrived at the conclusion that the Russians were not to be interfered with in Central Asia, and that accordingly Russia was left free to act as she pleased. The "Exchange Gazette" observed, "There will soon be no cover laid for Great Britain at the banquet table of nations."

Abstract
No. XXXIII.
21st February
1873.

The "Exchange Gazette" observed that the British Government gave Russia full liberty of action and encouragement to elastic the Khans of Central Asia. It did not apprehend any serious opposition in Parliament to the late Government on the question of the negotiation with the Russian cabinet, which was about to be raised: this was inferred from the natural disinclination of Englishmen to re-open questions which had been once settled, as well as from the character of the English policy for the last few years.

Abstract
No. XXXVI.
16th March

The "Exchange Gazette" said that England's interference in the affairs of a great and independent power like Russia was an insult to a nationality which is not easily forgotten.

The Afghans may one day be tempted to invade the invitingly rich country on the south and recover the Punjab and Cashmere, they will never see anything to covet on the north, but Russia will never ally herself with Mahomedans to snatch a country from the hands of Christians, although she may have to remind England of her engagement and insist on her not disturbing the tranquillity of a neighbour whom she has herself imposed upon Russia.

The "Moscow Gazette" referring to the debate in the House of Commons on the Central Asian question, observed the question of frontiers was not the main point, the obligations in which it was sought to entangle Russia were of greater significance, England is always pursuing a course which leads to diplomatic campaigns, and she will always be addressing notes and remonstrances to the Russian Government, placing Russia in the position of a minor whose every action needs questioning and controlling.

Abstract
No. XXXV
14th March
1873.

The "Moscow Gazette" saw with satisfaction that Mr. Gladstone's explanations in Parliament had assuaged the feelings of the public and had even approached the press. "The English are much more troubled by Russia's acquisition of the markets of Central Asia than with fears on account of India," but even on account of true England was not likely to wage war.

Abstract
No. LI.
13th May
1873.

The "Exchange Gazette" observed that the visiting of the Emperor of Germany to Russia had very much influenced the leading British journal, which came to the conclusion that only by some extraordinary combination of circumstances could Russia be injured or Germany disturbed, and that Russia might therefore be allowed to annex Khanat after Khanat in Central Asia.

Abstract
No. LII
May 1873.

Writing on the subject of the change of Government in England, and on the different lines of policy of the Liberal and Conservative parties, the Russian "Exchange Gazette" observed, a short time ago:—

"Three years ago, when, in consequence of a note written by Prince Gorchakof, a conference was held in London on the question of the Black Sea Treaty, the Tories and their organs were strenuously opposed to any violation of the Treaty of 1856 by Russia, and insisted on a declaration of war in case any attempt were made by Russia to convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake. Mr. Gladstone, however, paid no regard to the warlike outbursts of his political opponents, knowing that they were merely traps laid to divert him from his programme of action. The embarrassing conditions of the treaty were annulled. England did not declare war against Russia, and the Tories were disappointed in their expectations, although they recompensed themselves by crying out against the cowardly conduct of the Whig Cabinet. The Central Asia question and the Khivan expedition served as pretexts for attacks on the Government. The Tories trumpeted forth the Russian designs of conquest, a contemplated invasion of India, and the approaching contest between the two Colossi at the foot of the Himalayas. The expedition to Khiva was made out to be a first attempt against the British dominions; the Tories insisted that Russia entertained a scheme for depriving England of a profitable trade and of concentrating it in her own hand. These patriotic arguments obtained a success among Russophobists, and produced a certain effect among commercial classes, but Gladstone's Government, rising above party interests, did not declare war against Russia, and its policy met with the approval of the public. The Tories will now hardly be in a position to carry out their warlike views in conducting their foreign policy. A lengthened period of peace has produced such beneficial effects that the English people cannot approve a policy of interference in foreign affairs, and if Disraeli pursues an opposite course the days of his rule will soon be numbered. It cannot, on the whole, be said that the Conservative party has shown moderation in the advantages it has so far secured through its victory."

Abstract
No. XLIV
27th March
1874.

This article is written in an ironical tone, and implies throughout that, by a careful and judicious study of the state of parties and of public opinion in England, Russia is enabled to pursue a most advantageous policy with regard to England, and always to act opportunely.

Referring to the letter of a London correspondent of a German paper, in which it is stated that notwithstanding the Royal marriage there is a great objection raised in India and in England, the consequent spread of Russian influence in society, and that danger is apprehended from the spreading of Russian influence in Afghanistan and in the adjacent petty states; the "Exchange Gazette" of April 1874 expresses a disbelief in these statements, being of opinion that in India, as well as in England, there is full confidence in the establishment of the best of feelings between England and Russia, as a result of the recent matrimonial alliance.

Exchange
Gazette.
April 1874

April 29, 1874.

ROBERT MICHELL.

APPENDIX VII.

COPY of a MAHOMEDAN PROPHECY, in which implicit faith is placed by Mahomedans in India. Received 21st May 1862.

TRANSLATION of the latter part of the PREDICTIONS of NEEAHMUT-TOOLLA-SHAH, whose Mausoleum is in Cashmere.

"When that King is dead and gone, in his house a fracture (rupture) will take place."

(and)

"The Clan of Sikhs will exercise over Mahomedans great tyranny and oppression.

"For forty years this tyranny and heresy will remain."

"After this the whole empire of Hindoostan will be seized by the Nazarene." (Christians or English).

"For the space of one hundred years, their sovereignty will remain in Hindoostan."

"When in their time, heresy and tyranny shall become general." (i.e. pass into usage).

(Then)

"For their assassination Shah Ghurbee (i.e. the King, of or from the West) shall appear."

"Between these two will be fought desperate battles."

"And without doubt, great numbers will be slain by them."

"By the strength of the Crescented sword (H-Zor-i-Teg-i-Jeh-hud). The King of the West will be victorious.

(Then)

"Without doubt the followers of the Clan of Jesus (i.e. the English) will be broken, discomfited, and dispersed."

"Then for forty years the Moslem power shall be triumphant and supreme."

"After this period Anti-Christ shall be born in Isphahan."

"Hear what I am going to say about the destruction of the followers of Anti-Christ."

"For this purpose Jesus and the last of the Apostles, Meh-Jee, will appear."

"It was the year 570 of the Hegira when I said and predicted this, and all this will happen in the year of the Hegira 1280,* when Shah Ghurbee (i.e. the Western King) and the Nazarene (i.e. English) will meet and fight. All this became known to Shah Neeahmut-toolah by inspiration. That which he has foretold will certainly (without doubt) come to pass."

(Translated by J. Fred. Hoggson, Lieut. and Passed Interpreter, H.M. Bengal Army.)

* According to Mr. James Prinsep's tables, A.D. 1280, will commence on the 18th of June 1863, and consequently if the predictions are then to be fulfilled their fulfilment will have to be calculated from June-July 1862.

The alleged author of this prophecy, named Neeah-Mut-toolah Shah, was also the author of various commentaries on Mahomedan works, including I believe the Koran. I have heard of his works and writings, but the prophecy is the only part of them I have as yet seen.

The printed copy of the prophecy was published at Delhi at the press of Synd Jumel-ool-deen and its extensive circulation was effected by its being shipped in as a supplement to the numerous native newspapers published at Delhi, but how many months or years previous to the month of 1827 it is impossible to say. But if the printer is alive, and can be found, information on this subject might be drawn from him.

The accomplishment of that part of the prophecy which predicts the downfall of the Sikhs would seem to have given very considerable weight to the latter part of the prophecy which concerns us English. The house of Timour no doubt had a good deal to say to the printing and circulation of the prophecy, and through the influence of the late Kings of Delhi it must have found its way into Afghanistan and Persia, and the Furra-ool-shah Nawab (Tuffusar-ool-Hosain Khan) no doubt carried a copy with him to Mecca. This prophecy, in the hands of able men (Mahomedans) well versed in intrigue, is likely to do an immense amount of mischief in British India. The Crescentade, which is held out as a bait to the turbulent Mahomedan population of India, is of itself sufficient to account for the present throbbings of the Mahomedan pulse, which, recently received from Mecca from rebel chiefs to the *naifal* (i.e. Mahomedans) in the Delhi district has considerably accelerated, besides these letters, seditious papers have, to the best of my information, been put in circulation, and affairs have been so far matured that the 29th of May current, (the festival of the Bakra Reed, I believe) has been fixed on at the station of Karnal for bloodshed and murder. This may not now take place, but I think from the pointed allusion made to assassination in the so-called prophecy, that secret assassination by means of poison will be resorted to, and if the conspiracy extends over the country, which is by no means improbable, the food of the European troops would be impured with it. I have no direct evidence that such will be the case, but I should not be surprised if it was, and as the poisoning system will be adhered to for some time to come, careful supervision of food becomes necessary.

The sulphate of copper is a favourite poison in the Delhi district, it kills by causing violent purging and vomiting, somewhat like cholera, and as Delhi is the Indian head quarters of the present movement, it is probable that this variety of poison would be employed.

All this may appear extraneous matter, but it is intimately connected with the working of the prophecy, the great object being to fasten into the native mind, that the approach of the Western Moslem (Ghurbee Shah) will be followed by the rise of the Crescent and the downfall of the Cross. Ghurbee Shah is to overcome us by fair means, and Shah Ghurbee, i.e. the religious leader, is to accomplish his part by foul means or assassination.

ANOTHER VERSION OF NEEAHMUT-TOOLA-SHAH PREDICTIONS.

True, I say, a King will be born,
 His name will be Shah Teymoor ;
 His heir and successor will be Meeran Shah ;
 On his death Boo-Saeed will be King,
 After him, again, Omar Sheik will rule,
 Who will be succeeded by Baber Shah on the throne of Cabul.
 At Delhi Sekandar (Pattan) will be King,
 Who will be succeeded by Ibraheem Shah,
 And troubles will arise in his reign.
 Then Hoomayoon Shah will be King ;
 Sher Shah (Pattan) will drive him from Dehli.
 He (Hoomayoon) will take refuge at the Court of Persia ;
 The King of Persia will receive him kindly.
 Hoomayoon will return from Persia, slay Sher Shah,
 And resume the government of Hindoostan.
 Hoomayoon will be succeeded by Shah-Jehan-Geer,
 On whose death Shah Jehan will be King ;
 Who will be succeeded by his son Allum Geer,
 In whose reign people will suffer, and his rule upset.
 May be water and bread will not be procurable,
 Mankind will be in great tribulation,
 And fire like the plant (Moosterree) will rain on earth.
 Truth will cease, falsehood and deceit will increase,
 Friends will become enemies and doubts will arise.
 He (Allum Geer) will rule more than 30 years and less than 40,
 Till the birth of his younger son,
 Who will make a noise in the world,
 And oppress the nations (obscure).
 His death will be decreed by heaven,
 And Shah Moozum will be his successor ;
 Tranquillity will follow his reign,
 He will encourage learning and be merciful on his people.
 In this manner will he rule for some years,
 And finally become small die, and another be born (obscure),
 Who will be the means of restoring order in the world.
 Grief will leave the world and contentment reign.
 This will continue for 21 years.
 On his death his great (handsome) son will appear,
 Nadir will come from Persia and sit on the throne,
 And his sword will perpetrate the Delhi massacre.
 On his death there will be dissension in his house,
 The Seiks will then conquer the Mahomedans.
 For 40 years this evil will continue.
 After this the Christians will take the whole of India.
 Their rule (reign) will last 100 years ;
 But open injustice and evil deeds take place during their rule.
 The Western King will appear to slay them.
 Between them a great battle will be fought,
 And without doubt very many will be killed.
 The Western King will conquer with the " earnest "
 Sword, (N.H. The word *jehed* may mean " sword of religious war.")
 Without doubt the followers of Jesus will be defeated.
 Islam will then have the upper hand in India for 40 years.
 After this " Dejal " will appear in Espahan.
 To drive him away listen to what I say.
 Jesus will come and Mehdi, and the end of time will be at hand.
 This poetic prophecy was written in the year 570 Heejra.
 And will come to pass in the year 1280 Heejra.
 These things were revealed to Namut-Alla.
 And they will surely come to pass on men.

(True translation.)

H. MOORE, Capt.

Simla, 20th June 1862.

Persian Interpreter to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

LETTER FROM MECCA circulated throughout INDIA, 28th May 1862.

In the name of God the merciful, &c. &c. Letter of advice or admonition from the Prophet, & whom prayers, &c. &c.

This is a letter of advice from the Prophet. O Mussulmans listen to it with the ears of attention be strong in the faith with steadfast hearts, and bind on the shield of action that the Almighty God may have mercy on you. And I, the slave Sheik Saleh, the son of Sheik Achmed, a servant in the Haram (Temple) of the accepted Prophet, was reading the holy Koran, on the evening of Friday at midnight, no one was near me, when the Prophet Sallam appeared and sat on the right side and spoke thus:—"O, Sheik Saleh, do you know anything about my disciples or not?" We were engaged in this sorrowful discourse when suddenly from above came a cry, "O, Mohamed Sallam, make known to your thoughtless followers that between this Friday and the next, 70,000 faithless men are dead, and owing to their sins are captives under the wrath and displeasure of God, because they give not what is due to their fathers, mothers, and spiritual teachers, and follow not the precept of respect; they are constantly accusing and abusing, and have recourse to false witnesses, and play at cards, chess and dice, and pass their time in evil deeds; they show no inclination for prayer, fasting, and charity; they are usurers, wine-bibbers, and fornicators; they aid the wine-drinkers and publicans and associate with thieves, and know not the right from the wrong. Oh, Sheik Saleh, before this two letters of advice were sent, but they paid no attention to them, nor did they act upon them. Therefore I was ashamed in the presence of the Almighty, who said, 'Oh, Mohamed Sallam, the sin of indifference is heavy on your followers, nor do they follow the precepts of the Koran, and having taken bribes distress the minds of the people; they are usurers and drink wine; they abuse and falsely accuse men, and appear themselves as well-wishers and cause themselves to be honoured among men (by deceit), and having forgotten God and the Prophet have become blasphemers, neither do they pray or fast, nor do they fear the wrath of God; therefore will I bring an affliction against them.' Then Nebee Sallam said, 'O, merciful and forgiving Lord, by thy mercy there is protection in this life and after death salvation. Thy slaves are weak and helpless, and call themselves my disciples, show mercy to them and look not upon them with anger. I admonish and send letters of advice, that having heard they may fear and take the straight road and be far removed from evil deeds, and having repented of their sins become pure that they may die in the faith and enter Paradise. O Lord, so may it be. It is known from trustworthy books on visions that the holy Prophet went towards Hell, and what should he see but men and women burning there like dried wood, and Hell was crowded, but the women were more numerous than the men.' Then the Prophet Sallam, being moved to tears, asked Gabriel why the women were more numerous than the men. Gabriel replied, 'Women are deceitful and full of tricks, and with long tongues oppose (confront) their husbands; they oppose their orders and know not the unity of God, but the contrary, and teach men the same (false doctrine), neither do they pray nor fast and know not how to keep or break the marriage contract, and having learned the words of religion teach them not to others; for these reasons many women are captives in Hell, and unto the last day will their number exceed that of the men. And in 1203 (Hejra) a famine was sent; many people perished thereby. In 1206 cholera appeared in certain cities. In 1230 sudden deaths occurred. In 1240, for the second time, a great dearth occurred and many perished. In this manner visitations follow one another. In 1279 (H.) many human beings and demons will come to destruction.' And the Prophet Sallam asked Gabriel, 'How often will thou descend from heaven upon earth?' Gabriel replied, 'I will come five times. The first I will take away all blessings. The second I will take away all shame. The third I will take away all love and affection from the hearts of men. The fourth I will take away all taste for food and drink. The fifth time I will take all learning from the learned; and after this, in the last day, Ecnam Meldee will appear and with him men (?),* and the Lord Jesus having come will slay the men.' O, Sheik Saleh, tell my people to practice good deeds, to fear the end and repent, for (now) the door of repentance is open, but once it is closed repentance and good deeds will be of no avail. The world is a trustatory one, waste not your dear lives needlessly and spend not your days in sinful deeds; and having heard this letter of advice satisfy the poor and the mendicants, and to the orphans and those in need give the means of livelihood; leave them not in want, but aid the brothers in the faith for the work of God that He may befriend and assist you. Read this letter of advice publicly for three days in every place in order that the sin of carelessness may be removed from your hearts, and bring thus directed you may get into the right path; and on the fourth day send it from city to city, from country to country, and from village to village that every Mussulman, both man and woman, may be enlightened." After this, he said, my eyes were opened. By God! this is all true, and whoever will copy this and will send it from country to country and from city to city will drink the cup of "coward." Sheik Saleh said, if he has concocted this letter of advice himself may his face be blackened before the world and in a religious sense also.

* *Djal*, which means the great Antichrist.

This letter of admonition (advice or warning) was translated from the Arabic into Persian and then into Hindee, in order that all might understand. If anyone doubts this then he is a Kafir (infidel), the Lord deliver us from such. Give concord, O Lord Almighty, to all Musulmans, men and women. Amen, O God of all! The end of this letter of advice, printed at the Mahommedan press, in the city of Bombay, by desire of Mymen Soomar Patel, Hajee Soliman, and Moosa Kazi on the fourth of the month of Ramzan 1278,* on Thursday.

(True translation.)

(Signed) H. Moore, Captain.

Simlah, 28th May 1862.

Persian Interpreter to H.E. the Commander-in-Chief in India.

APPENDIX VIII.

AREA AND POPULATION OF THE TURKESTAN PROVINCE, FROM MATERIALS COLLECTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE STATISTICAL COMMITTEE OF TURKESTAN, 1872.

The Russian province of Turkestan embraces 300,000 square miles, and has a population of above (inclusive of troops).

The area and population of each of the three divisions of the province are shown as follows:—

	Area.	Population.
	Square Miles.	
Semirechensk region	143,220	
Syr-Daria ditto	181,629	
Zarafshan district	11,016	

The density of the population varies very much in the different parts of the province; thus, in the Semirechensk region, there are on an average 4 inhabitants to each square mile, and in the Syr-Daria region 4·5, whilst in the Zarafshan district there are 41 inhabitants to the square mile. The average proportion of inhabitants to each square mile of the area of the entire province is taken at 4,390.

The proportion varies considerably in the different districts of the Semirechensk and Syr-Daria regions, as shown in the following table,—

Semirechensk Region.

Isayk-Kul district	2,571 inhabitants per square mile.
Kopul	8 " "

Syr-Daria Region.

Jizakh district	2·4 inhabitants per square mile.
Karuma district (With Tashkend)	21·4 " "

The density of the population and the prosperity of the people in the Zarafshan district are commensurate with the fertility of the Zarafshan valley.

The nomads form 77 per cent. of the bulk of the entire population of the province; they range over the whole of the Semirechensk region and over the four northern districts of the Syr-Daria region.

The settled inhabitants of the Semirechensk region are almost exclusively Russians, with the addition of a small number of Chinese immigrants, of Sarts, and of Tartars.

The Russian residents in the province number about 30,000 individuals, exclusive of the military forces.

The most numerous race in the province are the Kirghizes, and their kin the Kara-Kirghizes; these compose about two-thirds of the entire population.

After them come the Sarts, who are a cross between the Toork, Uzbeks, and Tadjiks; these number over 125,000. They are chiefly town residents and tradespeople. The Tadjiks and Galcha (Tadjika of the hills) are a race of Iranian descent, the real aborigines of the country; they are above 70,000 in number. The Uzbeks, about 55,000, are mostly a settled people. Besides these there are in the province about 3,530 Turcomans, an indefinite number of Tartars, locally called Nagai, scattered throughout the province, and, in the towns, a certain proportion of Persians, Jews, Hindoos, and others.

Russian settlers are constantly increasing in numbers in the Semirechensk region, and so rapidly that the authorities have barely time to apportion them with lands as they arrive. New colonies are established every year. These incomers are mostly little Russians from Voronej, and Siberian peasants. Beyond the Semirechensk region, south-eastwards, Russian agricultural settlements have not yet extended.

The population of Tashkend (Asiatic and Russian quarters), according to a census taken in 1871, is 78,165, exclusive of Russian Troops.

In the Russian quarter there are 2,073 inhabitants, of whom,—

1,271 are of the orthodox Russian faith,
442 Mahomedans,
178 Jews,
104 Protestants, and
78 Catholics;

Classified according to nationalities, these are,—

1,289 Russians.
318 Sarts.
114 Kirghizes.
110 Germans.
98 Tartars.
10 Jews.
18 Poles, &c.

About 66 per cent. of these are of ages between 20 and 40. 55 per cent. are military and civil officers. The number of dwelling-houses and buildings in the Russian quarter is 468.

The population of the Asiatic part of Tashkend, or of Tashkend Proper, is 76,092, made up of—

Sarts (74,800).
Tartars (about 600).
Kirghizes (over 250).
Jews (over 200).
Hindoos (about 600).

The number of dwellings is 1,326. Courts and Serais 345, Meajids 255, Medressas (schools). The number of shops in the great bazaar is 3,330.

The following items of revenue of the Russian province of Turkestan, for the year 1870, are borrowed from the Cash Account of the Turkestan Treasury :—

a. Various imposts,—	R.	Cop.
For right of trade - - - - -	48,558	76
Excise on wines and brandy - - - - -	203,626	35½
" " tobacco - - - - -	4,097	0
Customs dues - - - - -	88	2¼
Stamps - - - - -	14,855	16
Chancery charges, &c. - - - - -	2,020	98
Fines, &c. - - - - -	838	62
Accidental receipts - - - - -	115,489	46
Return for various outlays - - - - -	14,726	19
b. From State properties,—		
From working of mines, &c. - - - - -	159	79½
	404,470	52½
<i>2. Credited to Ministry of Interior.</i>		
Post and telegraph charges - - - - -	42,024	25½
<i>3. Credited to Ministry of Justice.</i>		
Under various heads - - - - -	447	2¼
<i>4. Credited to Ministry for War.</i>		
a. From various departments of the military service - - - - -	19,581	26½
b. From sale of stores, &c. - - - - -	3,218	47
c. Various assessments and accidental receipts - - - - -	1,898,547	72
Transfer from the Zarafshan region in aid of the Treasury - - - - -	14,399	31½
Credited to Ministries of State Appanages and of Imperial Control - - - - -	88	65
Total amount of Revenue - - - - -	Roubles	2,382,777 22¼*

For the year 1872, the estimate of revenue from imposts and taxes is about Roubles 1,337,463, made up thus,—

	R.
1. From nomads, at the rate of R. 2. 75 on every tent (209,776 tents) - - - - -	576,864
2. Land taxes (tanap and herdj) - - - - -	402,497
3. Zeket from Asiatics - - - - -	240,278
4. Charges, at 25 copecks on each, of 105,048 tents of nomads of Semirechensk region, in lieu of tribute in kind; at 75 copecks on 104,728 nomad tents, and 68,864 settlements, in the Syr-Darian region - - - - -	156,456
5. Poll tax from 570 artificers, clerks, and petty traders in Semirechensk, at R. 2. 40 - - - - -	1,368
	Roubles 1,377,463

This is an increase of R. 70,000 on the income from the same sources in the year 1871, attributable to charges on 7,000 more tents and dwellings than last year, and to a higher rate of land-tax imposed on the settled population of the Syr-Darian region.

ROBERT MICHELL.

* In the "Turkestan Gazette," from which this is taken, the total is erroneously given as R. 2,407,002. 50.

APPENDIX IX.

A PRIVATE MEMORANDUM ON ADEN, written by the late VICEROY OF INDIA on board the "Foroze," in December 1868.

Having, in company with Lord Napier, made a pretty close inspection of the peninsula of Aden,* I am anxious to give you my impression as to the present state of this important position.

* We reached Aden on the 8th of December 1867, and spent the whole of that and the following day in walking over the fortifications of Aden. Lord Mayo was presented with an address, and met with a most cordial and gratifying reception from the inhabitants of Aden. After our interesting visit of two days we continued our voyage to Bombay.—O.T.B.

Ras Morbut Battery.

Immediately on landing we visited the Mole Battery, an open stonework, low, and said to be unable to resist any fire from ships.

We then went on to the Ras Morbut Fort. It is near the Residency, and is supposed to command a portion of the entrance to the harbour. This fort is constructed on defective principles. It is commanded by a rocky knob called the Flagstaff Redoubt, which, though now scarpaced, is supposed to be so dangerous that orders have been given to take all stone that is wanted from thence in the hope of levelling it altogether. It is very uncertain whether it would stand the concussion of its own guns, much less that of any artillery suited to cope with an armour-plated ship. The casemates are so hot that no European soldier could live in it in summer. The five shells would have to be placed between the men's beds; and a 9-inch shell fired from an enemy's ship would knock the whole thing to pieces.

Steamer Point Battery.

The stone battery at Steamer Point, which is armed with 110-pound Armstrongs, is also of very doubtful strength; in fact, I do not believe that there is a single stone fort on the Peninsula from which with safety could be fired a 9-inch rifled gun.

The entrance to the harbour at Steamer Point is about 6,500 yards wide, with deep water close up to the opposite Arabian shore, and consequently a vessel could run up out of the five of any battery which could be constructed at Aden. Little Aden, on the other side of the harbour, is a position of great importance. It is like the Peninsula of Aden itself,—a rocky basaltic hill. It would be most formidable were it to fall into any hands but our own. Negotiations are at present on foot for immediately acquiring possession of this point, and Sir E. Russell anticipates that they will soon be brought to a successful close. The Arab chief, who is the nominal owner of it, is willing to sell it, and the price has been already agreed upon; but the Sultan of Lahej and another Chief are supposed to have a certain lien upon it, and the Shaikh who is the principal owner cannot properly dispose of it until the claims of the others are discharged. Sir E. Russell, however, hopes that in a very few weeks this matter will be satisfactorily settled.*

* The matter is now satisfactorily settled. The purchase of Little Aden was completed on 2nd April 1869 for £80,000, and the Sultan of Lahej has waived all pretension or claim to it. *Vide Government of India Despatch, No. 172 of 2nd October 1872 (Political).*—O.T.B.

There is at present an enormous store of coal accumulated by the Peninsular and Oriental Company. I believe this quantity to be greatly in excess of what is usual in consequence of the unexpected close of the Abyssinian war.

In the evening we visited the Isthmus position and saw the large tanks placed within our defence wall which are just finished to receive the new supply of water. This is to be brought from Sheikh Othman, a distance of six miles, in a conduit made of bricks and cement. I understand the supply from this source will probably be considerable. I fear, however, that the water is very brackish, and it is supposed that as the source is more largely drawn upon its quality will not improve. The water supply of Aden has become a very serious question. The population, civil and military, has now risen to upwards of 30,000 souls, and the sole means by which really sweet water can be supplied is by condensers, which can only produce a limited quantity, and are worked at a very great cost owing to the high price of coal.

The Turks long ago constructed in the hills near the continent splendid tanks, which we have restored, for catching all the rain water that falls; but rain comes so seldom in these latitudes that it is not to be depended upon; and though the tanks have been restored for some few years, they have never yet been completely filled. They are at present empty, but a good heavy shower would replenish them in a very few hours.*

* When we were at Aden the natives spread about a story that the visit of the Lord Sahib was to bring great luck in rain, and curiously enough, soon after our departure heavy rain unexpectedly fell after an inter-emption of three years, and filled the tanks.—O.T.B.

I am in great hopes, however, that a project will be rapidly matured which will have the effect of bringing to the peninsula an ample supply of good water.

It is said that at a distance of 30 miles, at a place called Zaida, there exists a never-failing spring of excellent quality. It has never yet been visited by a European, but a portion of it

has been already brought by the Chief of Lahaj to Hota, which is not more than 14 miles from where the Sheikh Othman supply commences. The Sultan of Lahaj, who receives Rs. 12,000 a year from us, is, in addition to receive 1,200 a year more as his share of the profits of the Sheikh Othman water. General Russell says that the Sultan of Lahaj is perfectly willing to make a further arrangement about this spring, and though there are many points upon which we are not fully informed, both as to the quantity and the quality of the water, and as to the payments that would have to be made to some of the other Chiefs, I think that the difficulties can be easily surmounted, and that for a small annual payment and an outlay on works of 70,000*l.* or 80,000*l.*, an ample supply of fresh water could possibly be brought to Aden, and, being raised into a large pond or tank by steam power, could be distributed over the whole peninsula by gravitation. A quantity of iron pipes used in the Abyssinian Expedition, some of which are actually here, could easily be made available for this purpose. Captain Moekler, the Third Assistant here, has seen and tasted this Zuhā water near Hota, but it is not yet known what quantity this spring would afford. It is hoped however that before January all these points will be settled, and that it will be found that a work of comparatively small magnitude would supply the whole of the peninsula. With such an increasing commercial population there would be no difficulty in raising funds for this object, and the whole thing ought to be done without imposing any permanent charge upon the revenue of India. Our officers complain very much of the excessive cost of water, and say that in some instances they pay as much as 50 rupees a month for the quantity above their allowance which they are obliged to take for the ordinary purposes of life.

The demand on the part of the shipping must eventually be very large, and I consider that by judicious arrangements the support of the Aden troops, which will have to be increased and better paid, the cost of the police of the peninsula, and of several much wanted works of improvement for the benefit of the civil population, could, if supplemented by a small municipal tax, be before long defrayed by a moderate water rate.

I think, however, that it is most desirable that Aden should remain a free port. Our object is to attract thither the trade of the neighbouring seas, and to give such facilities for coaling and watering ships that no rival establishment could be created by any other Power except at enormous sacrifice and expense.

On the 9th December we inspected the works in the neighbourhood of the cantonment. We rode up the high promontory of Ras Marsing, overlooking Fisherman's Bay, where the lighthouse is placed. There are no military works on this height, and the bay which lies immediately underneath is supposed to be the weak part of the Aden position, as there is a broad strand on which troops could land, and a pathway over a rocky ridge leading into the cantonment which is used daily by the fishermen. This pathway could be easily ascended by an invading force. It could, however, be scarped without much difficulty. We then descended and rode along the causeway which connects the island of Seera with the peninsula and up to the circular fort on the top of the cliff. This work is perfectly useless. It is only a target for an enemy's ship. It is known to be unable to stand the fire of its own 56-pounders, and if it was thought desirable to arm the position with heavy guns, the first act of a wise engineer would be to level the work and place the guns on a platform upon a solid rock. A small battery has lately been constructed at the end of the causeway and at the foot of the ascent to the summit of Seera. It is unarm'd, but it is admitted by the engineers to be placed in the only position in which its guns would be perfectly useless for defending the entrance to the bay and the front of the cantonment. Its guns must all point straight out to sea. This work is also supposed to be in a most insecure state, as its foundation facing the sea is constructed of dry masonry, without any mortar or cement. It will probably settle its own fate by crumbling into the sea at the first storm.

We visited the hospital and barracks, which are excellent. The dormitories for the European troops are all on the upper story, and seem to be constructed on the most approved principles. A large airy verandah runs around each building, and everything appears to be done to make the men comfortable and healthy. The quarters for the married men are also very good.

I observed with great pleasure that a very considerable market has sprung up in the town of Aden. As we drove in this morning we saw long lines of camels and donkeys coming in from the desert loaded with firewood, a few rough vegetables, and other things. This only requires to be developed to create in a very few years a regular supply of many of the necessaries of life. The conclusions I have come to with regard to Aden are shortly these:—

* So insecure are some of the fortifications believed to be that the gunners are afraid to fire the guns. The large Armstrong guns sent from England cannot be mounted on account of their weight, and are lying on the sea bench. The Engineers of Aden made a slight mistake in composing the mortar of the fortifications with sea-water, which decomposes and helps it to crumble away.—O. T. B.

3. That the cheapest and most effective mode of defence would be by iron-plated monitors carrying the heaviest artillery that can be constructed, with some very large guns placed on sand batteries or on Moneiff's gun-carriages.†

4. That as a very large development of trade, and consequent increase of the population is certain to occur, the question of the water supply must be immediately faced, and means taken to procure at once a quantity sufficient for the wants of the population of 40,000 people.

† It is believed that two monitors are now stationed at Aden.—O. T. B.

* This was done some months afterwards, viz., 5. That the position of Little Aden ought to be acquired with as little delay as possible.*

6. That provision will have to be made at no distant time for locating a large labouring population on the Isthmus outside the military defences.

7. That a railway, materials for which are almost on the spot, should be made from the cantonment and Isthmus position to Steamer Point. This would render the defence of Aden possible by a comparatively small number of troops.

8. That as the Suez Canal promises to be completed so soon, and it is impossible to estimate the effect it will have in bringing large numbers of trading steamers and of armed European vessels to these waters, there is no time for delay. If Aden is to be maintained at all, an adequate defence and a certain supply of water ought to be provided at once. It might, however, be sufficient for the present to consider only the defences of Steamer Point, the stores of coal, and the defence of the entrance to the harbour, as it would be easy to cut off that portion of the position from the remainder of the Peninsula. There would thus be no inducement to a hostile power to attack the cantonment and the Isthmus position, which, without the coal depôts and the harbour, have no commercial or political importance.

9. Complaints are constantly being made of the want of a supply of vegetables sufficient for health. The Aden troops are now suffering severely from scurvy, said to be caused by the want of vegetable diet. Every exertion should be made to induce the Arabs to cultivate, and they are already beginning to do so to some extent at Hota.

Sir Edward Russell, who seems a very able and energetic officer, and Captain Goodfellow, his assistant, a man of great experience and a first rate Arabic scholar, appeared to regret very much that the visits to the chiefs on the coast, which used to be performed by him in company with Sir W. Coghlan and others, have been discontinued. Since the Indian Navy has been abolished there are no means of conveyance for this purpose. It is said that the chiefs are beginning to think that they are neglected, and stories are industriously circulated among them of our intention to abandon Aden altogether.

This is part of the same question that we discussed at the India Office a few days before I left, and I sincerely hope that in any arrangement that may be made with regard to maritime affairs in the Gulf and the Arabian waters, that provision will be made to enable our resident at Aden and his assistants to return to those friendly visits to the chiefs on the coast which have always been productive of so much good.

(Signed) MAVO.

India Office, 5th November 1873.

India Office,
30th April 1874. }

(True copies.)
O. T. B.

